The  Gift  of  Beatrix  Farrand 

to  the  General  Library 

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THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  •    BOSTON  •   CHICAGO  •   DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •    SAN   FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •   BOMBAY  •   CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd, 

TORONTO 


THE 

NEW   JAPANESE 

PERIL 


BY 

SIDNEY  OSBORNE 

Author  of**Th»  Problem  of  Japan"  and  "Th*  Isolation  of  Japan'A 


^im  1  nrfe 
THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1921 

All  rigtUs  reserved 


Add  t©  Lib. 


)  o  o  I 

-'     i   ■  y    * 


FOREWORD 

The  following  pages  are  intended  to  bring  the 
discussion  of  the  Japanese  question,  begun  by  the 
writer  in  The  Problem  of  Japan  (1918)  and  con- 
tinued in  The  Isolation  of  Japan  (191 9),  down  to 
date. 

While  it  is,  perhaps,  difficult  for  those  who  have 
made  a  study  of  Far  Eastern  questions  to  pre- 
serve a  non-partisan  and  impartial  attitude,  par- 
ticularly where,  as  in  the  present  discussion,  the 
future  supremacy  of  the  white  races  is  shown  to 
be  endangered,  the  author  has  endeavoured  to  re- 
tain as  objective  a  point  of  view  as  is  consistent 
with  his  natural  feelings  as  a  member  of  the 
Western  family  of  nations  against  whom  the  new 
Japanese  peril  may  come  to  be  directed. 

The  reader  is  warned  that  in  presenting  his 
views,  as  herein  set  forth,  the  author  makes  no 
claim  to  consistency  in  his  treatment  of  various 
aspects  of  the  subjects  discussed.  Such  a  thing 
as  consistency  would,  in  this  relation,  be  impos- 
sible, for  the  reason  that  the  writer  endeavours  to 
picture  future  developments  from  at  least  more 
than  one  standpoint.  Particularly  in  his  pres- 
entation of  the  problems  and  tendencies  that  are 


9i0 


vi         THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

involved  in  the  proposed  renewal  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Treaty  of  Alliance,  -the  author  has 
attempted  to  discuss  the  probable  consequences 
in  relation  to  each  turn  of  events  and  in  conjunc- 
tion with  each  new  set  of  circumstances.  For 
example,  the  question  of  whether  Great  Britain 
favours  a  renewal  of  the  Treaty  depends  on  world 
conditions  which  are  changing,  and  what  her 
ultimate  decision  in  the  matter  will  be  depends  on 
the  world  situation  at  the  very  moment  she  is 
called  upon  to  make  her  choice.  Similarly, 
Japan's  attitude  towards  Britain  depends  upon 
factors  which  are  constantly  subject  to  change. 

Accordingly,  it  has  been  the  writer's  purpose 
to  pursue  no  dogmatic  view  of  the  probable  course 
of  events,  but  rather  to  present  varying  phases  with 
their  probable  consequences,  and,  most  important 
of  all,  to  awaken  new  trains  of  thought  in  the 
reader's  mind  on  this  most  important  of  subjects. 

In  order  that  there  should  be  no  menace  to  the 
peace  of  the  world  arising  out  of  Japan's  policy 
in  the  Far  East,  it  would  be  necessary  for  her  to 
reverse  her  policy  and  go  in  the  opposite  direction. 
Does  anyone  believe  she  will  do  it?  If  she  will 
not,  and  continues  to  advance  in  the  direction  she 
is  moving,  then  the  Far  Eastern  question  bids 
fair  to  grow  into  a  menace  that  will  include  the 
whole  world  within  its  orbit. 

Reliance  on  treaties  there  can  be  none,  nor  in 
the  principle  of  peaceful  development.     The  fight 


FOREWORD  vii 

of  the  peoples  for  freedom,  democracy  and  the 
rights  of  nations  has  not  yet  been  won.  Those 
rights  will  still  have  to  be  defended  in  the  Pacific. 

Much  encouragement  has  been  derived  by  the 
writer  in  his  present  task  out  of  the  fact  that  many 
of  the  views  expressed  by  him,  in  the  former 
publications  above  referred  to,  have  been  justified 
by  subsequent  events.  Indeed,  the  swiftness  with 
which  epoch-making  transactions  have  followed 
upon  one  another  has  made  the  art  of  forecast 
an  unusually  diflScult  one.  It  is  unfortunate  that 
it  is  not  possessed  to  a  greater  degree  by  the 
statesmen  who  now  pretend  to  govern  us.  What 
is  needed  is  some  of  the  prescience  of  a  Disraeli, 
who  in  1879  v/rote  the  Marquis  of  Salisbury  a 
letter  in  which  he  gave  utterance  to  the  prediction, 
startling  for  that  time,  that  England,  under  cer- 
tain conditions,  would  some  day  be  fighting  by 
the  side  of  Russia  and  France  against  the  Central 
Powers.  That  was  a  long  look  ahead,  and  re- 
markable by  reason  of  the  fact  that  British  policy 
had  been  particularly  anti-Russian  during  Dis- 
raeli's premiership  and  so  remained  down  to  the 
Entente  of  1907. 

In  this,  the  greatest  crisis  of  affairs  in  history, 
Western  civilization  might  yet  be  saved  by  a 
statesman  with  the  genius  and  imagination  of 
a  Disraeli  or  a  Lincoln.  Some  magic  touch  is 
needed  to  electrify  the  world — to  convey  to  it  an 
interpretation  of  the  mysterious  messages  spoken 


viS       THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

in  an  unknown  tongue  with  which  the  entire  at- 
mosphere of  the  East  is  laden,  and  to  make  vivid, 
as  a  flash  of  lightning,  the  meaning  of  a  distant 
and  gathering  sound  that  approaches  with  the 
steadiness  and  imiformity  of  a  caravan  moving 
in  the  solitary  wastes  of  the  desert — a  sound  of  the 
measured  tramp  of  feet  and  of  the  rumbUng  thun- 
der of  heavy  gims. 


CONTENTS 

PAGS 

Foreword •    .    .    .  v 

CHAPTER 

I.  Japan  Develops  Her  Far  Eastern  Programme  i 
II.  Developments    Down    to    the    Cessation    of 

Hostilities lO 

III.  Three  Factors  of  Danger  for  Japan    ...  17 

IV.  Policies  of  Japan  and  England  Compared     .  26 
V.  Some  Possible  Future  Combinations.     ...  35 

VI.  Japan's  Modern  World  Diplomacy     .    •    .    .  45 

VII.  The  Questions  of  Race  Equality  and  Shantung  54 

VIII.  The  Shantung  Question 64 

IX.  The  Shantung  Question  and  Other  Corrupt- 
ing Evils 73 

X.  Japanese  Expansion 83 

XI.  A  Chino- Japanese  Union 93 

XII.  Britain's  Change  of  Policy  in  Asia  ....  105 

XIII.  The  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance   .' 117 

XIV.  The  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance 128 

XV.  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance — the  Japanese  Peril  141 

XVI.  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance — the  Japanese  Peril  153 

XVII.  China  and  the  Western  Powers 164 

XVIII.  America  Faces  the  New  World  Situation     .  175 


The  New  Japanese  Peril 

CHAPTER  ONE 

JAPAN    DEVELOPS    HER    FAR    EASTERN    PROGRAMME 

Nothing  could  have  been  more  opportune  for 
Japan  than  the  outbreak  of  the  great  European 
War.  After  having  successfully  fought  two  wars 
within  a  decade,  whereby  she  had  managed  to 
assert  in  the  one  her  superiority  over  another 
branch  of  the  Yellow  Race  and  in  the  other  her 
ability  to  stand  up  against  and  finally  vanquish, 
in  one  of  the  most  sanguinary  wars  in  history,  a 
very  prominent  member  of  the  European  Concert 
of  the  white  nations,  Japan  found  herself  a  decade 
later  still  struggling  painfully  to  overcome  her 
most  formidable  handicap  as  a  nation,  namely, 
her  financial  situation  as  a  debtor  nation,  with 
difficulty  in  making  both  ends  meet  and  forced  to 
ask  new  loans  of  Western  creditors. 

The  fundamental  problem  for  Japan  had  been 
to  increase  her  imports  above  her  exports.  For 
in  raw  materials,  having  little  coal  and  less  iron, 


8  THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

the  two  elements  upon  which  all  modem  industry 
chiefly  rests,  Japan's  progress  and  expansion  de- 
pended for  a  very  large  part  upon  her  ability  to 
control  sufficiently  large  sources  of  these  supplies. 

Not  having  them  at  home,  they  must  be  sought 
upon  the  mainland.  Rival  nations  must  be  pre- 
vented from  anticipating  Japan's  wishes  and  thus 
staying  her  development. 

The  first  step,  therefore,  was  to  secure  a  right 
to  intervene  in  China,  a  right  which  some  of  the 
Western  nations,  with  much  less  excuse,  had 
already  assumed  for  themselves,  in  defiance  in 
some  cases  of  China's  assertion  of  her  inalienable 
rights  of  sovereignty. 

The  second  step  was  taken  in  the  war  with 
Russia,  which  was  fought  primarily  to  free  Japan 
from  the  too  close  proximity  of  a  formidable  rival 
who  might  seize  for  herself  the  very  things  Japan 
so  greatly  coveted,  and  of  which  she  had  so  much 
need. 

Of  a  sudden,  in  August  1914,  came  the  great 
boon  for  the  Island  Empire,  still  struggling  to  con- 
solidate her  position  on  the  mainland,  in  Korea 
and  Manchuria,  and  still  intriguing  to  extend  her 
privileges  and  claims  over  other  domains  of  the 
Chinese,  in  the  same  manner  as  she  had  made 
Korea  and  South  Manchuria  subservient  to  her 
wishes.  The  European  War  seemed  destined,  in 
large  measure,  not  only  to  solve  Japan's  pressing 
financial  problems,  but  likewise  to  make  easy, 


JAPAN'S  FAR  EASTERN  PROGRAMME    3 

while  her  Western  rivals  were  engaged  in  butcher- 
ing one  another,  Japan's  intervention  policies  on 
the  mainland. 

The  writer  has  already  in  two  publications  from 
his  pen  (The  Problem  of  Japan  and  The  Isolation 
of  Japan)  described  the  process  by  which  Japan, 
during  the  course  of  the  war,  succeeded  in  attain- 
ing to  a  very  large  measure  of  her  projected  de- 
signs, namely,  the  hegemony  of  the  Yellow  Race 
and  a  controlling  voice  in  the  future  destinies  of 
the  Far  East.  And  yet  the  sudden  ending  of  the 
war  in  November  191 8,  with  the  totally  unexpected 
and  imwished-for  capitulation  of  the  Central 
Powers,  put  Japan  in  a  position  that  was  not 
entirely  free  from  embarrassment. 

Japan's  statesmen  had  reckoned  that  the  war 
would  end  either  in  a  draw  or,  at  the  very  least, 
in  an  indecisive  victory  for  the  Western  Powers 
which  would  leave  Germany  still  master  of  her 
fate.  In  such  an  event  it  was  felt  that  Japan's 
r61e  at  the  ensuing  Peace  Conference  would  be 
almost  that  of  an  umpire,  and  that  her  prestige 
and  influence  would,  in  this  fact,  reach  such  a 
height  that  all  resistance  to  her  demands  to  con- 
trol the  future  fate  of  China  and  the  Far  East 
would  be  lightly  swept  aside. 

The  lightning-like  succession  of  events,  how- 
ever, which  brought  about  the  complete  collapse 
of  the  Central  Powers  now  threatened  to  upset 
entirely  Japan's  well-devised  plans  and  even  to 


4  THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

put  her  position  as  a  Great  Power  to  the  proof, 
for  England  and  America  were  now  to  be  the 
dictators  of  the  Peace,  and  between  them  possessed 
the  argument  of  irresistible  force  and  power  with 
which  to  give  weight  to  their  wishes.  Moreover 
each  of  these  nations  (too  loyal  to  the  European 
contest  to  engage  themselves  elsewhere)  was 
smarting  under  the  consciousness  that  they  had 
upon  more  than  one  occasion  been  compelled  to 
yield  to  the  arrogant  claims  and  demands  of  Japan 
in  the  Far  East  and  to  accept  at  her  hands  a  policy 
which  was  in  flagrant  derogation  of  their  own 
interests. 

It  would  have  been  better  for  Japan  had  she 
remembered  that  Britain  never  forgets  nor  for- 
gives a  slight  or  trespass  against  her  Imperial 
prestige.  When  the  time  comes  to  settle  accounts, 
Japan  will  find  that  England  has  not  forgotten 
how  the  Land  of  the  Rising  Sun  took  advantage 
of  her  engagements  elsewhere  to  undermine  her 
national  and  economic  interests  in  China.  Nor 
will  England  hesitate  to  remind  Japan  that  she, 
Britain's  ally,  had  permitted  a  bitter  press  cam- 
paign to  be  conducted  against  the  British  partner 
of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance,  at  one  of  the  most 
critical  moments  of  the  entire  war,  when  the  AUies 
were  being  violently  attacked  in  the  West  and  the 
Russians  were  falling  back  in  the  East  (Verdun — 
first  half  of  1916).  The  check  everywhere  to  the 
British  arms — at  Gallipoli,  in  Mesopotamia,  and 


JAPAN'S  FAR  EASTERN  PROGRAMME    5 

in  the  naval  battle  at  Jutland — came  In  for  a 
severe  scoring  at  the  hands  of  the  wily  Nipponese, 
whereas  the  great  achievements  of  the  German 
arms  were  correspondingly  exalted  and  the  latter's 
spirit  held  to  be  above  all  praise.  Indeed,  a  part 
of  the  Japanese  press  even  went  so  far  as  to  suggest 
that  the  time  had  at  last  come  for  Japan  boldly 
to  denounce  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance,  or  at 
least  to  demand  its  revision.  That  these  recrim- 
inations are  not  to  be  attributed  to  the  emana- 
tions of  merely  irresponsible  organs  of  public 
opinion,  uncontrolled  by  the  public  authorities,  is 
plain,  for  it  is  a  fact  that  the  newspapers  in  Japan, 
as  in  no  other  country,  are  entirely  subservient 
to  the  Government,  particularly  when  questions 
of  foreign  policy  are  mooted,  and  in  this  in- 
stance the  press  of  the  seat  of  Government, 
Tokio,  with  hardly  an  exception,  joined  in  the 
hue  and  cry. 

For  many  months  this  agitation  continued,  and 
only  ceased  when  the  danger  of  a  German  break- 
through at  Verdim  had  been  overcome  and  Eng- 
land once  more  felt  herself  strong  enough  to  lodge 
a  protest,  in  vigorous  language,  with  Baron  Ishii, 
the  Japanese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  That 
this  was  a  serious  attempt  to  bring  about  the 
abrogation  of  the  Alliance  when  it  had  more  than 
half  of  its  duration  yet  to  run  and  in  war-time, 
in  direct  violation  of  the  explicit  terms  of  the 
Treaty,  there  can  be  no  doubt.    And  what  made 


6         THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

the  thing  especially  galling  to  the  British  Imperial- 
ist was  the  fact  that  this  Japanese  agitation  was  a 
demonstration  to  the  world  that  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Japanese  the  English  were  not  doing  par- 
ticularly well  in  the  war,  and  that  therefore  Japan 
could  do  better  for  herself  in  China  if  no  agree- 
ment existed. 

In  reality,  all  of  this  agitation  was  put  up  as 
a  screen  to  cover  a  bad  case  of  troubled  conscience. 
For,  at  the  very  time  this  press  campaign  against 
Japan^s  ally  was  going  on,  Japanese  statesmen 
were  negotiating  a  secret  treaty  with  Russia, 
which  was  intended  to,  and  does  in  effect,  nullify 
the  Anglo- Japanese  Agreement.  It  will  be  re- 
membered that  the  Anglo- Japanese  Treaty  of 
Alliance  was  first  entered  into  in  1902,  and  re- 
newed with  modifications  in  1905  and  191 1,  the 
last  time  for  a  period  of  ten  years.  The  renewal 
in  1 91 1  was  for  England  no  longer  a  matter  of  the 
far-reaching  importance  which  the  earlier  agree- 
ments had  possessed,  for  the  reason  that  England 
had  already,  in  1907,  come  to  an  understanding 
with  Russia  over  nearly  all  existing  matters  of 
difference,  and  from  thenceforth  directed  her 
diplomacy  towards  checking  the  advance  of  Ger- 
many. Russia  and  France  were  no  longer  her 
antagonists  in  Asia  and  in  Africa.  Britain,  that 
up  to  1904  had  been  working  hand-in-glove  with 
Germany  against  France  in  Morocco  and  with 
Germany  against  Russia  in  Persia,  now  abandoned 


JAPAN'S  FAR  JASTERN  PROGRAMME  7 

her  former  associate,  and  in  exchange  for  a  free 
hand  in  Egypt,  granted  by  France,  and  a  sphere  of 
influence  in  Persia,  granted  by  Russia,  composed 
all  differences  with  Russia  and  France,  and  entered 
upon  an  entirely  new  diplomatic  course  which 
culminated  in  the  outbreak  of  the  great  European 
War.  The  prior  crisis  in  affairs  in  1911,  ending 
in  a  Conference  of  the  Powers  at  Algeciras,  and 
the  two  Balkan  Wars  of  191 2  and  1913  were  but 
preludes  to  the  enactment  of  the  much  greater 
drama  upon  which  the  curtain  was  to  rise  in 
August  1 914. 

Now,  then,  the  point  we  wish  to  make  Is  that 
the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  was  directed,  so  far 
as  both  England  and  Japan  were  concerned, 
against  the  aggressions  of  Russia  in  Asia.  Eng- 
land feared  for  India  and  Japan  feared  for  China 
and  for  her  position  of  strength  generally  in  the 
Far  East.  But  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
the  Japanese  position  towards  Russia  rapidly 
changed,  and  they  composed  many  of  their  dif- 
ferences and  arranged  a  working  partnership  of  the 
two  nations  in  the  Far  East  by  the  secret  treaties 
of  1907,  1910,  1912.  They  had  been  driven  into 
each  other's  arms  primarily  by  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  towards  the  policy  of  the  '*Open 
Door**  in  China  and  particularly  in  Manchuria, 
where  the  former  enemies,  Russia  and  Japan, 
had  mapped  out  ''spheres  of  influence"  for  them- 
selves along  the  lines  of  the  South  Manchurian 


8         THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

Railway  to  the  harbours  of  Port  Arthur  and 
Dahiy.  In  other  words,  Japan  and  Russia  felt 
themselves  compelled  to  display  a  united  front 
against  the  insistent  demands  of  the  United 
States  for  the  application  of  the  policy  of  the 
'*Open  Door*'  and  equal  opportunities  for  trade 
in  China  and  Manchuria. 

In  spite  of  Japan's  growing  enthusiasm  for 
Russia,  however,  the  Anglo- Japanese  AlKance  was 
still  a  vital  factor  in  world  affairs  at  the  time  of 
the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War,  and  so  remained, 
even  in  the  eyes  of  Japanese  statesmen,  down  to 
the  summer  of  191 6,  when  at  last  Japan  began  to 
feel  herself  strong  enough  to  cut  the  painter  that 
tied  her  to  England  and  tie  up  to  her  new  ally, 
Russia.  The  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance,  which  had 
been  entered  into  for  the  purpose  of  putting  a  check 
on  Russian  aggression  in  Asia,  was  now  to  be  re- 
placed by  the  Russo-Japanese  Alliance,  which  in 
effect  declared  China  to  be  the  concern  of  these 
two  Powers,  and  of  these  two  Powers  alone.  It 
was  Japan's  first  great  step  in  the  direction  of  en- 
forcing her  new  programme,  so  providentially 
favoured  by  the  European  War,  of  ''Asia  for  the 
Asiatics."  For  Russia,  like  Japan,  is  a  truly 
Asiatic  Power,  and  is  so  regarded  by  all  Asiatics. 
Japan's  second  and  equally  important  step  in  the 
same  direction  was  made  when  she  succeeded,  in 
1 91 7,  in  winning  over  the  United  States  to  the 
recognition  of  her  ''special  interests"  in  China, 


JAPAN'S  FAR  EASTERN  PROGRAMME  9 

upon  the  occasion  of  the  Baron  Ishii  mission  to 
America. 

With  the  right  of  the  Asiatics  to  demand  from 
Europeans  and  Americans  that  they  accept  such 
a  programme  (namely,  **Asia  for  the  Asiatics**) 
we  have  no  quarrel.  It  is  solely  a  question  of  how 
the  programme  is  to  be  carried  out.  If  carried 
out  in  the  same  spirit  and  with  the  same  high 
selflessness  with  which  the  United  States  applies 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  Americas,  then  there 
is  a  great  deal  to  be  said  for  the  doctrine  of  **Asia 
for  the  Asiatics'*;  but  if  the  doctrine  is  carried 
out  in  the  manner  and  spirit  displayed  by  Japan 
towards  all  the  world  in  China,  Manchuria  and 
Korea,  and  towards  China  in  the  matter  of 
Japanese  aggressions  upon  Chinese  territorial 
integrity  and  China's  sovereign  rights  as  an 
independent  nation,  then  the  doctrine  is  an  unjust 
and  pernicious  doctrine. 


CHAPTER  TWO 

DEVELOPMENTS     DOWN     TO     THE     CESSATION     OP 
HOSTILITIES 

It  must  be  clear  to  every  thinking  American  that 
the  United  States  cannot,  without  stultifying 
itself  and  throwing  overboard  one  of  the  most 
important  planks  in  its  foreign  policy,  permit 
Japan  to  apply  the  doctrine  of  "Asia  for  the 
Asiatics"  in  disregard  and  defiance  of  the  principle 
of  the  *'Open  Door,'*  first  enunciated  by  John  Hay 
as  Secretary  of  State  in  1899,  and  later  accepted 
by  the  other  Great  Powers,  including  Japan,  in 
various  treaties  entered  into  between  those  Powers 
and  China  and  in  sundry  agreements  entered  into 
with  one  another.  But  it  is  greatly  to  be  feared 
that  this  is  precisely  the  course  that  Japan  pro- 
poses to  take  in  case  the  doctrine  comes  to  be 
generally  recognized,  or  rather,  to  express  the 
matter  more  accurately,  Japan  will  refuse  to  stop 
acting  in  disregard  and  defiance  of  the  principle  of 
the  ''Open  Door"  in  the  Far  East.  For  in  South 
Manchuria  the  '*Open  Door"  has  been  a  closed 

door  for  many  years,  due  to  the  systematic  exclu- 

10 


THE  CESSATION  OF  HOSTILITIES  11 

sion  of  all  Western  trade  competition  in  this  im- 
portant Japanese  sphere  of  influence. 

Nor  could  the  United  States  afford  to  stand  at 
one  side  and  permit  Japan  to  assail  and  to  violate 
the  sovereignty  of  China,  as  she  has  done  in  the 
matter  of  the  ** twenty-one  demands"  presented 
to  China  on  January  i8,  1915,  at  a  time  when  the 
other  Great  Powers  had  their  hands  tied  by  the 
European  War  and  were  imable  to  interfere. 

Under  these  demands  the  land  of  the  Mikado 
not  only  attempted  to  secure  from  the  Chinese 
important  politico-economic  advantages  in  Shan- 
tung, South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia, but  it  likewise  set  over  against  China  such 
demands  as,  had  they  been  granted,  would  have 
reduced  China  to  the  position  of  a  vassal  State, 
and  would  necessarily  have  put  an  end  to  any  and 
every  influence  possessed  by  the  Western  Powers 
in  the  Far  East. 

Fortunately,  diplomatic  pressure,  exerted  in  the 
nick  of  time  by  England  and  the  United  States, 
compelled  the  Government  at  Tokio  to  renounce, 
at  least  temporarily,  some  of  its  most  far-reaching 
demands.  The  Japanese  Government,  neverthe- 
less, could  be  well  satisfied  by  the  results  attained, 
for  it  secured,  after  long  negotiations,  culminating 
with  the  ultimatum  and  threatened  use  of  force 
of  May  7,  1915,  such  advantages  as  placed  it  in 
a  position  practically  to  dictate  the  future  develop- 
ment of  China  and  her  dependency  upon  Japan 


12        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

in  the  more  important  essentials  of  her  national 
life. 

;''  In  the  subsequent  agreement  that  was  signed 
between  China  and  Japan  on  the  2Sth  of  May, 
Japan  succeeded  to  the  rights  of  Germany  in 
Shantung  and  was  allowed  to  have  a  free  hand  in 
South  Manchuria.  By  these  manoeuvres  Japan 
had  managed  to  work  out  an  encircling  policy 
that  included  the  capital,  Peking,  the  province 
of  Chili  and  all  the  sea  approaches  thereto,  within 
its  grasp,  and  an  unassailable  base  from  which  to 
extend  Japanese  influence  over  further  large 
tracts  of  China,  including  the  command  of  the 
most  important  railways  and  waterways. 

Following  upon  the  imposition  of  the  greater 
part  of  the  *' twenty-one  demands''  upon  China, 
the  Government  at  Tokio  let  no  grass  grow  under 
its  feet  in  its  efforts  further  to  consolidate  its 
position.  As  already  pointed  out,  Japan  came  to 
an  understanding  with  Russia  in  1916  as  regards 
their  future  relations  in  China,  and  in  191 7  Japan 
succeeded  in  bringing  England  and  France  into 
line  with  Russia,  by  means  of  secret  treaties, 
which  guaranteed  to  Japan  the  support  of  those 
countries  with  respect  to  her  claims  as  successor 
to  Germany  in  Shantung  and  the  German  islands 
north  of  the  Equator. 

Naturally,  the  participation  of  the  United 
States  in  the  World  War,  coming  after  her  declara- 
tion of  war  against  Germany  in  April  191 7,  pro- 


THE  CESSATION  OF  HOSTILITIES   13 

vided  Japan  with  an  opportunity  of  still  further 
extending  her  sway  over  the  future  destinies  of 
China,  for  on  the  2nd  of  November  of  that  year 
Baron  Ishii  was  able  to  convince  the  American 
Government  that  it  was  no  longer  in  a  position 
to  refuse  to  recognize  the  paramount  interests  of 
Japan  in  the  Far  East,  and  accordingly,  as 
already  referred  to  in  our  first  chapter,  the 
famous  Ishii-Lansing  Agreement  was  signed,  in 
which  America  undertakes  to  recognize  Japan's 
'* special  interests''  in  China.  By  this  act  the 
United  States  formally,  albeit  in  the  camouflaged 
language  of  diplomacy,  abrogated  the  hitherto 
(next  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine)  most  dearly  prized 
plank  of  her  foreign  policy,  for,  in  spite  of  all 
attempts  subsequently  to  weaken  the  force  of  the 
concession,  it  surely  must  be  conceded  that  the 
acknowledgment  of  special  rights  in  one  nation 
is  totally  inconsistent  with  the  principle  of  the 
"Open  Door''  and  equal  opportunities  for  all 
nations.  Most  to  be  criticized  about  the  transac- 
tion is  the  fact  that  it  placed  the  United  States, 
for  the  first  time  in  its  history,  open  to  the  charge 
of  violating  without  provocation  the  sovereignty 
of  China.  For  China  had  not  been  consulted  in 
the  matter  at  all,  and  it  was  China's  sovereign 
rights  as  an  independent  nation  that  were  the 
subject-matter  of  the  Ishii-Lansing  Agreement. 

But  the  close  of  the  war  has  changed  many 
things,  and  it  is  not  alone  the  Japanese  who  are 


14        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

agitating  themselves  over  the  question:  Will  the 
United  States  continue  to  honour  its  signature  to 
a  document  that  departs  so  widely  from  the 
hitherto  recognized  principles  of  the  American 
Government?  Or  are  we  to  have  furnished  to  us 
another  example  of  the  truism  which  has  at  one 
time  or  another  been  recognized  by  all  govern- 
ments, namely,  that  conditions  may  arise  that 
make  all  agreements  between  governments  mere 
"scraps  of  paper'*? 

In  1 914,  and  within  three  months  of  the  out- 
break of  hostilities,  Japan  had  succeeded  in  ex- 
pelling the  Germans  from  Shantung  and  had 
established  herself  in  the  province  so  successfully 
that  by  the  beginning  of  1915  she  was  ready  to 
move  further  to  extend  her  control  over  China. 
In  1 91 5  she  had,  by  the  '* twenty-one  demands," 
attained  to  a  quasi-protectorate  over  China.  In 
1 916  she  had,  by  secret  treaty,  secured  the  ad- 
herence of  Russia  to  her  Chinese  programme.  In 
February-March  191 7  she  had,  by  secret  treaties, 
bound  England,  France  and  Italy  to  the  same  end, 
and  in  November  of  the  same  year  she  had  suc- 
ceeded in  committing  the  United  States  (as  in- 
dicated above)  in  support  of  her  designs. 

And  yet,  with  this  record  of  stupendous  achieve- 
ment, almost  without  a  parallel  in  history,  the 
ambitious  and  clever  statesmen  of  the  Mikado 
did  not  rest  satisfied.  The  war  was  not  yet  over, 
and  there  were  still  more  fruits  to  be  plucked. 


THE  CESSATION  OF  HOSTILITIES  15 

Accordingly,  in  1918,  using  the  situation  of  the 
Czechs  in  Siberia  as  a  pretext,  Japan  succeeded 
in  enlisting  the  aid  of  England,  America,  France 
and  Italy  in  an  expedition  to  the  mainland  for 
the  purpose,  as  it  was  alleged,  of  rescuing  the 
Czechs  from  the  Bolsheviki  and  the  Germans, 
although  the  Bolsheviki  were  at  that  time  entirely 
unorganized  and,  if  anything,  needed  protection 
from  the  Czechs,  and  the  nearest  German  troops 
were  five  thousand  miles  away.  Of  course,  Japan 
had  charge  of  the  expedition  and  furnished  the 
bulk  of  the  troops.  The  others  only  gave  colour 
to  the  undertaking.  Because  of  Japan's  para- 
mount interests  in  the  Far  East  and  her  geograph- 
ical proximity,  it  could  not  have  been  otherwise. 

To  begin  with,  Japan  dispatched  100,000  men 
to  Siberia,  which  was  just  ten  timefe  as  many  as 
she  had  proposed  to  send  when  negotiating  with 
the  other  Powers.  But  under  the  pretext  that  the 
Trans-Siberian  Railway  needed  guarding  and  that 
her  merchants  and  immigrants  in  Siberia  required 
protection,  Japan  justified  the  sending  of  so  large 
an  army  of  Japanese  troops.  To  be  sure,  it  re- 
quires little  political  insight  to  realize  that  what 
Japan  was  really  after  was  Vladivostok  and 
Russia's  Maritime  Province,  together  with  the 
expansion  of  Japanese  influence  as  far  west  as 
the  Baikal  inland  sea  in  South-eastern  Siberia.  It 
is,  therefore,  almost  impossible  to  conceive  what 
could  have  been  the  weighty  material  or  moral 


16        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

considerations  that  induced  the  statesmen  of  the 
Western  nations,  and  particularly  President  Wil- 
son, to  enter  upon  the  folly  of  this  intervention. 

With  the  settling  of  the  Japanese  in  Eastern 
Siberia,  the  last  stroke  was  given  to  the  con- 
struction of  the  imposing  edifice  of  stone  upon 
stone,  since  the  beginning  of  August  1914,  for  the 
purpose  of  attaining  a  Japanese  hegemony  in  the 
Far  East.  There  now  remained  to  give  per- 
manency to  the  structure.  It  must  be  made  un- 
assailable. And  to  this  end,  after  hostilities  came 
to  a  swift  close  in  November  1918,  the  Japanese 
directed  their  best  efforts,  realizing,  however,  that 
the  unexpected  and  to  them  unwelcome  collapse 
of  the  Central  Powers  had  created  a  new  and 
dangerous  international  situation,  in  which  Japan 
ran  great  risk  of  finding  herself  utterly  isolated, 
as  against  the  solidarity  and  overwhelming  physi- 
cal superiority  of  the  Western  victors  in  the 
World  War. 

We  shall  leave  the  consideration  of  these  new 
factors  in  the  situation  to  the  following  chapter. 


I 


CHAPTER  THREE 

THREE   FACTORS   OP  DANGER  FOR  JAPAN 

For  Japan,  one  of  the  dangers  in  the  situation 
that  arose  after  the  cessation  of  hostilities  was 
the  question  of  what  recognition  the  Powers,  and 
particularly  the  United  States,  were  going  to  ac- 
cord China  in  return  for  the  latter's  participation 
in  the  war  upon  the  invitation  and  advice  of  the 
Government  at  Washington. 

Second  in  importance  for  the  Island  Empire, 
as  a  source  of  possible  obstruction  to  its  plans, 
was  the  idealistic  programme  of  President  Wilson, 
embodied  in  his  Fourteen  Points  and  in  his  efforts 
to  establish  a  League  of  Nations. 

A  third  menace  for  Japan  lay  in  the  possibility 
of  an  Anglo-Saxon  alliance,  comprising  all  the 
English-speaking  nations,  in  which  event  England 
and  America  would  be  expected  to  adopt  a  com- 
mon programme  with  respect  to  their  interests  in 
the  Far  East. 

As  regards  the  first  factor  in  this  new  situation 
with  which  the  Government  at  Tokio  saw  itself 
confronted,  namely,  the  attitude  of  the  Powers 

17 


18        THE  NEW;  JAPANESE  PERIL 

towards  China  at  the  ensuing  Peace  Conference, 
Japan  had  already  taken  measures  to  protect 
herself  when,  as  above  pointed  out,  she  secured 
the  promise  of  England,  France  and  Italy  (Rus- 
sia's consent  had  also  been  obtained,  but  prior  to 
the  Revolution)  to  s^upport  Japan  at  the  Peace 
Conference  in  her  designs  to  control  Shantung 
and  the  German  islands  north  of  the  Equator. 
The  United  States,  alone  of  the  Great  Powers 
at  war  with  Germany,  had  not  given  its  assent 
to  the  Japanese  programme,  and  it  was  just 
the  United  States  that  had  taken  the  leading 
part  in  overcoming  the  opposition  of  Japan  to 
China's  entrance  into  the  war  on  the  side  of  the 
Allies. 

Twice  in  1 915  that  astute  statesman,  Yuan  Shi 
Kai,  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  had 
sounded  the  Allies  with  respect  to  the  possibiKty 
of  China  declaring  war  on  Germany.  Both  times 
she  was  advised  by  Great  Britain  that  her  partici- 
pation, however  desirable  from  many  standpoints, 
might  result  in  serious  complications  elsewhere. 
Clearly  enough,  what  was  meant  was  that  in  the 
event  of  Japan  not  having  her  way  in  China,  her 
defection  from  the  Allied  group  was  feared,  and 
such  a  disaster  was  certainly  not  to  be  compensated 
by  the  adherence  of  China. 

China  had  no  quarrel  with  Germany.  On  the 
contrary,  Germany,  because  of  her  almost  fault- 
less attitude  towards  China  in  the  matter  of 


THREE  FACTORS  OF  DANGER      19 

respecting  Chinese  rights  and  susceptibilities  and 
the  purely  commercial  character  of  her  occupancy 
of  Shantung  (see  the  writings  of  Stanley  Hombeck 
and  T-  P.  Millard),  was  better  liked  as  a  nation 
than  any  of  the  other  Great  Powers,  with  the 
possible  exception  of  the  United  States. 

Accordingly,  it  was  with  little  enthusiasm  that 
China  made  the  offers  above  referred  to.  Her  real 
enemy  was  Japan,  and  the  problem  was  how  to 
rescue  a  large  and  practically  defenceless  empire 
from  the  clutches  of  a  ruthless  and  ambitious 
neighbour  who  was  armed  to  the  teeth.  China 
saw  her  only  hope  in  joining  that  one  of  the  warring 
groups  who  would  be  both  willing  and  able  to 
afford  her  the  necessary  protection  and  be  just 
to  her  in  the  settlement  of  her  problems  at  the 
Peace  Conference. 

Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  striving  as  she  was  to 
keep  China  weak  and  defenceless,  an  easy  prey 
to  her  imperialistic  designs,  imderstood  China's 
purpose  only  too  well,  and  therefore  embraced 
every  means  to  frustrate  it;  and  there  is  evidence 
that  in  1916  Japan  went  so  far  in  her  opposition 
as  seriously  to  contemplate  a  break  with  her  allies 
and  adherence  to  the  cause  of  the  Central  Powers. 
And  when  the  United  States  finally  entered  the 
war,  after  first  breaking  off  diplomatic  relations 
with  Germany  in  February  191 7,  Japan  hastened 
to  secure  the  guarantees  she  felt  she  needed  from 
her   allies   and  without  which  her  position  in 


20        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

China  would  be  utterly  shaken  and  insecure.  She 
acted  promptly,  for  she  saw  clearly  what  effect 
the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  war 
would  have  upon  the  Chinese  nation.  For  the 
Chinese  regard  America  as  entirely  without  selfish 
imperialistic  aims  in  China,  and  therefore  as  a 
champion  whose  friendly  sympathies  could  be 
relied  on  to  do  justice  to  China  when  the  time 
came  for  the  settlement  of  Chinese  problems. 

Accordingly,  the  Japanese  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  when  asked  for  the  third  time  to  give  his 
consent  to  the  entrance  of  China  into  the  war, 
replied  by  pulling  out  a  drawer  in  his  desk,  in 
which  lay  a  document  which  turned  out,  upon 
examination,  to  be  the  draft  of  an  agreement  in 
which  England,  France  and  Italy  undertook  to 
support  the  Japanese  claims  at  the  Peace  Con- 
ference. The  bland  Japanese  diplomat  presented 
the  same  to  the  British  Ambassador  with  the 
remark  that  he  would  be  most  happy  to  be  of 
service,  provided  he  got  his  agreement.  And  he 
got  it.  Failing  to  secure  American  adhesion  to 
this  document,  Japanese  resourcefulness  sought 
other  means  to  attain  the  same  result,  and  ac- 
cordingly the  Baron  Ishii  mission  was  conceived, 
to  proceed  to  America  and  win  over  *'the  Yan- 
kees.** America  yielded  to  pressure  because  she 
was  enlisted  whole-heartedly  to  go  in  and  bring  the 
European  War  to  a  close,  and  she  could  not  af- 
ford to  have  an  enemy  on  her  right  flank.    Hence 


THREE  FACTORS  OP  DANGER      21 

the  Ishii-Lansing  Agreement,  with  its  recognition 
of  Japan's  ''special  interests'*  in  China. 

The  situation  at  the  close  of  the  war,  however, 
was  this:  Whatever  the  Ishii-Lansing  Agreement 
might  mean — and  there  is  a  great  difference  of 
opinion  about  that — it  was  not  to  be  expected 
that  America  would  go  the  length  of  supporting 
the  Japanese  programme  with  respect  to  Shantung. 
Japan  might  have  ** special  interests"  in  China, 
but  that  surely  did  not  mean  the  right  to  swallow 
up  whole  provinces.  And  yet,  for  reasons  which 
seem  vague  and  imsatisfactory  to  the  average 
intelligent  follower  of  events,  President  Wilson 
was  induced  to  support  the  secret  treaties  signed 
by  England,  France  and  Italy,  which  gave  Japan 
control  of  Shantung.  Secret  treaties  were  sup- 
posed to  be  anathema  to  the  President.  And, 
indeed,  the  Treaty  of  London,  which  also  under- 
took to  dispose  of  provinces  without  the  consent 
of  the  peoples  or  Governments  concerned,  has 
never  received  the  sanction  of  the  President,  and 
he  has  put  his  refusal  on  the  ground  that  it  is  a 
secret  treaty  entered  into  by  his  associates  in  the 
war  who  had  failed  to  advise — ^much  less  consult — 
him  in  the  matter.  But  if  the  Treaty  of  London 
is  bad  for  that  cause,  the  treaty  disposing  of 
Shanttmg  is  still  worse,  for  the  reason  that  the 
former  was  signed  while  America  was  stUl  a 
neutral  (April  26,  1915),  whereas  the  latter  was 
signed  after  America  had  decided  to  enter  the 


82        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

war,  namely,  after  she  had  broken  off  relations 
with  Germany. 

We  now  come  to  the  consideration  of  the 
Fourteen  Points  and  the  League  of  Nations,  which 
seemed  to  be  a  menace  to  Japanese  interests. 
Assuming  that  these  ideals  became  realized,  it 
meant  an  end  of  secret  diplomacy,  the  nullification 
of  all  secret  agreements,  universal  disarmament, 
government  by  the  consent  of  the  governed,  repre- 
sentative government  everywhere  answerable  to 
the  people,  an  end  of  autocracies  and  oligarchies, 
and  the  introduction  generally  of  a  reign  of  justice 
and  good  will  throughout  the  world.  With  such 
a  programme  even  in  prospect,  Japan  trembled  for 
her  not  easily  earned  triumphs  in  Korea,  in 
Manchuria,  in  Shantung  and  other  provinces  of 
China.  Its  realization  meant  the  end  of  Japan's 
dream  of  hegemony  in  the  Far  East.  It  meant 
that  the  rest  of  the  world  would  be  leagued  against 
her  to  maintain  the  independence  and  integrity 
of  China  and  of  Russia,  whose  Eastern  Asiatic 
provinces  Japan  coveted. 

Japan  went  to  the  Peace  Conference  and  sup- 
ported the  proposition  of  a  League  of  Nations 
with  her  tongue  in  her  cheek,  and  then  only  after 
her  territoriaJ  claims  in  China  and  elsewhere  had 
been  fully  recognized.  She  would  in  no  event  have 
supported  a  real  League  of  Nations,  but  she  felt 
that  she  could  afford  to  support  the  particular 
brand  that  was  being  offered  at  the  Peace  Con- 


THREE  FACTORS  OF  DANGER      23 

ference,  because  she  saw  that  from  the  beginning 
to  the  very  end  of  that  Conference,  and  from  the 
first  to  the  last  paragraph  of  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  adopted  by  the  Conference,  all 
the  principles  of  a  real  League  that  would  have 
been  dangerous  to  Japan  were  thrown  overboard. 
Thus,  at  the  very  outset,  the  Conference  restored 
and  even  glorified  the  supposedly  discredited  prin- 
ciple of  secret  diplomacy.  On  the  question  of 
disarmament  it  uttered  not  a  word  that  could 
cause  disquietude  to  the  smallest  State  that  had 
imperialistic  designs.  Even  the  Prince  of  Mon- 
aco, with  his  *'army"  of  fourteen  constables, 
might  safely  disregard  all  that  the  Conference  had 
to  say  on  that  subject.  The  principle  of  self- 
determination,  had  it  possessed  the  proverbial 
nine  lives  of  a  cat,  would  have  had  all  of  them 
extinguished  by  the  Conference.  And  what  was 
there  left  of  the  democratic  idea  in  the  League 
upon  whose  Supreme  Council  sat,  not  representa- 
tives of  the  peoples,  but  representatives  of  Gov- 
ernments only,  and  whose  decisions  were  subject 
to  the  veto  of  one  single  voice?  Not  to  enunciate 
in  detail  all  the  other  principles  for  which  the 
Fourteen  Points  and  the  League  were  supposed 
to  stand  sponsor,  it  is  enough  to  say  that  Japan 
sat  grimly  and  silently  by  and  saw  every  one  of 
them  violated  and  disregarded.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances it  is  not  astonishing  that  the  Japanese 
diplomats  returned  home  at  the  close  of  the  Con- 


24        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

ference  with  a  smile  upon  their  faces  that  re- 
sembled that  of  the  famous  tiger  who  took  the 
lady  from  Niger  out  for  a  ride. 

The  third  factor  of  danger  above  referred  to 
which  Japan  had  to  be  on  her  guard  against  was 
the  much-mooted  Anglo-Saxon  hegemony  of  the 
world — ^America  and  England  joining  hands  across 
the  sea.  There  was  much  to  be  said  for  the 
realization  of  such  an  alliance.  The  two  coimtries 
had  common  interests  to  protect  in  the  Far  East, 
America  and  some  of  the  British  Dominions  had 
similar  race  problems  to  solve  in  connection  with 
the  opposition  of  their  peoples  to  the  admission 
of  the  yellow  races  as  immigrants,  both  nations 
had  Far  Eastern  possessions  the  security  of  which 
was  menaced  by  the  Japanese  proclamation  of  a 
Monroe  Doctrine  for  Asia,  and  lastly,  Japan  was 
fast  reaching  the  position  of  industrial  inde- 
pendence which  would  make  her  not  only  a 
formidable  competitor  in  the  world's  markets, 
but  a  particularly  dangerous  adversary  in  the 
struggle  for  the  markets  of  China. 

But  the  idea  of  an  Anglo-Saxon  alliance  suffered 
shipwreck  on  the  rocks  of  Ireland.  No  Anglo- 
Saxon  alliance  can  ever  be  consimimated  so  long 
as  the  Irish  problem  persists  in  its  long  lease  of  life 
and  remains  an  unsolved  political  puzzle  for  the 
British  statesmen.  There  may  be  other  factors 
that  prevent  such  a  consummation;  but  they  are 
negligible  by  the  side  of  the  Irish  one.    The 


THREE  FACTORS  OF  DANGER      25 

British  themselves  are  beginning  to  realize  that 
this  is  so,  for  we  find  frequent  references  to  it  in 
those  opposite  extremes  of  British  journalism,  the 
London  Times  and  the  Daily  News.  Perhaps, 
with  a  growning  menace  of  a  Japanese  or  Yellow 
peril,  if  that  should  ever  come,  or  with  an  actual 
menace  to  her  interests  in  India  before  her  eyes, 
Britain  will  consent  to  solve  the  Irish  difficulty 
and  include  in  the  alliance  Germany  and  even 
Russia.  Indeed,  we  shall  refer  to  this  possibility 
in  a  subsequent  chapter.  For  the  present,  Japan 
feels  herself  secure  from  the  Anglo-Saxon  menace. 


CHAPTER  POUR 

POLICIES   OP  JAPAN  AND  ENGLAND  COMPARED 

In  the  shaping  of  her  foreign  policy  consequent 
upon  the  decisions  to  be  taken  at  the  Peace  Con- 
ference, Japan  had  one  final  factor  to  consider  in 
addition  to  those  of  which  mention  has  already 
been  made.  And  in  the  consideration  of  this 
final  factor  it  will  not  be  without  advantage  to 
examine  the  startling  parallel  that  exists  between 
the  foreign  policy  of  the  Island  Empire  of  Japan 
and  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Island  Empire  of  the 
United  Kingdom.  Nor  is  it  at  all  strange  when 
we  examine  into  the  reasons  for  it  that  the  foreign 
policies  of  these  two  nations,  so  widely  divergent 
in  race,  culture,  colour,  religion  and  political  his- 
tory, run  along  similar  lines. 

As  has  so  often  before  been  pointed  out  by  the 
present  writer  and  by  others,  the  geographical 
position  of  Japan  towards  the  mainland  of  Asia 
is  precisely  the  same  as  England's  situation  with 
respect  to  the  mainland  of  Europe.  Both  nations 
have  derived  a  great  part  of  their  power  and 
strength  from  the  fact  of  their  insularity.    In  the 

26 


POLICIES  COMPARED  27 

early  days  of  her  history  England  had  several 
times  suffered  invasion.  Firstly  by  the  Romans 
and  then  successively  by  the  Angles,  Saxons, 
Danes  and  finally  by  the  Normans  or  Northmen. 
The  Romans  obtained  no  permanent  footing  in 
Britain  and  finally  withdrew.  The  Angles  and 
the  Saxons,  on  the  other  hand,  established  them- 
selves and  reigned  for  centuries,  in  conflict  with 
the  native  Britons  and  the  invading  Danes.  But 
civil  war  weakening  the  solidarity  of  Anglo-Saxon 
England,  a  third  and  decisive  Danish  conquest  of  a 
house  divided  against  itself  was  accomplished  by 
William  the  Conqueror.  And  when  finally,  after 
two  centuries  of  internal  strife,  England  emerged 
under  Edward  the  First  (the  first  sovereign  since 
the  Norman  Conquest  who  bore  an  English  name) 
as  a  united  nation,  English  history  begins  to  take 
on  a  fixed  character  as  regards  resistance  to  foreign 
invasion  and  by  degrees  the  advantages  of  in- 
sularity are  impressed  upon  the  British  nation. 
England  becomes  a  great  Maritime  Power,  de- 
pendent almost  entirely  upon  her  fleet  for  protec- 
tion against  invasion,  and  develops  towards  the 
continent  of  Europe  a  policy  of  creating  a  balance 
of  power,  setting  off  one  strong  nation  or  combina- 
tion of  nations  against  another  strong  nation  or 
combination  of  nations  and  making  the  best  and 
cleverest  use  of  the  prevalent  continental  jealousies 
to  weaken  a  growing  rival.  Indeed,  since  the 
reign  of  Queen  Elizabeth  four  formidable  rivals 


28        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

to  British  world  supremacy  have  successively 
arisen — Spain,  Holland,  Prance,  Germany — and 
all  of  them,  by  the  masterfulness  of  British  diplo- 
macy, have  been  reduced  to  impotence.  The 
writer  speaks  in  no  spirit  of  condemnation.  The 
achievement  is  too  great  to  be  worthy  of  anything 
save  admiration. 

Japan,  like  England,  although  in  a  lesser  degree, 
has  suffered  from  invasions.  There  is,  however, 
this  distinctive  difference  between  the  two  cases, 
namely,  that  Japan  has  always  succeeded  in  re- 
pelling the  would-be  foreign  conqueror.  In 
A.D.  1019  the  Sushen  or  Toi — ancestors  of  the 
Manchu — ^who  in  a.d.  549  had  raided  the  island 
of  Sado,  off  the  west  coast  of  the  main  island  of 
Honshiu,  had  conquered  the  islands  of  Tsushima 
and  Iki  in  the  Korean  straits,  and  effected  a  land- 
ing on  the  northern  shores  of  Kiushiu.  They  had 
been  driven  off,  and  Iki  and  Tsushima  had  been 
reoccupied.  In  the  following  century  the  Mongol, 
Gengis  Khan  (1162-1227),  had  created  a  gigantic 
empire  between  the  Dnieper  and  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  and  his  successors  extended  his  conquests. 
One  of  them,  the  celebrated  Kublai  Khan,  a 
grandson  of  Gengis,  in  1263  subjugated  Korea, 
which  became  his  vassal  kingdom.  In  1264  he 
fixed  the  capital  of  his  empire  at  Peking  and 
aspired  to  become  the  master  of  the  whole  of  the 
rest  of  China.  In  1265  Kublai  ordered  his  vassal, 
the  Korean  King  of  Koma,  to  transport  Kublai's 


POLICIES  COMPARED  29 

envoys  to  Japan,  where  they  were,  in  effect,  to 
demand  the  submission  of  the  Japanese.  No 
answer  having  been  received  from  the  Japanese, 
Kublai  made  preparations  for  the  invasion  and 
conquest  of  Japan.  The  invasion,  begun  in 
November  1274,  was  conducted  upon  a  large 
scale  and  may  be  likened  to  the  attempted  con- 
quest of  the  Greeks  by  the  Persians  under  Darius. 
The  Japanese  put  up  the  same  desperate  resistance 
against  forces  superior  in  numbers  and  in  equip- 
ment as  had  the  ancient  Greeks  at  Marathon,  and 
with  equal  success.  Like  the  Persians  at  Mara- 
thon, the  Mongols  and  Koreans  were  forced  to  take 
to  their  ships  and  to  beat  an  ignominious  retreat, 
thus  ending  Kublai*s  first  invasion  of  the  Mikado's 
realms. 

Undiscouraged  by  his  first  failure,  Kublai  now 
made  preparations  upon  a  much  larger  scale,  and 
in  1 28 1,  collecting  a  large  fleet  of  ocean-going 
ships,  embarked  no  fewer  than  100,000  Mongols 
and  Chinese  upon  them  at  a  port  on  the  Chinese 
mainland  opposite  Formosa.  The  fleet  bearing 
this  host  was  directed  to  effect  a  junction  in  the 
Korean  straits  with  another  fleet  of  1,000  vessels, 
carrying  50,000  Mongol  and  20,000  Korean 
soldiers. 

The  details  of  the  struggle,  as  momentous  in 
world  history  as  that  of  the  Greeks  with  the  army 
and  navy  of  Xerxes,  are  unfortunately  missing. 
For  fifty-three  days,  on  land  and  sea,  the  fighting 


80        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

went  on  almost  without  Intermission.  Like  the 
ancient  Greeks,  the  Japanese  displayed  the  most 
desperate  valour,  and  although  pitted  against  a 
foe  so  superior  in  fighting  strength  and  equipment, 
did  not  confine  themselves  to  the  defensive. 
Grappling  with,  they  boarded  the  enemy's  ships, 
and  their  two-handed  swords  wrought  terrible 
execution  among  the  invaders.  Like  England  in 
1588,  in  the  struggle  with  the  Spanish  Armada, 
Japan  was  saved  by  the  elements.  A  tempest 
arose,  shattering  the  Mongol  fleet.  What  re- 
mained of  Kublai's  army  re-embarked  and  the 
second  and  last  invasion  of  Japan  was  over. 

For  centuries  Japan  was  now  enabled  to  pursue 
her  way  immolested  by  other  Powers,  with  one 
or  two  minor  interruptions  to  her  security.  In 
141 9  friendly  relations  with  China  ended  when  a 
Mongolian-Korean  fleet  attacked  Tsushima  and 
was  beaten  off  by  the  Japanese.  In  1529  there 
was  a  fresh  quarrel,  and  in  1531  a  Chinese  squad- 
ron again  appeared  off  Tsushima  and  was  again 
defeated  and  put  to  flight.  The  rest  of  the 
sixteenth  century  was  taken  up  for  the  most  part 
in  internal  strifes,  having  for  their  object  the 
unification  of  Japan  and  the  crushing  of  the  feudal 
barons  and  militant  Buddhist  monks  of  central 
and  eastern  Honshiu.  In  1592  Japan's  great 
military  leader,  Hideyoshi,  having  put  the  finishing 
touches  on  the  consolidation  of  the  Island  Empire, 
now  turned  his  thoughts  to  the  mainland  and 


\  POLICIES  COMPARED  31 

undertook  the  conquest  of  Korea  and  China. 
Had  he  not  died  in  1598,  it  is  probable  that  his 
endeavours  would  have  met  with  more  or  less 
success  in  view  of  the  initial  advantages  he  had 
already  won  in  his  campaigns  against  the  Chino- 
Korean  armies.  His  death,  however,  brought 
the  war  to  an  end:  an  armistice  was  concluded 
in  Korea  and  the  Mikado's  forces  were  soon 
afterwards  withdrawn.  Within  a  few  decades 
thereafter  took  place  the  decisive  step  (1636),  in- 
augurated by  the  Shogun  lyemitsu,  closing  Japan 
entirely  to  foreigners  with  the  exception  of  an 
occasional  Dutch  trading  ship  that  was  permitted 
to  enter  the  port  of  Nagasaki.  After  1 7  90  only  one 
Dutch  ship  a  year  was  permitted  so  to  trade,  and 
it  is  not  until  the  Restoration,  definitely  accom- 
plished in  1868,  that  Japan  once  again  formally 
resumed  relations  with  foreign  Powers. 

In  the  subsequent  years,  as  Japan,  adopting 
Western  methods,  arose  to  Imperial  greatness,  her 
foreign  policy  became  fixed  along  lines  that  were 
imposed  upon  her  by  her  history  and  by  her 
geographical  location.  Like  England  after  the 
Norman  Conquest,  Japan  had  recognized  the  ad- 
vantages of  her  insularity  in  successfully  resisting 
foreign  invasion.  Like  England,  Japan  now 
recognized  that  her  future  security  must,  in  the 
first  instance,  rest  upon  a  fleet  basis.  And  again 
like  England,  Japan  perceived  the  menace  to  her 
existence  that  might  result  by  reason   of  the 


32        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

establishment  of  a  strong  Power  opposite  to  her 
upon  the  mainland,  and  adopted  similar  measures 
to  overcome  it. 

Korea  and  the  Russian  Maritime  Province 
form  the  western  boundary  of  the  Sea  of  Japan. 
They  are  separated  from  the  Japanese  archi- 
pelago by  a  distance  across  the  Sea  of  Japan, 
at  its  narrowest  point,  no  greater  than  that  which 
separates  Antwerp  or  Rotterdam  from  the  City 
of  London.  This  stretch  of  coastland  occupies  a 
position  of  the  same  strategical  importance  with 
reference  to  Japan  that  the  mouths  of  the  Scheldt 
and  the  Rhine  do  to  England.  Korea  was  a 
vassal  State  of  China,  but  it  was  evident  to  Japan 
that  unless  she  did  something  about  the  matter 
herself,  Korea  would  inevitably  fall  an  easy  prey 
to  Russia,  in  which  event  she  would  have  at  her 
very  doors,  and  within  easy  striking  distance  of 
her  coasts,  one  of  the  most  powerful  and  mili- 
taristic nations  in  the  world.  In  February  1890 
the  Tsar  Alexander  III  had  issued  a  rescript 
authorizing  the  construction  of  a  railway  across 
Siberia.  It  was  to  be  completed  in  ten  years. 
Commenced  at  both  ends,  the  eastern  section  had 
been  opened  in  September  1893.  Unless  Japan 
speedily  became  the  suzerain  of  Korea,  she  might 
see  the  peninsula  snatched  from  her  grasp  by 
Russia.  Japan  accordingly  first  made  war  on 
China  (in  1894-5)  to  rid  Korea  of  Chinese  in- 
fluence and  to  substitute  her  own,  and  ten  years 


POLICIES  COMPARED  S3 

later  (in  1904-5)  on  Russia,  to  prevent  Russia 
from  extending  her  influence  and  sovereignty  over 
Korea.  Japan  succeeded  in  both  of  these  wars, 
and  in  19 10  annexed  Korea  out  and  out.  There 
remains  yet  the  Maritime  Province,  with  the 
great  fortified  port  of  Vladivostok.  In  Russia's 
present  internal  and  external  difficulties  Japan 
sees  an  opportunity  for  the  fulfilment  of  the  rest 
of  her  aspirations  in  this  region,  namely,  the  con- 
quest of  the  Maritime  Province  and  the  extension 
of  Japanese  influence  over  the  entire  country  in 
Siberia  east  of  Lake  Baikal. 

Thus  far  the  leading  lines  of  British  and  of 
Japanese  foreign  policy  are  identical,  and  have 
been  shaped,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  by  the  same 
general  principles — sea-power  as  the  basis  of  in- 
sular security  and  a  continental  policy  that  in- 
volves the  subjection,  by  war  or  diplomacy,  some- 
times by  means  of  both  together,  of  a  too  ambitious 
rival. 

Relying  upon  the  continued  application  of  this 
policy  by  England  after  the  close  of  the  war, 
Japanese  diplomats  reckon  as  a  factor  in  her 
future  foreign  policy  that  the  European  Con- 
tinent may  be  split  into  various  groups  and  fac- 
tions in  which,  on  the  one  hand,  a  French  group, 
inflamed  thereto  by  England,  will  persist  in  a 
policy  of  revenge  and  exhaust  themselves  in  the 
effort  to  reduce  Germany  to  utter  impotence. 
And,  on  the  other  hand,  the  various  other  con- 


84        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

tending  groups  will  split  up  or  weaken  themselves 
in  the  conflict  beyond  the  point  of  recovery. 

To  fish  in  such  troubled  waters  as  these  would 
be  easy  work  for  the  Mikado's  statesmen,  for 
Japan  has  her  own  ends  to  gain  in  the  Far  East. 
With  a  European  Continent  exhausted  and  broken 
up  into  various  warring  camps  and  the  United 
States  withdrawing  herself  in  splendid  isolation, 
Japan  would  be  courted  as  never  before.  No 
Power  or  combination  of  Powers  would  want  to 
offend  her.  Moreover,  the  possibility,  always 
present  to  the  understanding  of  European  diplo- 
mats, of  an  alliance  of  Japan  with  a  rehabilitated 
Russia  and  a  resuscitated  Germany,  makes  this 
final  factor  of  Japan's  foreign  policy  of  almost 
transcendental  importance  to  her  future  expansion 
as  a  nation. 

Indeed,  so  great  are  the  possibilities  of  new 
combinations  among  the  European  and  Asiatic 
States  which  the  recent  war  and  the  Peace 
Treaties  have  called  into  being,  that  it  may  not 
be  without  value  to  discuss  in  my  next  chapter 
some  of  the  new  alignments  of  the  Powers  that 
are  reasonably  to  be  expected  in  the  coming  days, 
if  we  leave  out  of  consideration  the  possibility  of 
America,  England,  Germany  and  Russia  joining 
with  one  another  to  preserve  the  future  peace  of 
the  world. 


CHAPTER  FIVE 

SOME  POSSIBLE   FUTURE   COMBINATIONS 

The  principal  result  of  the  World  War  thus  far 
has  been  to  secure  for  England  the  practically 
undisputed  hegemony  of  the  world.  The  United 
States  might  have  had  it  had  President  Wilson 
been  able  to  stick  to  his  original  programme  and 
the  Fourteen  Points.  But  British  diplomacy  and 
statesmanship,  made  wise  by  the  handling  of 
just  such  problems  for  centuries  past,  tmderstood 
how  to  organize  effective  opposition  to  President 
Wilson's  proposals,  and  when  the  Peace  Con- 
ference met  the  American  leader  had  not  long  to 
wait  before  he  discovered  that  his  plans  were  being 
undermined  from  every  direction.  It  was  not  a 
difficult  task  for  Britain's  trained  diplomats  to 
play  upon  French  credulity  and  French  fears  and 
to  hold  Italy  in  leading  strings  because  of  the 
latter's  financial  and  economic  dependence  upon 
England  and  her  hopes  for  securing  British  sup- 
port to  her  aspirations  in  the  settlement  of  her 
Peace  problems.  Accordingly,  in  the  face  of  the 
combined  attack  of  England,  France,  Italy  and 

35 


86        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

Japan,  President  Wilson  felt  himself  compelled 
to  sacrifice  one  after  the  other  of  his  Fourteen 
Points  in  order  to  rescue,  as  he  believed,  a  last 
remnant  of  his  great  programme,  namely,  the 
League  of  Nations,  by  whose  help  he  still  hoped  to 
eventually  carry  out  his  plans.  But  even  here 
President  Wilson  met  with  failure.  The  mandate 
idea  was  taken  over  by  England  and  cleverly 
adapted  to  suit  her  own  projects,  and  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  likewise  treated  to  a  dose  of  British 
medicine,  with  the  result  that  it  emerged  from  the 
ordeal  in  a  much  weakened  state  of  health  and 
emasculated  of  much  of  its  vigour.  Moreover, 
the  bankruptcy  of  President  Wilson's  policy  in 
Paris  had  brought  down  upon  him  the  opposition 
of  the  American  Senate  at  home,  which,  when  the 
treaty  was  presented  to  it,  refused  to  honour 
President  Wilson's  signature  thereto,  placing  its 
opposition  on  the  high  patriotic  ground  that  the 
treaty  was  a  danger  to  America  and  a  menace  to 
American  interests  throughout  the  world.  And 
accordingly,  with  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  by 
the  American  Senate,  American  foreign  policy  has 
once  more  withdrawn  itself  into  its  former  chan- 
nels, leaving  European  and  general  world  politics 
alone  and  confining  itself  to  its  narrower  com- 
mercial and  political  interests  in  the  Central  and 
South  American  States  and  in  the  Far  East. 

With  America,  the  one  Great  Power  that  might 
have  checkmated  her,  eliminated  from  the  race 


POSSIBLE  FUTURE  COMBINATIONS  37 

for  world  dominion,  England  pursued  a  course 
that  led  straight  to  her  goal.  French  aspirations 
involving  the  annexation  of  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine  were  opposed  because  this  would  have 
made  France  politically  the  dominant  factor  on 
the  Continent,  and  would,  sooner  or  later,  have 
forced  Germany  to  place  herself  under  French 
leadership,  if  she  wished  to  survive,  with  the  re- 
sult that  eventually  a  continental  block  might 
arise,  with  France  at  its  head,  to  dispute  with 
England  the  question  of  world  hegemony.  To 
prevent  this,  England  will  see  to  it  that  Germany 
is  not  too  greatly  weakened  in  comparison  with 
France  and  that  the  feeling  of  antagonism  between 
the  two  nations  is  kept  alive. 

In  the  case  of  Italy,  British  politics  required 
that  Italy  should  have  to  dance  to  the  British 
fiddle.  An  economically  and  financially  inde- 
pendent Italy  meant,  for  such  a  vital  race  as  the 
Italian,  that  in  a  few  short  decades  Italy  would 
have  attained  to  the  hegemony  over  the  Mediter- 
ranean, including  much  of  the  African  littoral. 
Already  in  North  Africa,  as  in  Tunis,  there  are 
signs  that  the  Italians,  by  reason  of  their  superior 
racial  vitality  and  a  deeper  seated  colonizing  in- 
stinct, are  crowding  out  the  French. 

Italy  had  hoped  that  a  successful  ending  of  the 
war  would  place  her  in  a  position  to  revive  the 
glories  of  the  Venetian  Republic  of  former  days, 
and  that  imdisputed  possession  of  the  Adriatic 


88        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

and  its  principal  ports  on  the  Dalmatian  shore 
would  render  her  position  in  the  Mediterranean 
impregnable  and  give  to  her  a  practical  mastery 
of  the  Levant.  But  the  Peace  Conference,  led 
by  England,  willed  it  otherwise,  and  Italy  will 
lose  the  Dalmatian  coast,  with  the  islands,  except 
Lavinia  and  Lissa,  and  she  will  have  opposed  to 
her  in  possession  of  that  coast  the  hostile  Serbo- 
Slav  State,  which,  by  retaining  places  of  such  high 
strategical  importance  as  Sebenico  and  the  strongly 
fortified  Cattaro,  is  in  a  position  to  completely 
nullify  the  value  of  the  Adriatic  to  Italy  as  a  factor 
in  her  imperialistic  plans  of  expansion. 

It  is  not  alone  that  Italy  has  been  deprived  of 
these  points  of  advantage  that  makes  the  Italian 
cup  of  disappointment  nm  over,  but  it  is  the  fact 
that  there  has  been  created  by  the  Supreme  Coun- 
cil, at  the  behest  of  England,  a  powerful  Greek 
State,  a  sort  of  Eastern  financial  agent  for  Eng- 
land, with  the  great  ports  of  Piraeus,  Salonika  and 
Smyrna,  through  which  important  currents  of 
trade  between  Asia,  Africa  and  Europe  will  flow, 
rather  than  through  the  Italian  ports  in  the 
Adriatic.  British  support  of  Greece  in  the  ex- 
pansion of  the  latter's  territory  at  the  expense  of 
Bulgaria  and  Turkey  makes  it  clear  that  Greece 
may  continue  to  rely  on  British  support  in  the 
future,  all  the  more  in  view  of  the  fact  that  it  is  the 
racially  allied  Bulgars,  Magyars  and  Turks  who 
are  the  most  severely  treated  in  the  dispensation 


POSSIBLE  FUTURE  COMBINATIONS  39 

of  the  Peace  terms  which  England  has  permitted 
the  Supreme  Council  to  hand  out.  It  is  true  that 
Italy  has  received  as  a  sop  an  economic  mandate 
over  a  part  of  the  Anatolian  coast,  but  she  has^ 
had  to  resign  herself  to  the  loss  of  Smyrna  and  the 
Dodekanese  Islands,  and  in  the  concession  to  her 
of  the  coal  mines  of  Heraklea,  the  French. are 
permitted  to  retain  a  25  per  cent,  interest. 

The  Serbo-Slav  State,  Italy's  most  formidable 
future  rival,  has  no  outlet  upon  the  -^Egaean  Sea.^ 
Its  future,  commercially,  rests  apparently  upon 
the  Adriatic.  With  the  necessary  ports  secured 
to  Serbia  upon  the  Adriatic,  a  thing  she  agitated 
for  constantly  before  the  war,  the  Serbo-Slav 
State  will  in  the  future  constitutute  a  natural  ally 
for  Greece,  and  to  this  alliance  will,  naturally,  also 
come  Rumania,  for  it  will  be  the  task  of  these 
three  States  to  hold  in  check  Hungary  and 
Bulgaria,  at  whose  expense  this  triple  alliance 
has  so  greatly  profited  by  way  of  annexation 
of  territory. 

Italy,  on  the  other  hand,  looks  to  Germany  and 
to  Russia.  Absolutely  dependent  on  England 
for  her  means  of  subsistence — coal — and  shut  off, 
if  need  be,  from  Russia's  Black  Sea  ports,  whence 
Italy  could  draw  food,  raw  materials  and  coal, 
by  reason  of  Britain's  control  of  the  Dardanelles, 
Italy  sees  herself  entirely  isolated  overseas  in  any 
future  conflict  in  which  she  has  not  England  be- 
hind her.    Accordingly,  it  is  only  common  sense 


40        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

„^-^.  ■ 

and  logic  for  Italy  to  want  to  restore  land  com- 
munications with  the  great  natural  sources  of  sup- 
ply for  her  imports  and  the  two  great  markets  for 
her  exports — Russia  and  Germany. 

One  has  only  to  think  of  the  fact  that  the 
greatest  Sea  Power  in  the  world  has  the  absolute 
control  of  every  highway  that  permits  of  passage 
in  or  out  of  the  Mediterranean  in  order  to  under- 
stand how  literally  true  it  is  that  Britain  holds 
in  her  grasp  the  continents  of  Europe,  Asia  and 
Africa.  Gibraltar,  Suez,  the  Dardanelles — these 
are  the  pillars  upon  which  Britain  has  built  up  her 
present  world  hegemony.  With  each  one  of  these 
continents  split  up  into  innumerable  cross-currents 
of  interests,  England  can  now  impose  her  will  upon 
them  all,  and  it  is  not  going  too  far  to  say  that 
henceforth,  and  so  long  as  this  hegemony  con- 
tinues, no  nation  in  the  world  may  attempt  any- 
thing that  strokes  against  the  will  or  the  interests 
of  England. 

It  is  nevertheless  true  that  there  are  elements 
of  weakness  in  Britain's  present  position  which 
are  giving  her  statesmen  a  great  deal  of  food  for 
anxious  thought.  For  example,  a  hostile  alliance 
between  Germany,  Russia  and  Japan,  between 
Germany,  Russia  and  China,  or  even  between 
Germany  and  Russia  alone  must  be  avoided  even 
at  the  price  of  making  some  important  concessions. 

A  certain  clever  German  said  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  when  he  heard  of  England's  entrance 


POSSIBLE  FUTURE  COMBINATIONS  41 

on  the  side  of  Germany's  enemies,  "O  weh,  mein 
Vaterland!  England  macht  nie  eine  falsche 
Rechnung*'  (''Alas,  my  Fatherland!  England 
never  makes  a  mistake  in  her  calculations'*). 
There  are  many  who  believe  that  England  has 
now,  for  the  first  time  in  her  history,  made  such 
a  mistake  in  occupying  the  Dardanelles  and  Con- 
stantinople.'^^  They  point  out  that  for  centuries 
Russia  has  fought  for  these  prizes  and  that  in  the 
recent  war  they  would  have  been  assured  to  her 
had  she  not  been  obliged  to  fall  away  from  her 
allies  owing  to  her  military  defeats  and  the  con- 
sequences of  her  Revolution.  But  in  opposing 
Russia  at  the  Straits  and  in  Constantinople,  Eng- 
land is  not  pursuing  a  new  line  of  policy.  It  is 
merely  Disraeli's  statesmanship  all  over  again. 
Said  Lord  Cromer,  *'Had  it  not  been  for  the 
Crimean  War,  and  the  policy  subsequently 
adopted  by  Lord  Beaconsfield's  Government,  the 
independence  of  the  Balkan  States  would  never 
have  been  achieved,  and  the  Russians  would  now 
be  in  possession  of  Constantinople." 

Prior  to  the  conquest  of  Constantinople  by  the 
Turks  in  1453,  there  were  three  great  outlets  for 
the  trade  of  Asia  into  Europe.  They  were  Con- 
stantinople, Alexandria  and  the  Syrian  coast. 
Turkey  was  a  non-commercial  Power,  and  from 
the  moment  of  her  ascendancy,  between  the  years 
1453  ^^^  1516,  Turkey  blocked  one  after  the  other 
of  the  great  trade  routes  between  East  and  West 


42        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

which  had  hitherto  been  maintained  chiefly  in 
the  interests  of  the  Western  nations  of  Europe. 
Accordingly,  the  Ottoman  conquest  of  the  Near 
East  was  one  of  the  decisive  events  in  world  his- 
tory. After  that  conquest  the  Western  world 
found  itself  compelled  to  choose  between  forgoing 
its  profits  in  trade  with  the  East,  or,  unless  it 
made  war  on  the  Turk  to  recover  possession  of  the 
trade-routes  and  trading  centres,  to  discover  a  new 
route  to  the  East  with  the  continuity  of  which  the 
Ottomans  could  not  interfere.  Europe  preferred 
the  latter  alternative,  and  hence  the  great  mari- 
time activity  displayed  at  Cadiz,  at  Bristol  and  at 
Lisbon  during  the  latter  half  of  the  fifteenth 
century.  Eventually  England,  by  her  mastery 
of  these  new  sea-routes  to  the  East,  became  the 
world's  greatest  trader  and  grasped  the  lion's 
share  in  the  overseas  trade  with  the  Orient.  Thus 
the  situation  remained  down  to  the  beginning  of 
the  present  century. 

At  about  that  time  Russia  began  extending  her 
railroads  into  the  region  of  the  Middle  East  and 
a  commencement  was  made  in  the  construction 
of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  which  was  to  have  brought 
direct  overland  connection  between  the  Persian 
Gulf  and  the  German  ports  in  the  North  Sea. 
Such  projects  as  these  threatened,  therefore,  a 
loss  to  England,  by  diversion  to  the  overland  routes 
of  a  great  part  of  her  carrying  trade  with  the  East. 
Then  came  the  World  War,  and  its  more  than  sue- 


POSSIBLE  FUTURE  COMBINATIONS  43 

cessful  conclusion  for  England  placed  her  in  the 
favourable  position  of  controlling,  for  the  first 
time  since  the  Turkish  conquest,  not  only  the 
principal  sea-routes  to  the  East,  but  the  principal 
land-routes  as  well. 

The  occupancy  of  Egypt,  with  the  great  ports 
of  Alexandria,  Port  Said  and  the  Canal,  the  con- 
trol now  exercised  over  Constantinople  and  the 
Straits,  and  the  possession  of  the  mandate  in 
Palestine,  carrying  with  it,  as  it  does,  full  sway 
over  the  transportation  lines  in  Syria,  place 
England  in  a  most  enviable  position  with  respect 
to  the  trade  of  the  Near  and  Middle  East,  for  she 
is  now  enabled  to  levy  tribute  on  pretty  nearly 
all  of  it. 

Looking  back  at  the  question  of  Syria,  one  sees 
how  completely  isolated  economically  that  country 
will  be  in  French  hands,  unless  the  French  call 
upon  and  make  use  of  British  co-operation.  Just 
as,  in  ancient  times,  goods  from  the  East  found 
their  way  to  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  thence 
by  way  of  Basra,  Bagdad  and  Damascus  to  the 
Syrian  seaboard,  so  in  the  future  trade  will  to  a 
large  extent  follow  the  same  route,  and  England 
holds  in  her  grasp  both  the  first  and  the  last  stages 
of  this  trunk  line.  The  French  in  Syria,  sand- 
wiched in  between  two  British  spheres  of  in- 
fluence, must  yield  the  palm  to  the  latter. 

The  future  position  of  France  is  in  some  doubt. 
France  may  remain  an  ally  of  England,  but,  if 


44        THE^  NEW.  JAPANESE  PERIL 

so,  it  becomes  a  rather  one-sided  arrangement, 
for  the  reason  that  England  will  take  no  chances 
of  losing  her  newly  won  position  through  taking 
sides  in  any  French  quarrel  in  which  her  own 
vital  interests  are  not  affected.  For  France,  the 
friendship  of  such  States  as  Poland  and  Czecho- 
Slavia  is  but  a  poor  substitute  for  the  loss  of  her 
great  Russian  ally.  The  fate  of  all  of  these 
newly  created  States  is  still  absolutely  uncertain. 
For  a  chauvinistic  people  like  the  Poles,  the  trials 
of  peace  will  be  more  difficult  to  overcome  than 
the  trials  of  war.  Accordingly,  with  respect  to 
the  new  States,  it  is  impossible  to  forecast  any- 
thing with  reasonable  certainty,  except  that 
things,  in  the  end,  will  probably  turn  out  quite 
differently  from  what  most  of  us  at  present  expect. 


CHAPTER  SIX 

japan's  modern  world  diplomacy 

The  American  Government  must  never  forget 
one  thing,  namely,  that  if  a  condition  can  be 
brought  about  whereby  it  were  to  lose  the  aid  and 
moral  support  of  Europe,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
if  Japan  were  to  succeed  in  freeing  herself  from 
outside  interference  or  menace — in  other  words, 
if  Japan  can  succeed  in  isolating  the  United  States 
politically — she  will  then  be  in  a  position  to  throw 
down  the  gauntlet  to  America  and  to  let  a  decision 
at  arms  determine  the  question  of  the  hegemony 
of  the  Far  East  and  the  Pacific. 

Japan  has  already  partly  consolidated  her  po- 
sition in  the  Far  East  by  establishing  her  military 
superiority  over  China  and  Russia,  and  the 
object  of  the  twenty-one  demands  imposed  on  the 
former  in  19 15  and  -of  the  secret  treaty  exacted 
from  the  latter  in  1916,  was  to  further  the  plans 
of  the  Japanese  Imperialists  directed  primarily 
against  the  United  States. 

America's  profound  interest  in  the  fate  of 
China,  consistently  recognized  by  all  American 

45 


46        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

statesmen  of  the  past  and  moulded  into  a  principle 
under  the  name  of  the  Hay  Doctrine,  had  first 
to  be  undermined  in  order  that  Japan's  para- 
mountcy  in  China  might  stand  forth  as  an  estab- 
lished fact.  Without  strife,  if  possible;  with 
strife,  if  need  be.  For,  otherwise,  how  could 
Japan,  an  industrially  backward  State  as  com- 
pared with  some  of  the  great  Western  nations, 
hope  to  compete  and  to  make  headway  in  the 
markets  of  China,  as  against  the  products  of  her 
industrially  and  commercially  superior  Western 
rivals,  except  by  having  preferential  facilities  in 
those  markets?  For,  without  such  facilities,  she 
perceived  her  own  home  industries  doomed  to 
suffer  such  a  handicap  as  would  rob  them  of  any 
prospect  of  f utvue  expansion  and  legitimate  health- 
ful growth. 

Moreover,  Japan's  new  arrangement  with  Rus- 
sia, above  referred  to,  had  likewise  for  its  object 
to  secure  the  submission  of  the  only  other  Great 
Power,  save  the  United  States,  who  might  be 
expected  ever  to  challenge  the  Japanese  claim  to 
the  hegemony  of  the  Far  East.  With  China  and 
Russia  disposed  of,  the  Mikado's  diplomats 
figured  that  they  had  in  the  future  to  wait  for 
the  right  opportunity  only,  when,  for  one  reason 
or  another,  the  United  States  would  stand  alone 
in  world  politics  and  be  left  without  friends  or 
allies  to  aid  her  in  the  supreme  contest  that  will 
then  be  unloosed  for  the  prizes  that  lie  about  the 


JAPAN'S  WORLD  DIPLOMACY       47 

shores  of  the  Pacific  waiting  for  a  world  conqueror 
to  pick  them  up. 

At  the  very  least  the  Russo-Japanese  rapproche- 
ment was  to  assure  Japan  against  an  attack  upon 
her  right  flank  in  Manchuria,  in  case  of  a  war 
with  America.  And  now  that  Russia,  since  191 7, 
has  been  eliminated,  for  the  time  being,  from  the 
international  diplomatic  chess-board,  and  her 
promises  of  191 6  are  no  longer  of  value,  Japan 
seeks  to  attain  the  same  ends  by  seizing  Russia's 
Maritime  Province  and  by  establishing  her  in- 
fluence in  Siberia  as  far  west  as  Lake  Baikal, 
under  the  pretence  of  setting  up  a  buffer  State 
in  that  region  to  protect  Japan  from  Bolshevist 
influences.  The  ruse  is,  of  course,  only  too  pal- 
pable a  one,  and  will  hardly  succeed  in  deceiving 
the  most  credulous.  The  real  purpose  is  just 
what  it  was  in  19 16,  when  Russia  was  still  a 
Great  Power  to  be  reckoned  with.  An  under- 
standing with  Russia,  which  at  that  time  could  be 
reached  by  means  of  the  pen,  must  now,  by 
reason  of  intervening  circumstances,  be  attained 
by  means  of  the  sword,  and  the  Nipponese  will 
no  doubt  succeed  in  proving,  in  this  case,  that  the 
hand  that  employed  the  one  instrument  can,  with 
equal  facility,  wield  the  other. 

To  jockey  her  allies  into  such  a  position  that 
they  would  all  have  to  assent  to  her  having  a  free 
hand  in  China  was  the  primary  object  of  Japan's 
diplomacy,  for  which  she  laboured  unceasingly 


48        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

throughout  the  war,  and  had  the  United  States 
Senate  ratified  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  thereby 
placing  the  seal  of  American  sanction  upon  the 
spoliation  of  China  in  Shantung,  Japan's  object 
would  have  been  attained  in  its  entirety, 

Russia's  precarious  position  during  the  war, 
after  the  success  of  the  great  German  offensive 
in  19 1 5,  had  forced  her  to  agree  to  all  of  Japan's 
demands.  Likewise,  Japan's  other  allies,  Eng- 
land, France  and  Italy,  were  obliged  to  sign  away 
their  freedom  of  action  in  the  determination  of 
matters  affecting  Japan's  paramount  position  in 
the  Far  East,  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  there  was 
an  ever-present  possibility  throughout  the  war 
that  they  might  need  Japan's  further  help  to  de- 
feat Germany,  and  the  fear  existed,  moreover, 
that  to  offend  Japan's  susceptibilities  might  even 
mean  the  transfer  of  her  support  from  the  side 
of  the  Allies  to  the  side  of  Germany. 

Having  successfully  navigated  her  ship  of  state 
through  the  troublous  seas  of  war  and  diplomacy 
to  the  point  we  have  indicated,  Japan  now  per- 
ceived but  one  remaining  obstacle  in  her  path- 
way, and  all  her  efforts  thenceforth  were  to  be 
directed  towards  the  removal  of  this  last  hin- 
drance to  the  attainment  of  her  supreme  desire. 

Accordingly,  upon  the  entrance  of  the  United 
States  into  the  war  the  Japanese,  partly  by  veiled 
threats  and  partly  by  painting  the  internal  situa- 
tion in  China  as  necessitating  the  strong  inter- 


JAPAN'S  WORLD  DIPLOMACY       49 

vening  hand  of  Japan,  undertook  to  gain  the  ad- 
herence of  the  United  States  to  her  policies  in 
China.  And,  indeed,  they  laboured  with  some 
success.  America,  on  the  eve  of  putting  all  her 
strength  into  the  European  contest,  felt  impelled 
to  jettison  some  of  her  cargo  in  the  Far  East, 
but  she  did  so  very  reluctantly  and  left  open  for 
herself  as  many  avenues  of  retreat  from  the  new 
course  she  was  entering  upon  as  it  was  possible 
to^do. 

Baron  Ishii,  chief  of  the  Japanese  Mission,  who 
conducted  the  negotiations  with  Secretary  Lan- 
sing, did  not  perhaps  secure  all  he  meant  to  do, 
when  he  left  Washington  with  an  agreement  in  his 
pocket  which  gave  the  formal  recognition  of  the 
United  States  to  Japan's  ''special  interests'*  in 
China.  But  what  Japan  herein  lacked  in  the 
form  of  explicit  declaration  she  more  than  made 
up  by  the  methods  with  which  the  new  agree- 
ment was  exploited  in  the  Far  East. 

China,  that  had  been,  one  might  easily  say, 
from  time  immemorial  so  staunch  a  friend  of 
America,  felt  herself  abandoned  and  betrayed. 
She  deeply  resented  this  action  of  the  United 
States,  so  gravely  affecting  her  sovereign  rights 
and  so  wotmding  to  her  pride  and  dignity  as  an 
independent  nation.  Two  nations,  one  of  them 
her  age-long  friend,  had  got  together  in  secret 
and  had  arranged  to  dispose  of  her  rights  without 
so  much  as  *'by  your  leave." 


60        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

Indeed,  had  the  internal  troubles  of  China  at 
this  time  been  less  poignant,  there  conceivably 
might  have  arisen  a  situation  whereby  the  action 
of  the  United  States  would  have  driven  China 
completely  into  the  arms  of  Germany,  whose 
ultimate  success  in  the  war  many  leading  Chinese 
regarded  as  practically  the  only  safeguard  against 
the  aggressive  aims  of  Japan,  which  were  then 
taking  on  an  ever-increasing  attitude  of  menace 
that  was  threatening  China  with  the  complete 
destruction  of  her  sovereignty  and  the  entire  loss 
of  her  independence. 

The  United  States,  particularly  through  the  in- 
fluence of  her  very  able  and  energetic  Minister  at 
Peking,  Mr.  Paul  S.  Reinsch,  was  able  in  great  part 
to  counteract  the  effect  of  this  baleful  Japanese 
propaganda,  exploiting  to  the  utmost  a  Japanese 
interpretation  of  the  far-reaching  effect  of  the 
Ishii-Lansing  Agreement,  with  the  result  that 
China  was  eventually  induced  to  enter  the  war 
on  the  side  of  the  Allies. 

When  the  Peace  Conference  met,  Japan  was 
well  aware  that  she  would  have  to  reckon  with 
no  opposition  to  her  plans  on  the  part  of  England, 
France  and  Italy.  But  she  had  still  to  reckon 
with  the  probable  opposition  of  the  United  States, 
and  the  problem  was  how  to  win  over  the  latter 
country  to  the  full  recognition  of  her  paramount 
position  in  China,  already,  as  it  was  believed, 
quite  firmly  secured  to  her  by  reason  of  the  con- 


JAPAN'S  WORLD  DIPLOMACY       51 

sent,  embodied  in  the  secret  treaties,  which  had 
been  wrung  from  Russia,  England,  France  and 
Italy  in  191 7. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  she  held  these  tramp 
cards,  Japan  recognized  that  America  was  a  factor 
that  could  not  be  left  out  of  the  calculation,  if  the 
question  was  to  be  considered  settled  for  all  time. 

Accordingly,  Japan  set  to  work,  and  soon  per- 
ceived that  she  might  hope  to  attain  her  ends  if 
the  seeds  of  dissension  could  be  sown  among  the 
members  of  the  Conference,  whereby,  in  the  midst 
of  contending  factions,  the  weight  of  her  own 
great  influence  could  always  be  thrown  in  favour 
of  those  who  stood  to  support  her  claims. 

The  decision  of  the  members  of  the  Conference, 
at  its  opening  session,  to  hold  their  meetings  be- 
hind closed  doors  was  perhaps  the  greatest  triumph 
that  could  have  been  wished  for  by  those  members 
of  the  Peace  Conference  who,  like  Japan,  had 
secret  agreements  in  their  portfolios,  and  who 
hoped  to  secure  great  advantages  for  themselves 
by  reason  of  a  lack  of  unity  among  the  conferees, 
which  secret  diplomacy  would  engender  and 
which  the  centrifugal  forces  thus  set  in  motion 
would  perpetuate. 

From  the  moment  that  the  first  point  in  Wil- 
son's programme — open  diplomacy — ^was  aban- 
doned by  its  author,  Japan's  representatives  knew 
that  her  aims  were  attainable  and  that  the  last 
hindrance  to  recognition  of  her  supremacy  in  the 


52        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

Far  East  must  dissolve,  like  the  proverbial  noon- 
day mist  before  the  sun,  under  the  influence  of 
the  poisonous  gases  of  revenge,  jealousy  and  am- 
bition which  the  close  atmosphere  of  the  secret 
Conference  Chamber  would  generate. 

The  bearing  of  the  Japanese  conferees  through- 
out the  various  sessions  of  the  Conference  was  a 
master-work  of  Eastern  finesse.  For,  beneath  the 
attitude  of  calm  and  indifference  which  Baron 
Makino  and  his  colleagues  invariably  displayed, 
there  burned  the  fires  of  intense  excitement  as 
they  followed  the  various  acts  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  great  world  drama  that  were  to 
mean  so  much  to  the  future  weal  or  woe  of  their 
Fatherland. 

When  the  Conference  opened,  the  representa- 
tives of  the  Land  of  the  Rising  Sim  saw  a  Japanese 
sky  black  with  the  threatening  clouds  that  had 
come  up  out  of  the  West.  The  Japanese  states- 
men had  come  to  Paris  in  no  confident  mood. 
But  once  the  Conference  had  committed  itself  to 
the  holding  of  secret  sessions  and  the  first  breach 
in  the  Wilson  programme  had  been  made,  like 
magic  the  menacing  portents  that  had  been 
gathering  in  the  heavens  that  surround  the  Island 
Empire  disappeared,  perhaps  never  to  return. 
At  any  rate,  such  was  the  aspect  of  affairs  as  they 
appeared  to  the  Japanese  representatives  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Conference,  and  subsequent 
events,  down  to  the  close  of  the  Conference  and 


JAPAN'S  WORLD  DIPLOMACY       53 

the  return  of  President  Wilson  to  America,  only 
confirmed  them  in  their  first  impressions. 

They  had  held  back,  and  had  waited  for  the 
right  moment  to  play  their  trump  cards.  The 
rubber  was  won  at  Paris,  but  the  game  was  lost  at 
Washington,  when  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
refused  to  endorse  the  promissory  notes  issued  at 
Versailles. 


I 


CHAPTER  SEVEN 

THE  QUESTIONS  OF  RACE  EQUALITY  AND  SHANTUNG 

On  February  13,  191 9,  the  text  of  the  first  draft 
of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  was  laid 
before  the  members  of  the  Peace  Conference  for 
discussion  and  for  the  consideration  of  any  pro- 
posed amendments  thereto. 

With  the  approval,  it  is  said,  of  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  and  of  President  Wilson,  Baron  Makino, 
head  of  the  Japanese  delegation,  had  introduced 
an-amendment  to  this  draft  whereunder  the  League 
of  Nations  covenanted  to  put  a  stop  to  the  dis- 
criminatory treatment  which  in  certain  parts  of 
the  world  was  still  being  unjustly  meted  out  to 
nations  and  to  the  individual  nationals  of  certain 
nations,  on  the  sole  basis  of  a  difference  in  race. 
Thus,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  United  States, 
like  all  the  other  Great  Powers,  has  entered  into 
treaty  relations  with  Japan  in  which  the  Japanese 
are  granted  the  privileges  of  the  most  favoured 
nation,  the  United  States  permits  discrimination 
to  be  shown  in  certain  States  of  the  West  against 
the  acquirement  of  citizenship  on  the  part  of 


RACE  EQUALITY  AND  SHANTUNG  55 

Japanese  nationals  and  against  their  ownership 
of  real  property  in  those  States.  Similar  con- 
ditions exist  in  Australasia  ^  and  in  British 
Columbia. 

Against  the  aforementioned  amendment,  intro- 
duced by  Baron  Makino,  Mr.  Charles  Hughes,  the 
Premier  of  Australia,  raised  a  loud  and  vigorous 
protesting  voice.  Among  other  powerful  argu- 
ments with  which  he  attempted  to  justify  his  op- 
position, he  insinuated  that  the  Japanese,  of  all 
peoples,  were  the  last  who  had  the  right  to  com- 
plain of  discriminatory  treatment,  in  view  of  the 
manner  in  which  they  interpreted  the  doctrine  of 
the  equality  of  races  in  their  attitude  towards  the 
Koreans  and  the  Chinese.  The  Koreans  had  been 
treated  as  an  inferior,  subject  people  and  their 
nation  had  been  robbed  of  its  independence.  The 
Chinese  were  about  to  suffer  the  same  fate  as  the 
Koreans,  unless  the  Western  nations  intervened. 
Accordingly,  argued  Mr.  Hughes,  the  Japanese 
proposal  was  purely  an  exercise  in  hypocrisy,  and 
represented  an  attempt  on  their  part  to  promote, 
by  indirect  methods,  their  real  object,  which  was  to 
secure  the  hegemony  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  If 
the  British  Dominions  and  the  United  States  were 
to  permit  unrestricted  immigration  to  those 
countries  in  compliance  with  the  Japanese  de- 
mand, they  would  simply  be  playing  the  Japanese 
game  and  promote  Japan's  hidden  designs. 

In  consequence  of  the  feelings  aroused  in  both 


56        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

the  British  and  the  American  delegations  by  rea- 
son of  Mr.  Hughes's  vigorous  onslaught,  the 
Mikado's  representatives  decided  not  to  push  the 
amendment  any  further  at  that  time  and  to  let 
the  whole  proposition  rest  until  the  return  from 
America  of  President  Wilson,  in  March,  at  which 
time  the  discussion  of  the  Covenant  and  of  any 
amendments  thereto  would  be  renewed. 

During  President  Wilson's  absence  in  America 
a  powerful  opposition  to  this  race  amendment 
clause  began  to  manifest  itself,  not  only  in  Aus- 
tralia, but  likewise  in  New  Zealand  and  in  Canada. 
And  in  the  United  States  the  fear  was  fostered 
that  consideration  of  the  race  amendment  clause 
would  result  in  dragging  the  vexatious  immigra- 
tion question  into  the  debate. 

Lord  Robert  Cecil  declared  that,  however  much 
sympathy  one  might  have  with  the  idea,  it  was 
impossible  to  include  the  principle  of  the  equality 
of  races  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 
without  interfering  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
States  affected  thereby.  Accordingly,  Japan  was 
informed  that  England  must  decline  to  support 
the  amendment. 

The  Anglo-Saxon  countries  being  united  in  their 
opposition  to  the  amendment,  the  Japanese 
delegation  now  directed  their  efforts  towards  an 
alteration  in  its  form,  so  as  to  make  the  same  a 
part  of  the  preamble  of  the  Covenant,  without 
inclusion  in  the  terms  of  the  body  of  the  instru- 


E4CE  EQUALITY  AND  SHANTUNG  .57 

I 

ment.  Moreover,  a  change  was  made  m'  the 
phraseology  of  the  text  of  the  amendment  in  its 
new  form.  Careful  avoidance  was  made  of  em- 
ploying the  word  ''race"  in  the  draft  now  pre- 
sented, and  the  principle  of  race  equality  was 
cleverly  preserved  by  the  use  of  the  following 
terms:  **by  the  maintenance  of  the  principle  of 
the  equality  of  nations  and  of  the  just  treatment 
of  their  nationals.'* 

At  the  meeting  of  the  League  of  Nations  Com- 
mittee of  the  Peace  Conference  held  on  April  ii, 
1919,  the  amendment  in  the  altered  form  above 
set  forth  was  introduced  by  Baron  Makino.  In 
the  course  of  a  well-argued  speech  supporting  the 
amendment,  he  called  particular  attention  to  the 
fact  that  it  was  the  desire  of  the  people  and  of 
the  Government  of  Japan,  most  positively  ex- 
pressed in  word  and  deed,  that  the  principle  he 
was  now  contending  for  be  given  due  recognition 
in  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations.  Both 
Baron  Makino  and  his  able  colleague,  Viscoimt 
Chinda,  addressed  the  Committee,  and  their 
eloquent  efforts  to  set  forth  the  justice  of  their 
claim  in  the  fairest  possible  light  made  a  profound 
impression  upon  their  audience.  It  may  be  easily 
imagined  that  the  impression  produced  upon  M. 
Clemenceau,  who  was  representing  France  upon 
the  Committee,  was  a  particularly  deep  one,  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  in  France  and  her  colonial 
possessions  the  immigration  problem,  as  we  know 


58        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

it,  does  not  exist  and  there  is  no  race  question 
for  them  at  all. 

The  amendment  came  to  a  vote.  Eleven 
States  supported  it,  six  States  rejected  it.  Never- 
theless, in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  amendment 
had  been  carried  by  so  large  a  majority,  President 
Wilson,  as  Chairman  of  the  Committee,  declared 
the  defeat  of  the  amendment  on  the  ground  that 
acceptance  required  a  unanimous  approval.  In 
other  words,  the  negative  vote  of  a  single  member 
of  the  Committee  could  defeat  the  amendment. 
This  decision,  although  a  purely  arbitrary  one  of 
President  Wilson,  as  was  shown  afterwards  by 
the  adoption  of  other  amendments  without  a 
unanimity  of  voices,  was  acquiesced  in  by  Japan 
when  it  was  seen  that  none  of  the  States  repre- 
sented on  the  Committee  ventured  to  enter  a 
protest. 

The  Japanese  had  met  with  a  check,  but  even 
so  their  cause  was  not  dead  yet,  and  the  situation 
for  them  was  anything  but  a  desperate  one  at 
this  stage  of  the  negotiations.  In  the  regular 
course  of  events  and  in  accordance  with  the  rules 
of  the  Conference,  the  League  of  Nations  Com- 
mittee would  have  to  report  to  the  Plenary  Ses- 
sion of  the  Peace  Conference,  as  a  committee  of 
the  whole,  and  only  by  them  could  it  be  definitively 
determined  what  the  exact  terms  of  the  new  draft 
of  the  Covenant  were  to  be.  The  Japanese  were 
in  a  position  to  plead,  not  alone  the  justice  of 


RACE  EQUALITY  AND  SHANTUNG  59 

their  claims  but  also  the  further  very  important 
fact  that  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  Com- 
mittee to  whom  the  claim  had  been  referred  had 
voted  in  favour  of  its  adoption,  and  even  their 
opponents  had  been  constrained  to  vote  as  they 
did  not  from  conviction,  but  impelled  thereto  by 
expediency — the  exigencies  of  home  politics  re- 
quired it. 

In  any  case,  the  Japanese  diplomats  had  secured 
a  strategical  advantage  of  the  first  importance, 
whereby,  if  they  saw  fit  to  pursue  the  matter  to 
its  utmost  limits,  they  would  have  behind  them 
the  moral  forces  of  the  world,  and  it  was  thereby 
made  possible  for  them  to  wreck  the  organization 
of  the  League  of  Nations  if  such  an  amendment 
as  they  were  presenting,  resting  as  it  did  upon 
incontrovertible  moral  grounds,  should  be  rejected. 

In  other  words,  the  attitude  of  certain  of  the 
Great  Powers  towards  the  Japanese  race  amend- 
ment to  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 
provided  the  Mikado's  statesmen  with  a  good 
trading  proposition,  so  that  when  the  measures  of 
really  vital  import  to  the  Island  Empire  came 
up  for  consideration  before  the  Conference,  Baron 
Makino  and  his  colleagues  could  press  for  their 
acceptance  with  less  likelihood  of  meeting  a 
rebuff.  For  when,  soon  thereafter,  the  question  of 
Shantung  came  up  for  consideration,  the  Japanese 
were  in  a  position  to  say  to  the  Conference  that 
if  it  was  immoral  and  unjust  for  Japan  to  demand 


60       THE.  NEW  JAPANESE  PEEK 

Shantung,  it  was 'equally  immoral  and' unjust  for 
the  Conference  to  require  that  Japan  give  up 
her  claim  to  the  recognition  of  race  equality. 

On  April  19th  and  the  days  following,  an  op- 
portunity was  given  both  to  the  Japanese  and  to 
the  Chinese  delegates  to  place  their  case  before 
the  Council  of  Four.  The  Chinese  delegation 
demanded  the  imconditional  return  of  the  Shan- 
ttmg  territory,  occupied  by  Japan,  to  China. 
Baron  Makino,  however,  was  only  willing  to 
promise  restoration  on  certain  conditions,  such  as 
were  embodied  in  various  secret  agreements  which 
China  had  been  compelled  to  sign  in  1915  and  in 
1 91 8.  The  Chinese  objection  to  this  proposition 
was,  of  course,  that  having  signed  the  aforesaid 
agreements  under  coercion  they  never  had  any 
validity  and  were  null  and  void. 

President  Wilson  supported  the  Chinese  con- 
tention and  pronoimced  very  strongly  in  favour 
of  a  complete  and  imconditional  withdrawal  of 
the  Japanese  from  Shantung.  The  Japanese  dele- 
gation combated  the  Chinese  contention  and  in- 
sisted that  the  agreements  in  question  "were  en- 
tirely outside  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference and  were,  therefore,  not  a  subject  that  it 
was  permissible  to  discuss.  The  Council  of  Four 
thereupon  suggested  to  both  sides  that  the  solu- 
tion of  the  question  be  postponed  until  a  pre- 
liminary Peace  had  been  signed  and  that  the 
question  should  then  be  laid  before  the  League  of 


RACE  EQUALITY  AND  SHANTUNG  61 

Nations  "fdr  decision.  To  this  proposal  the 
Chinese  delegation  gave  their  immediate  consent. 
Not  so  the  Japanese.  Baron  Makino  demanded 
that  a  decision  be  reached  before  the  arrival  of  the 
German  plenipotentiaries  at  Versailles. 

In  the  meantime  the  Peace  Conference  assem- 
bled in  Plenary  Session  on  April  28th  for  the  pur- 
pose of  adopting  the  definitive  terms  of  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations.  It  was 
anticipated  that  at  this  session  the  Japanese  dele- 
gation would  once  again  bring  forward  the  race 
amendment  and  that  the  occasion  might  give  rise 
to  some  lively  exchanges  between  the  Japanese 
proponents,  on  the  one  side,  and  the  Anglo-Saxon 
opponents,  on  the  other. 

There  was  an  atmosphere  of  tense  excitement 
in  the  assembly  when  Baron  Makino  took  the 
floor  and  began  to  speak.  His  speech  was  a  short 
but  masterful  exposition  of  the  Japanese  point 
of  view,  but  it  soon  became  apparent  that  the 
head  of  the  Japanese  delegation  was  speaking  in 
no  challenging  mood,  but,  on  the  contrary,  was 
prepared  to  make  concessions.  He  set  forth  that 
the  principle  of  the  equality  of  nations  was  em- 
bodied in  the  very  nature  and  structure  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  There  could  never,  he  argued, 
be  constituted  a  real  Society  of  Nations  unless 
the  members  composing  it  should  mutually  guar- 
antee to  apply  the  principle  of  equal  and  just 
treatment  towards  all  the  members,  without  dis- 


62        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

crimination  as  to  race  or  nationality.  It  was  not 
his  purpose,  he  said,  to  urge  the  acceptance  of  the 
Japanese  proposal  at  the  present  stage,  but  he 
considered  it  his  duty  to  give  public  utterance  to 
the  feeling  of  bitter  disappointment  that  animated 
the  Japanese  people  and  Government  by  reason  of 
the  rejection  of  the  amendment  by  the  League  of 
Nations  Committee,  to  whom  the  matter  had  been 
presented.  And  although,  he  added  in  conclu- 
sion, the  Imperial  Government  was  prepared  to 
express  its  acquiescence  in  the  ruUng  at  the  present 
time,  it  reserved  the  right  to  present  the  matter 
again  at  the  proper  time  to  the  Council  of  the 
League  of  Nations. 

Makino*s  clever  speech  did  not  fail  of  its  in- 
tended effect.  The  moderation  and  unselfishness 
of  the  Japanese  were  thus  plainly  demonstrated. 
It  would  have  been  invidious  to  even  suggest  that 
the  Imperial  Government,  in  reality,  cared  less 
than  two  straws  for  the  adoption  of  the  principle 
of  race  equality  at  the  present  juncture. 

That  would  have  been  to  rob  them  of  one  of 
the  sharpest  weapons  in  their  diplomatic  armoury. 

Up  to  now  the  Japanese  had  only  been  fencing. 
At  this  point  began  the  real  battle  for  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Shantung  question.  The  matter  had 
to  be  fought  out  in  the  Council  of  Four,  reduced 
to  Three  now,  by  reason  of  Orlando's  withdrawal 
in  the  Fiume  controversy.  Only  President  Wilson 
opposed  the  Japanese  demands.    Clemenceau  and 


RACE  EQUALITY  AND  SHANTUNG  63 

Lloyd  George,  embarrassed  by  their  consciousness 
of  the  secret  treaties,  suggested  postponement  and 
delay.  Against  President  Wilson's  obstinacy  the 
Japanese  perceived  only  one  means  of  success. 
It  was  to  be  a  desperate  venture,  but  the  Japanese 
evidently  knew  their  man.  The  Supreme  Council 
was  presented  with  an  ultimatum.  President 
Wilson  must  withdraw  his  opposition  or  the 
Japanese  delegation  would  depart  for  home.  In 
the  latter  alternative  it  was  intimated  that  a 
separate  Peace  would  be  made  with  Germany  and 
an  economic  and  financial  consortium  closed  with 
her  to  exploit  Russia. 

This  bombshell  was  exploded  at  the  very  moment 
that  the  German  delegation  reached  Versailles  for 
the  purpose  of  hearing  and  receiving  the  Peace 
terms.  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George,  thor- 
oughly alarmed  at  the  prospect  with  which  they 
were  confronted,  now  in  turn  threatened  the 
President  with  the  loss  of  his  League  of  Nations, 
a  project  to  which  the  President  had  wholly  given 
himself  and  for  the  sake  of  which,  as  they  knew, 
he  could  be  compelled  to  make  sacrifices.  Face 
to  face  with  such  a  bitter  alternative,  the  Presi- 
dent succumbed,  and  China  was  offered  up  a 
victim  on  the  altar  of  Western  selfishness. 


CHAPTER  EIGHT 

THE   SHANTUNG   QUESTION 

It  is  a  fortunate  thing  for  America  that  President 
Wilson's  capitulation  to  Japanese  Imperialism 
and  his  abandonment  of  his  principles  in  the  face 
of  the  adroit  manoeuvres  of  his  astute  colleagues 
at  Paris  were  set  at  naught  by  the  subsequent 
action  of  the  United  States  Senate.  Indeed,  it  is 
difficult  to  understand  how  President  Wilson  could 
ever  have  believed  that  the  American  people  would 
accept  the  oditim  of  such  an  iniquitous  transaction. 
The  Shantung  decision  of  the  Peace  Conference 
involved  not  alone  one  iniquity  towards  China — 
it  was,  in  fact,  a  combination  of  iniquities.  It 
concerned  the  recognition  and  approval  of  a  whole 
series  of  infamous  acts  committed  by  Japan  in 
her  relations  with  China  since  the  outbreak  of  the 
war.  When  Japan,  in  May  191 5,  forced  China 
to  accept  the  twenty-one  demands,  the  question 
of  the  future  disposition  of  Shantung  was  an 
integral  part  thereof.  By  the  twenty-one  de- 
mands China  was  compelled  to  grant  Japan  the 
rights  which  she  sought  in  the  province  of  Shan- 
tung.   China  had  yielded  to  jorce  majeure  and 

64 


THE  SHANTUNG  QUESTION         65 

umder  protest.  Foreign  sympathy  for  China  in 
the  face  of  this  high-handed  act  of  aggression  was 
exhibited  everywhere,  and  it  was  generally  be- 
lieved that  when  the  Great  Powers,  Japan's  allies, 
were  released  from  the  tension  of  the  war,  they 
would  join  with  America  in  some  action  that 
would  restore  China  in  her  rights. 

The  twenty-one  demands  involved  much  more 
than  the  Shantung  concession  to  Japan.  They 
included  also  very  far-reaching  financial,  economic 
and  political  concessions  to  Japan,  amoimting,  in 
fact,  to  a  virtual  protectorate. 

Accordingly,  when  the  Peace  Conference  not 
only  failed  to  put  on  record  its  unqualified  dis- 
approval of  the  twenty-one  demands,  but  actually 
placed  the  stamp  of  its  approval  on  one  of  the 
most  important  of  them,  the  Chinese  nation  had 
great  reason  to  feel  that  they  were  being  delivered 
over,  tied  hand  and  foot,  to  the  tender  mercies 
of  their  arch-enemy,  t  Moreover,  the  betrayal  was 
made  more  flagrant  by  reason  of  the  fact  that 
it  was  consummated  in  the  face  of  the  practically 
unanimous  opposition  of  public  opinion  through- 
out the  world.    This  was  the  first  iniquity. 

The  second  iniquity  was  that  the  Shanttmg  con- 
cession was  embodied  in  the  Peace  Treaty,  into 
which  had  been  incorporated  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  under  which  the  signatory 
Powers,  **in  order  to  promote  international  co- 
operation and  to  achieve  international  peace  and 


66        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

security  ...  by  the  prescription  of  open,  just 
and  honourable  relations  between  nations,  by  the 
firm  establishment  of  the  understandings  of  inter- 
national law  as  the  actual  rule  of  conduct  among 
Governments,  and  by  the  maintenance  of  justice 
and  a  scrupulous  respect  for  all  treaty  obligations 
in  the  dealings  of  organized  peoples  with  one 
another,  agree  to  this  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations.'' 

That  there  are  many  unjust  and  immoral  con- 
ditions contained  in  the  treaty  is  now  pretty 
generally  admitted.  Such  conditions,  in  so  far  as 
they  were  imposed  upon  the  enemy  States,  are 
at  least  understandable  in  view  of  the  state  of  the 
public  mind  in  the  victorious  countries  at  the  end 
of  the  war.  What  is  not  understandable,  how- 
ever, is  that  a  friend  and  an  ally,  and  one  that 
had  made  important  sacrifices  for  the  cause  of  the 
Allies,  should  be  treated,  at  the  end  of  the  war, 
as  an  enemy  and  even  worse  than  an  enemy. 
For  the  action  of  the  Peace  Conference  involved 
not  alone  the  loss  to  China  of  one  of  her  richest 
and  most  important  provinces,  but  it  affected  the 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  the 
Chinese  nation  in  a  manner  that  vitally  touches 
sovereignty.  Indeed,  fairly  regarded,  the  Shan- 
tung decision  of  the  Peace  Conference  was  merely 
the  first  step  in  the  ultimate  partition  of  China 
and  the  destruction  of  Chinese  independence. 

To  embody  such  an  act  of  spoliation,  involving 


THE  SHANTUNG  QUESTION         67 

a  breach  of  every  one  of  the  noble  professions 
which  we  have  quoted  from  the  preamble  of 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  in  the 
very  instrument  in  which  those  professions  are 
declared  to  be  the  guide  for  the  future  conduct 
of  the  world,  could  not  have  failed  to  spell  disaster, 
not  alone  for  the  treaty,  but  for  the  League  of 
Nations — the  one  hope  of  mankind  for  a  better 
world  order. 

The  third  iniquity  we  have  to  consider  very 
closely  touches  the  honour  of  the  United  States. 
It  was  at  the  instance  of  the  United  States  that 
the  Peking  Government,  in  March  191 7,  after 
very  carefully  considering  the  bearing  and  con- 
sequences of  their  act,  broke  off  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Germany.  If  not  explicitly  expressed, 
although  the  contrary  is  maintained  by  some  well- 
informed  persons,  it  was  at  least  tacitly  tmder- 
stood  that  China's  participation  in  the  war  on  the 
side  of  the  Allies  would  necessarily  carry  with  it 
certain  advantages  for  China  at  the  ensuing  Peace 
Conference,  not  the  least  among  which  was  to  be 
the  release  of  China  from  the  pressure  and  ag- 
gression of  Japan.  Indeed,  China's  negotiators 
made  it  quite  plain  to  the  Powers  that  she  had  no 
impelling  reasons  for  joining  in  a  war  against 
Germany,  a  nation  towards  whom  the  Chinese 
had  the  kindliest  feelings,  except  the  one  fact  that 
thereby  China  hoped  to  provide  herself  with  the 
means  and  the  opportunity  to  resist  the  encroach- 


68        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

ments  of  Japan.  And  how  did  the  European 
nations  meet  this  frankness  of  China's  statesmen? 
They  met  it  by  entering  into  a  secret  treaty  with 
Japan  in  February- March  191 7  (at  the  very 
time  that  the  Peking  Government  broke  off 
diplomatic  relations  with  Germany),  conceding 
to  Japan,  among  other  things,  her  claims  upon 
Shantung.  And  as  a  further  evidence  of  good 
faith  they  kept  the  fact  a  secret  from  China  and 
the  United  States  until  February  1919,  when  the 
matter  was  being  thrashed  out  at  the  Peace  Con- 
ference. The  European  Allies,  knowing  that  they 
would  have  to  abandon  and  betray  China  at  the 
Peace  Conference,  permitted  the  United  States  to 
pledge  her  honour  to  China,  and  then  had  the  face 
to  attempt  a  justification  by  appealing  to  the 
sacredness  of  the  secret  treaties.  In  other  words, 
the  Allies  gave  Japan  an  invalid  promissory  note 
in  1 91 7,  and,  having  disclosed  the  fact  two  years 
later,  succeeded  in  securing  its  payment  by  pro- 
curing the  responsible  endorsement  of  Uncle  Sam 
thereon.  Nothing  in  international  relations  has 
ever  been  more  infamous. 

We  have  mentioned  three  iniquities  that  char- 
acterize the  action  of  the  Supreme  Cotmcil  of  the 
Peace  Conference  with  reference  to  Shantimg. 
Out  of  these  iniquities  flowed  consequences  of  a 
very  far-reaching  character  and  of  which  the  end 
cannot  as  yet  be  seen. 

Firstly^  the  situation  aroused  intense  feeling 


THE  SHANTUNG  QUESTION         69 

tnroughout  China,  and  the  national  sentiment 
was  expressed  by  the  action  of  the  Chinese  Peace 
delegates,  who  refused  to  sign  the  Peace  Treaty. 
No  amount  of  persuasion  on  the  part  of  their 
former  Allies  could  move  them,  and  in  answer 
to  the  cynical  assurance  offered  them  by  the 
Supreme  Council  that  China  could  safely  rely  on 
the  League  of  Nations  to  set  everything  at  rights 
sometime  in  the  future,  the  Chinese  delegates 
merely  answered  that  there  was  little  to  be  hoped 
for  from  a  League  of  Nations  when  the  very  in- 
strument which  created  it  authorized  or  permitted 
the  violation  and  nullification  of  every  vital  prin- 
ciple for  which  the  League  of  Nations  was  sup- 
posed to  stand. 

In  their  abstention  from  the  treaty  and  their 
refusal  to  accept  any  compromises  on  the  ques- 
tion of  Shantung,  the  Chinese  delegation  saw  their 
best  remedy  against  the  paralyzing  effect  of  the 
Supreme  Coimcil's  decision.  If  that  decision  were 
carried  into  effect,  it  meant  a  great  deal  more  to 
China  than  the  mere  loss  of  a  province.  It  meant 
that  international  sanction  had  been  given  to  the 
acts  of  a  nation  that  was  seeking  to  rob  her  of 
her  independence.  It  meant  the  revival  of  the 
twenty-one  demands  in  their  full  force. 

In  the  stand  they  took,  the  Chinese  delegation 
had  behind  them  the  practically  unanimous  senti- 
ment of  their  coimtrymen,  who  had  come  to  the 
silent  resolve  that,  cost  what  it  might,  they  would 


70        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

repudiate  the  agreement  forced  upon  them  in 
1 91 5.  The  Chinese  people,  whose  capacity  for 
passive  resistance  is  incalculable,  are  determined 
to  make  a  stand  as  regards  this  question,  and  it 
will  be  strange  indeed  if  they  do  not  succeed  in 
carrying  their  point,  even  against  the  combined 
machinations  of  their  enemies. 

We  have,  secondly,  to  consider  that  the  manner 
in  which  the  Supreme  Council  played  with  the 
principles  of  the  League  of  Nations  in  the  very 
instrument  that  created  it  brought  it  to  pass  that 
the  League  was  born  in  an  atmosphere  of  sus- 
picion and  distrust.  Those  principles  had  been 
discussed  throughout  the  world,  and  they  had 
come  to  be  held  in  sacred  regard  by  the  majority 
of  peoples  and  by  the  intellectuals  of  all  lands. 
But  these  very  circles  were  the  first  to  detect  the 
hoUowness  of  the  professions  which  belied  them- 
selves in  the  very  instrument  that  gave  them 
birth.  The  new-born  child  was  received  nowhere 
with  open  arms.  Its  would-be  foster  parents 
treated  it  like  a  stepchild.  The  action  of  China's 
delegation  had  therefore  not  missed  its  effect. 
Moreover,  the  failure  of  the  Peace  Conference  to 
repair  the  defect  or  to  find  new  remedies  for  a 
wrong  thus  constituted  has  only  aggravated  the 
suspicion  and  distrust  with  which  the  instrument 
is  received  in  the  widest  circles  throughout  the 
world.  And,  indeed,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that,  until  the  Peace  Treaty  is  entirely  revised 


THE  SHANTUNG  QUESTION         71 

i 

and  the  injustice  and  immorality  eliminated 
therefrom,  there  can  be  no  hope  of  the  successful 
organization  of  a  real  League  of  Nations. 

Thirdly,  there  is  the  fact  that  greatly  as  the 
Allied  nations  desired  the  participation  of  the 
United  States  in  the  carrying  out  of  the  Peace 
terms,  they  themselves  made  it  impossible  for  her. 
For  the  methods  they  had  been  guilty  of  in  their 
action  towards  China,  leaving  all  other  considera- 
tions aside,  awakened  a  profound  distrust  in  the 
American  people.  They  could  not  overlook  the 
fact  that  England,  hitherto  the  universally  recog- 
nized champion  of  fair  play,  and  from  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  the  self -constituted  protector  of 
the  small  and  the  weak  nations,  had  made  a 
mockery  of  these  principles  and  of  the  principle 
of  self-determination  by  making  a  portion  of  the 
territory  of  her  future  ally  the  subject-matter  of 
a  bargain  with  China's  oppressor,  Japan.  Nor 
could  the  American  people  disregard  the  fact  that 
England  showed  anything  but  good  faith  when 
she  withheld  knowledge  of  the  secret  treaties  from 
America,  who  was  at  least  equally  interested  in  the 
fate  of  China,  down  to  the  very  last  moment 
(February  1919). 

The  American  people  have  never  had  the  cynical 
disregard  for  the  ways  of  statesmen  which  up  to 
very  recently  was  so  prevalent  in  Europe.  And, 
accordingly,  revelations  such  as  these  came  as  a 
great  shock  to  them  and  had  much  to  do  with  the 


n       THE  NEW  JAPANESE  EEEIL 

determination  ot  theii-  representatives  fa  Congress 
to  withdraw  the  country  entirely  from  any  pos- 
sibility of  further  European  entanglements. 

I  have  thus  attempted  to  sketch,  however  im- 
perfectly, the  almost  annihilating  effect  the  Shan- 
timg  business  has  had  upon  the  attempted  World 
Peace  of  to-day.  That  this  amazing  result  was 
not  foreseen  by  those  who  were  its  responsible 
authors  simply  shows  how  deaf,  dumb  and  blind 
our  statesmen  are  with  respect  to  the  forces 
which,  in  the  last  analysis,  really  control  the 
world.  They  went  on  their  way  serenely  at  Paris 
in  total  disregard  of  the  moral  sentiments  of  man- 
jkind,  with  the  results  we  all  know  —  a  Peace 
Treaty  that  is  respected  nowhere  because  it  has 
not  deserved  respect,  a  world  disorganized  and 
still  at  war,  innumerable  new  causes  of  strife 
disseminated  throughout  the  globe. 

Before  the  Peace  Conference  met.  President 
Wilson  is  reported  to  have  said  that  the  *'acid 
test"  of  the  ensuing  Peace  Treaty  would  be  the 
treatment  meted  out  to  Russia.  Had  the  Russian 
question  come  up  for  final  determination  by  the 
Peace  delegates  and  for  inclusion  in  the  Peace 
Treaty,  it  is  possible  that  President  Wilson  would 
not  have  missed  fire  in  his  prophecy.  As  it  stands, 
however,  the  **acid  test"  of  the  Peace  Treaty 
turns  out  to  be  the  treatment  meted  out  to  China 
r--a  quite  unthinkable  result  before  the  Peace 
Conference  met. 


CHAPTER  NINE 

THE  SHANTUNG  QUESTION  AND  OTHER  CORRUPTING 
EVILS 

I  HAVE  hitherto  referred  only  in  a  general  way 
to  the  rights,  privileges  and  concessions  obtained 
by  the  Japanese  at  the  expense  of  China  in  the 
province  of  Shantung.  These  are  now  to  be  con- 
sidered more  in  detail. 

Under  the  revised  Japanese  demands  presented 
to  China  on  April  26,  191 5,  and  which  the  latter 
was  compelled  to  accept  in  the  following  month 
under  a  threat  of  the  use  of  force,  Japan  was 
granted  **all  rights,  interests  and  concessions 
which.  Germany,  by  virtue  of  treaties  or  other- 
wise, possesses  in  relation  to  the  province  of 
Shantung.**  Furthermore,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment consented  that  *'as  regards  the  railway  to 
be  built  by  China  herself  from  Chefoo  or  Lungkow 
to  connect  with  the  Kaao-chow-Tsinanfu  Railway, 
if  Germany  is  willing  to  abandon  the  privilege 
of  financing  the  Chefoo- Weihsen  line,  China  will 
approach  Japanese  capitalists  to  negotiate  a  loan.*' 

With  the  lapse  of  time,  these  far-reaching  priv- 
73 


74        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

ileges  appearing  to  the  Japanese  not  comprehen- 
sive enough  to  satisfy  their  grasping  purpose, 
China  was  induced,  partly  by  threats,  partly  by 
the  corruption  of  officials,  to  sign  a  new  secret 
agreement  on  September  24,  1918,  under  which 
the  Chinese  Republic  was  required  to  employ 
Japanese  loans  and  Japanese  technical  assistance 
for  the  construction  of  railroads  in  the  province  of 
Shantung.  There  already  existed  in  the  province 
a  railroad,  built  by  the  Germans  during  their 
occupation,  running  from  the  port  of  Tsingtao  via 
Kiao-chow  on  the  east  to  the  extreme  westerly 
borders  of  the  province  at  its  capital,  Tsinan. 
From  Tsinan  two  great  railway  lines  branch  off — 
one  of  them  to  the  north  via  Tientsin  to  Peking, 
the  other  running  south  to  Shanghai  and  thence 
to  Hangchow  and  Ningpo. 

It  was  now  proposed,  in  the  secret  treaty  just  re- 
ferred to,  to  permit  Japan  to  extend  the  Tsingtao- 
Tsinan  Railroad  to  a  point  nearly  due  west  from 
Tsinan,  namely,  the  town  of  Shunteh,  in  the 
province  of  Chili.  Furthermore,  the  Japanese 
were  to  be  permitted  to  construct  a  railroad  con- 
necting with  the  Tsingtao-Tsinan  line  and  running 
in  a  southerly  direction  to  Soochow,  in  the 
province  of  Kiangsu.  In  addition  to  the  railroads 
already  named  as  marked  out  for  construction  by 
Japan,  she  became  the  successor,  confirmed  by  the 
Peace  Treaty,  to  the  German  rights  to  the  con- 
struction of  the  line  from  Chefoo  to  Weihsen,  in 


OTHER  CORRUPTING  EVILS        75 

the  province  of  Shantung,  running  from  the  centre 
of  the  province  to  its  extreme  north-eastern  border 
on  the  Yellow  Sea.  One  glance  at  the  map  is 
sufficient  to  show  that  with  the  construction  of 
these  railways,  together  with  the  control  over  the 
Tsingtao-Tsinan  line,  the  entire  province  of 
Shantung,  from  north  to  south  and  from  east  to 
west,  comes  within  the  grasp  of  Japan.  More- 
over, the  control  over  these  lines  will  place  her  in 
the  position  to  retain  the  mastery  over  the  two 
main  lines  of  railroad,  already  mentioned,  running 
north  and  south  from  the  junction  point  at 
Tsinan,  and  likewise  of  the  railway  now  in  course 
of  construction  and  running  from  the  coast- 
town  Haichow,  in  the  province  of  Kiangsu,  to 
Soochow  and  Hangchow.  In  other  words,  the 
entire  railway  system  of  China  will  be,  to  a  very 
great  extent,  at  the  mercy  of  Japanese  railway 
control,  exercised  from  the  strategically  central 
position  occupied  by  Japanese  controlled  rail- 
ways in  Shantung  province,  from  which  vantage- 
ground,  if  the  Japanese  so  will  it,  North  China 
may  be  cut  off  from  South  China  and  East  China 
from  West  China.  Furthermore,  the  Mikado's 
subjects  are  given  the  right,  under  this  agreement, 
to  station  troops  in  Tsinan  and  Tsingtao  and  to 
provide  Japanese  instructors  to  the  detachments 
of  police  to  whom  is  assigned  the  duty  of  guarding 
the  railway-line  from  Tsingtao  to  Tsinan. 
Having  these  considerations  in  mind,  one  is 


76        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

able  to  understand  the  exceedingly  small  value 
contained  in  the  Japanese  promise  to  restore  the 
Kiao-chow  region  to  China,  and  the  more  so  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  the  restoration  is  to  be  made 
dependent  upon  the  grant  to  Japan  of  a  concession 
at  Tsingtao  which,  under  the  exclusive  jurisdiction 
of  Japan,  will  practically  carry  with  it  control 
of  the  port. 

In  this  connection  it  is  well  to  remind  the  reader 
that  Japan's  present  claims  in  the  province  of 
Shanttmg  are  not  simply  an  outflow  of  her  con- 
quest of  Kiao-chow  from  the  Germans.  On  the 
contrary,  Japan's  course  of  procedure  from  the 
very  beginning  of  her  campaign  to  drive  out  the 
Germans  was  steeped  in  illegality,  involving 
flagrant  breaches  of  neutrality  and  the  contraven- 
tion of  the  rules  of  international  law.  The  facts 
are  these.  In  1898  Germany  acquired  a  lease  of 
Kiao-chow  with  its  port  of  Tsingtao  from  China. 
Soon  after  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1914  Japan  sent 
an  ultimatimi  to  Germany  demanding,  among 
other  things,  the  surrender  of  Kiao-chow  to  Japan 
**with  a  view  to  the  eventual  restoration  of  the 
same  to  China."  An  Allied  force  of  Japanese  and 
British  troops  attacked  and  took  Kiao-chow  on 
November  16,  1914.  The  British  troops,  follow- 
ing international  law,  landed  inside  the  German 
leased  territory.  The  Japanese  troops,  on  the 
other  hand,  disregarding  the  law,  landed  at 
Lungkow,  150  n^iiles  outside  the  German  leased 


I 


OTHER  CORRUPTING  EVILS        77 

territory.  They  seized  the  whole  peninsula,  with 
the  entire  railway — 290  miles  in  length — running 
between  Kiao-chow  and  Tsinan,  and  occupied  all 
the  stations,  in  spite  of  China's  protest. 

Instead  of  complying  with  China's  request  to 
withdraw  her  troops  from  the  interior  of  Shantung 
after  the  fall  of  Kiao-chow,  Japan  presented  to  the 
President  of  China,  Yuan  Shi  Kai,  the  famous 
twenty-one  demands,  in  which  she  demanded  the 
power  to  control  China's  police  and  finance,  to 
officer  the  Chinese  Army,  to  open  China's  mines 
and  to  monopolize  the  supply  and  manufacture 
of  fire-arms.  There  were  also  other  far-reaching 
demands  to  which  we  need  not  refer. 

Under  pressure  of  an  ultimatum  and  a  threat 
to  employ  force,  China  reluctantly  gave  her  con- 
sent, and  made  it  known  to  the  world  that  she 
did  so  only  that  the  peace  of  the  Far  East  might 
be  maintained  at  a  time  when  all  China's  friends 
were  engaged  in  a  desperate  struggle  with  the 
Central  Powers.  Moreover,  China's  rulers  felt 
that  the  final  settlement  must  rest  with  the  Peace 
Conference. 

In  the  meantime,  Japan  intimated  to  China 
that  the  only  condition  which  would  satisfy  her 
in  withdrawing  was  the  concession  of  a  number 
of  railway  and  mining  rights.  In  order  to  prevent 
serious  trouble  and  to  relieve  the  people  from  the 
pressure  of  Japan's  oppressive  measures,  the 
Tuan  Cabinet  acceded  to  the  wishes  of  Japan 


78        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

and  made  a  number  of  secret  preliminary  agree- 
ments, granting  to  Japan  the  privileges  she  de- 
manded. But  the  Tuan  Cabinet  which  made 
these  secret  agreements  was  discredited  the  mo- 
ment the  news  leaked  out  and  was  forced  to 
resign  fifteen  days  after  the  preliminary  agree- 
ments were  signed. 

China  now  asks  that  Kiao-chow,  with  the  rail- 
ways and  mines,  should  be  directly  returned  to 
her,  and  she  promises  to  open  the  same  to  the 
co-operation  of  all  friendly  Powers.  Her  reasons 
for  doing  so  are  as  follows: 

(i)  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  transfer 
of  the  leased  territory  to  Germany  in  1898  was 
not  a  voluntary  act,  nevertheless  the  sovereignty 
of  China  over  the  leased  territory  continued  to 
be  recognized. 

(2)  The  inhabitants  of  Shantung  are  purely 
Chinese  and  the  universal  wish  is  to  remain  under 
China's  sovereignty. 

(3)  Shantung  is  the  cradle  of  Chinese  civiliza- 
tion and  the  home  of  Confucius  and  of  Meng-tse. 

(4)  Shantung  is  very  densely  populated,  con- 
taining a  population  of  38,000,000  over  an  area  of 
56,000  square  miles,  and  has,  therefore,  no  space 
to  offer  to  foreigners,  whose  only  object  in  coming 
there  is  to  exploit  the  native  for  their  own  benefit. 

(s)  Shantung  has  within  her  borders  all  the  pre- 
requisites (mining,  ports,  railroads)  for  the  eco- 
nomic leadership  in  North  China. 


OTHER  CORRUPTING  EVILS         79 

(6)  Strategically,  Kiao-chow  controls  the  en- 
trance to  the  Gulf  of  Chili  and  to  North  China. 

(7)  The  restoration  of  the  leased  territory  is  a 
condition  precedent  to  the  maintenance  of  peace 
in  the  Far  East,  and  the  continuance  of  foreign 
occupation  must  sooner  or  later  lead  to  conflict. 

(8)  Kiao-chow  is  the  best  natural  harbour  in 
North  China,  and  within  the  zone  of  the  Kiao- 
chow-Tsinan  Railroad  are  situated  two  immense 
coalfields  and  an  iron  mine  containing  40,000,000 
tons  of  high-grade  ore.  On  the  projected  southern 
extension  of  the  railway  are  three  very  big  coal- 
fields, with  a  total  reserve  of  over  a  billion  tons, 
which  are  the  only  bituminous  coalfields  within 
economic  distance  of  the  Yangtse  iron  mines. 
Its  westward  extension  would  reach  the  province 
of  Shansi,  which  contains  some  of  the  largest 
coalfields  in  the  world.  Japan  already  holds 
Dalny  as  her  leased  territory.  If  she  holds  on 
to  Kiao-chow  she  will  be  in  a  position  to  control 
the  whole  of  North  China,  including  Manchuria 
and  Inner  Mongolia,  with  the  latter  already  in 
her  hands.  She  would  be  able  to  close  the  door 
of  North  China  to  any  other  Power,  and  the 
independence  of  China  would  be  greatly  impaired, 
if  not  utterly  destroyed. 

Indeed,  we  perceive  in  Japan's  Shantimg  pro- 
gramme  only  one  step  among  many  that  have 
been  taken  in  the  direction  of  bringing  about 
the  complete  subjection  of  the  Chinese  to  Japanese 


80        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

influence.  For  example,  the  continuance  of  in- 
ternal strife  in  China  is  to  be  attributed  to  the 
fact  that  the  Japanese  have  made  civil  war  a 
lucrative  profession  there.  The  Military  Gov- 
ernors (Tuchuns)  hold  independent  commands 
over  hordes  of  uniformed  coolies,  and  no  honest 
effort  is  made  to  settle  their  differences,  for  the 
reason  that  these  warriors  stand  to  profit  from  a 
continuance  of  the  internal  conflict.  And  Japan 
furnishes  the  money. 

Thus  the  Chinese  nation  is  being  corrupted  in 
high  places.  And  as  if  that  were  not  enough,  we 
find  that  just  as  well  organized  an  attempt  is 
being  made  to  corrupt  and  demoralize  the  masses 
by  promoting  and  facilitating  the  introduction 
into  China  of  opium  and  other  narcotics.  The 
profits  to  the  Japanese  from  the  opium  traffic  in 
1913  were  $8,400,000,  and  they  have  increased 
enormously  during  the  war. 

China's  long  struggle  against  the  opium  traffic 
and  habit  is  familiar  to  the  world.  When  the 
Great  War  began,  the  traffic  was  on  its  last  legs 
apparently.  The  Chinese  Government  and  the 
Chinese  people  were  in  a  way  to  accomplish 
what  had  seemed  to  be  impossible,  and  com- 
pletely to  stamp  out  the  cultivation,  trade  in, 
and  use  of  the  drug  in  the  whole  of  China.  All 
the  principal  Powers,  including  Japan,  were 
nominally  co-operating  with  China  in  this  effort, 
and   had   made   agreements   accordingly.    Then 


OTHER  CORRUPTING  EVILS        81 

the  war  came,  disturbed  and  unsettled  the  ad- 
ministration of  China,  and  let  down  all  bars  to 
Japanese  ''penetration."  How  Japanese,  with 
the  connivance  and  often  with  the  actual  help  of 
the  Japanese  Government,  took  advantage  of 
these  circumstances  to  introduce  and  fasten 
another  drug  habit  on  the  Chinese  constitutes  as 
black  an  action  as  has  been  charged  to  any 
nation  in  recent  times.  That  some  other  nations 
have  likewise  a  share  in  the  blame  is  apparent 
from  the  following,  which  I  quote  from  the  Man- 
chester Guardian  of  May  27,  1920: 

**The  attack  which  is  now  being  made  in 
America  upon  England  for  maintaining  what  is 
called  'Britain's  opium  monopoly'  has  led  the 
India  Office  to  publish  a  complete  statement  show- 
ing the  quantity  and  value  of  opium  grown  in 
and  exported  from  the  Indian  Empire  from 
1913-14  to  1918-19. 

"It  is  not  very  pleasant  to  read,  upon  the 
authority  of  Mr.  Montagu,  that  the  cultivation 
of  the  poppy  has  grown  from  144,561  acres  in 
1914  to  204,186  acres  in  1916-17  (the  latest 
figures  available).  The  export  values  have  in- 
creased enormously,  but  this  appears  to  be  due 
more  to  the  prices  obtained  for  opium  than  to 
an  increased  volume  of  export.  At  the  same  time 
the  Government  admits  that  during  19 18-19  the 
^:port  had  increased  from  8,710  chests  in  19 16  to 
10,467  in  1919. 


82        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

*'The  statement  goes  to  confirm  one  of  the 
principal  contentions  of  our  American  critics — 
namely,  that  although  Great  Britain  does  not 
ship  direct  to  China,  Anglo-French  friendship 
permits  us  to  pass  the  drug  through  French 
territory.  I  observe  that  out  of  the  total  export 
of  10,467  chests  from  India,  5,190  chests  were  in 
19 19  sent  to  Indo-China  and  Siam,  whilst  over 
2,400  chests  were  shipped  to  the  island  of  Java. 
These  cannot  have  been  medical  supplies.  In 
one  other  respect  the  return  gives  colour  at  least 
to  another  American  contention — that  we  are 
enabled  by  our  friendship  with  Japan  to  pass  the 
drug  through  Japanese  ports.  Chests  of  opium 
shipped  to  Japanese  ports  from  India  have  nearly 
trebled — namely,  from  799  chests  in  19 14  to  1,936 
in  1919." 


CHAPTER  TEN 

JAPANESE   EXPANSION 

So  long  as  Russia  remained  a  Great  Power  and 
able  to  resist  the  aggressive  encroachments  of 
Japan  in  Asia,  the  Japanese  confined  their  opera- 
tions in  China's  northern  domains  to  the  exten- 
sion of  their  influence  over  Southern  Manchuria 
and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia.  In  these  two 
regions,  far-reaching  claims  had  been  forced  upon 
China  in  1915,  when  Japan  presented  the  twenty- 
one  demands  for  Chinese  constimption.  These 
demands  included  (i)  the  extension  of  the  term 
of  the  lease  not  only  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny, 
but  also  of  the  South  Manchurian  and  Antung- 
Mukden  Railway;  (2)  the  granting  of  special 
privileges  to  Japanese  as  regards  the  ownership 
of  land,  and  with  respect  to  trade,  manufacttire 
and  farming  in  South  Manchuria;  (3)  the  right 
of  Japanese  subjects  to  have  civil  and  criminal 
cases  in  which  they  are  defendants  tried  by  the 
Japanese  Consul;  (4)  the  grant  of  certain  special 
mining  privileges;  (5)  the  grant  to  Japanese 
capital  of  a  preference  in  case  China  requires  loans 

83 


84        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

for  building  railways  in  South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia;  (6)  the  grant  to  Japan 
of  a  preference,  in  political,  financial,  military 
or  police  matters  in  case  China  requires  foreign 
instructors  or  advisers  in  South  Manchuria. 

Under  the  secret  agreement  of  September  24, 
19 1 8,  China  is  required  to  build  four  railroads  in 
Manchiuia  and  Mongolia  and  to  employ  Japanese 
capital  in  their  construction.  This  new  Japanese 
demand,  together  with  those  referred  to  in  the 
foregoing  paragraph,  represents  the  fixed  Japanese 
policy  towards  China  that  by  indirect  means  seeks 
to  destroy  every  vestige  of  Chinese  sovereignty 
in  the  provinces  named,  and  under  the  cloak  of  a 
pretended  ''friendly  co-operation'*  in  economic 
and  financial  matters,  in  reality  provides  the 
Japanese  with  the  right  to  exploit  China  to  the 
utmost  limit  of  her  capacity  to  endure.  By  these 
means  South  Manchuria,  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 
and  Shantung  had  completely  fallen  under  the 
yoke  of  Japan.  And  thus  matters  stood  when, 
in  the  course  of  the  year  19 18,  it  became  apparent 
that  the  Russian  State  was  in  process  of  disorgani- 
zation and  could  no  longer  hope  to  oppose  itself 
with  vigour,  as  formerly,  to  the  expansion  politics 
of  its  Japanese  neighbour  in  the  Far  East.  And 
accordingly,  at  this  juncture,  the  Nipponese 
stepped  over  into  North  Manchuria  and  into 
Outer  Mongolia,  hitherto  the  particular  spheres 
of  influence  that  belonged  to  Russia.    Under  the 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  86 

pretext  that  the  BolsIie\^st  peril  was  a  menace  to 
Japanese  interests  in  Korea  and  adjoining  regions, 
Japan  sent  troops  of  occupation  to  the  aforemen- 
tioned former  Russian  spheres  of  influence,  and 
in  a  very  short  time  extended  her  economic  and 
financial  interests  over  them.  Nor  was  this  the 
crowning  limit  to  her  imperialistic  designs.  There 
remained  for  consummation  the  spread  of  Japanese 
influence  in  the  great  region  of  the  Amur  River, 
the  seizure  of  Vladivostok  and  the  entire  Maritime 
Province  of  Russia,  and  the  penetration  of  all 
Russian  Siberia  east  of  Lake  Baikal.  All  of  these 
fell  into  the  capacious  maw  of  Japan  prior  to  the 
coming  of  summer  in  1920.  And  to  this  end 
nothing  could  have  served  Japan's  purposes  bet- 
ter than  the  complete  fiasco  in  which  ended  the 
expedition  of  the  five  Great  Powers  in  Siberia,  a 
project  that  had  been  cleverly  promoted  by  Japan, 
knowing  that  it  was  doomed  to  failure  from  the 
very  outset,  but  realizing  that  no  better  lesson 
could  be  given  the  Powers  than  this  one  that  they 
must  leave  it  to  Japan  alone  to  put  a  check  on 
Bolshevist  influences  in  the  Far  East.  The  five 
Powers  came,  saw  and  were  conquered.  When  the 
last  American  soldier  had  been  put  aboard  ship 
bound  for  home,  the  Japanese,  who  alone  re- 
mained behind,  were  given  the  order  to  advance, 
and  almost  in  a  twinkling,  what  the  five  Great 
Powers  had  been  unable  to  accompUsh  in  com- 
bination, J^pan  accomplished  single-handed,  and 


86        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

to-day  her  influence  is  paramount  in  North 
Manchuria,  in  Outer  Mongolia,  in  the  Amur 
region,  in  the  Maritime  Province,  and  in  all  Siberia 
east  of  Lake  Baikal. 

But  it  was  not  alone  in  the  acquirement  of 
influence  over  vast  new  stretches  of  the  earth's 
surface  that  Japan  showed  her  greatness  during 
the  war  and  after.  It  was  likewise  in  a  commercial 
and  financial  sense  that  Japan  made  good  use  of 
her  time.  The  enormous  profits  that  flowed  into 
Japanese  coffers  as  the  result  of  the  temporary 
cessation  of  European  competition,  due  to  the 
war,  resulted  in  a  remarkable  expansion  of 
Japanese  trade,  industry  and  shipping.  New 
markets  were  acquired  in  Australia,  the  Dutch 
East  Indies,  British  India,  China,  South  America 
and  South  Africa.  Immense  forttmes  were  made 
in  the  sale  of  ammunition  and  other  war  supplies 
to  the  Allies.  A  large  part  of  Japan's  foreign 
debt,  which  prior  to  1914  had  been  growing  to 
huge  proportions,  was  paid  off,  and  still  Japan 
had  money  left  over  in  plentiful  amount  to 
invest  in  French,  British  and  Russian  loans.  The 
figure  reached  by  these  loans  stood  at  1,151 
million  yen  in  September  1918.  The  Japanese 
gold  reserve  had  mounted  by  December  1918  to 
a  sum  total  of  1,093  niiUion  yen.  For  the  first 
time  since  she  emerged  as  a  modem  State  Japan 
became  a  creditor  instead  of  a  debtor  nation. 
She  has  brought  under  her  influence  vast  new 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  87 

regions  comparable  in  area  with  all  of  Europe, 
and  she  has  made  such  strides  in  industry,  com- 
merce and  finance  as  to  make  her  to-day  a  dan- 
gerous rival  even  of  England  and  America.  And 
all  this  has  been  done  within  the  living  memory 
of  many  of  her  statesmen.  Truly  a  formidable 
giant. 

Apologists  for  Japan  in  her  aggressive  and  im- 
perialistic designs  are  in  the  habit  of  citing,  as  a 
reason  and  excuse  for  Japan's  expansion,  the  fact 
that  it  is  a  most  serious  problem  for  Japan  to  face, 
namely,  to  provide  food  for  a  population  which 
already  exceeds  the  limit  which  the  country's  soil 
can  support,  and  which  is  debarred  by  Exclusion 
Acts  from  seeking  relief  in  the  less  populated 
regions  of  America  and  Australia.  With  a  birth- 
rate of  32  per  thousand  and  a  death-rate  of  21.5 
per  thousand,  the  population  increases  every  year 
by  about  750,000.  In  the  last  ten  years  the  popu- 
lation of  Japan,  excluding  Korea  and  Formosa, 
has  increased  from  50  to  57  millions,  an  average 
of  380  to  the  square  mile.  The  land  under  culti- 
vation and  the  rice  production  have  increased  by 
only  s  per  cent.,  whereas  the  number  of  inhabi- 
tants has  grown  by  12  per  cent.  So  long  as  the 
present  birth-rate  is  maintained,  the  nation  must 
depend  more  and  more  upon  imported  food  sup- 
pHes,  as  it  is  claimed  that  the  limit  of  tillable 
soil  and  productivity  has  been  reached.  So  long 
as  Japan  can  purchase  the  surplus  food  she  needs 


88        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

by  means  of  a  favourable  balance  of  trade  the 
pt*oblem  may  be  faced.  But  with  each  yearly 
increase  in  the  population  there  must  come  a 
corresponding  increase  of  imported  food,  which  in 
turn  necessitates  an  increased  sale  of  Japanese 
manufactured  goods  in  foreign  markets.  Facing 
the  matter,  therefore,  under  normal  conditions, 
it  is  necessary  for  Japan  either  to  increase  her 
supply  of  food  by  means  of  industrial  expansion 
or  to  expand  territorially  into  the  less  populated 
regions  of  the  Asiatic  Continent.  In  other  words, 
Japan  is  overcrowded  and  must  overflow  along 
the  line  of  least  resistance — that  is  to  say,  into 
Asia.  Having  stated  the  case  for  Japan,  we  have 
now  to  consider  the  reasonableness  of  the  explana- 
tion thus  set  forth. 

Up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War,  Japan 
had  acquired  as  a  result  of  her  Chinese  War  in 
1894-5  and  of  her  Russian  War  in  1904-5,  vast 
increases  of  territory  comprising  the  island  of 
Formosa,  Korea,  half  of  the  island  of  Saghalin, 
and  a  practical  mastery  of  South  Manchuria, 
which  opened  that  vast  region  to  Japanese  enter- 
prise and  Japanese  colonization  to  the  same  ex- 
tent as  is  the  case  in  territory  entirely  under 
Japanese  sovereignty.  And  how  did  Japanese 
attempts  at  colonization  turn  out  in  these  cases? 
Very  poorly  indeed,  for  the  records  show  that 
less  than  100,000  Japanese  left  Japan  to  settle 
permanently    in    these    countries.    Accordingly, 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  89 

having  learned  from  this  experience,  the  Japanese 
will  be  the  first  to  admit  that  they  are  not  a 
colonizing  race  and  never  will  be.  Take  Shantung. 
What  excuse  is  there  for  Japanese  territorial  ex- 
pansion in  Shantung,  which  is  already  far  more 
overcrowded  than  the  Japanese  Island  Empire? 
And  if  Japanese  efforts  to  colonize  regions  that 
lie  close  to  their  very  doors  have  utterly  failed, 
how  little  excuse  is  there  for  the  assertion  that 
they  must  take  over  still  wider  areas  in  order 
to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  Island  Empire's  grow- 
ing population.  Markets  they  must  have.  Raw 
materials  they  must  have.  With  all  this  we  agree 
fully.  But  are  these  not  to  be  had  without 
extending  Japanese  sovereignty  over  wide  tracts 
of  land  to  which  they  have  no  just  title?  The 
answer  is,  of  course,  in  the  affirmative.  Economic 
pressure  is  neither  an  explanation  nor  a  justifica- 
tion of  Japan's  imperialistic  designs.  We  must 
seek  for  the  reasons  elsewhere.  And  they  are  to 
be  found,  as  the  writer  has  pointed  out  in  his 
former  publications,  in  the  continued  exercise  of 
irresponsible  authority  by  the  Military  Party  at 
Tokio,  at  the  head  of  which  is  the  veteran  states- 
man and  Genro,  Yamagata.  Authoritative  Cab- 
inet government  does  not  exist  in  Japan.  The 
Foreign  Office  is  subservient  to  the  War  Office. 
The  Ministers  of  War  and  of  the  Navy  must  be 
chosen  from  those  respective  services,  and  have 
the  power  to  upset  any  Cabinet,  by  the  simple  act 


90        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

of  resigning,  in  case  the  civilian  members  thereof 
prove  intractable  to  their  will.  Behind  the  War 
and  Navy  Ministries,  behind  the  Cabinet,  behind 
Parliament  and  behind  the  Mikado  himself  stand 
the  Genro  or  Elder  Statesmen,  with  Yamagata 
at  their  head.  These  are  the  men,  answerable  to 
no  authority,  who  have  the  deciding  voice  in  the 
conduct  of  Japan's  policies,  internal  and  external. 
Many  members  of  the  Liberal  Party  in  Japan 
continue  to  claim  that  the  influence  of  the  Genro 
is  declining.  Do  any  of  Japan's  recent  actions 
give  support  to  this  claim?  One  would  have  to 
be  very  optimistic  indeed  to  believe  such  a  thing. 
The  writer  believes,  on  the  contrary,  that  Japan, 
led  by  the  stem  directing  hand  of  her  MiHtary 
Party,  stands  only  upon  the  threshold  of  her 
designs,  which  embrace  all  of  Asia.  How  this  is 
to  be  accomplished  will  be  understood  when  we 
examine  the  r61e  that  China  is  to  play  in  this 
future  drama. 

Japan's  purpose  has  been  to  demonstrate  to 
the  Chinese  that  they  have  absolutely  nothing  to 
hope  for  from  the  Western  nations.  The  Western 
nations  have  exploited  China;  they  have  stolen 
from  her  some  of  her  richest  territorial  posses- 
sions; they  forced  the  opium  traffic  upon  her;  they 
have  managed  her  finances  to  a  great  extent  for 
their  own  imjust  enrichment;  they  have  despoiled 
China  of  her  riches,  carried  off  as  loot  many  of 
her  art  and  scientific  treasures;   they  called  her 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  91 

into  the  war  as  an  ally,  accepted  most  extraordi- 
nary sacrifices  made  in  their  behalf,  and  then 
abandoned  her  at  the  Peace  Conference  to  the 
rapacious  tyranny  of  her  great  Eastern  enemy. 
Such  is]^but  a  rough  and  utterly  incomplete  outline 
of  what  China  has  suffered  at  the  hands  of  the 
Western  nations. 

Japan's  purpose  was,  as  stated,  to  prove  to  the 
Chinese  people  that,  far  from  getting  better  treat- 
ment from  the  Western  democratic  nations,  they 
would  actually  get  worse  treatment  from  them 
than  by  dealing  directly  with  Japan  alone.  She 
will  try  to  convince  the  Chinese  that  in  future 
the  technical  and  financial  resources  of  Japan 
will  be  employed  to  organize  and  build  up  the 
Chinese  Empire,  rather  than  for  its  exploitation. 
The  doctrine  of  **Asia  for  the  Asiatics''  will  then 
come  into  its  own,  and  the  two  nations,  working 
in  double  harness  for  their  own  mutual  interests, 
will  show  the  Western  nations  the  door.  If  a 
race  war  should  ensue,  Japan  is  prepared  to  give 
battle  both  on  sea  and  land,  and  China's  hordes 
will  be  armed  and  disciplined  to  make  common 
cause  against  the  common  foe.  The  Military 
Party  in  Japan  have  resolved  to  attempt  these 
things,  for  it  is  for  them  the  only  road  to  follow 
if  they  are  to  preserve  to  the  Emperor  his  Im- 
perial prerogatives  and  to  themselves  the  retention 
of  power  and  place,  which,  if  any  other  political 
course   is   followed,   will   gradually   slip   out   of 


92        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

their  hands  and  into  the  hands  of  the  common 
people. 

With  multitudes  of  agents,  sympathizers,  propa- 
gandists, priests,  missionaries,  pedlars,  etc.,  pour- 
ing into  all  parts  of  the  country  for  the  one  pur- 
pose of  converting  China  and  pushing  on  an  in- 
cessant campaign  in  favour  of  a  Chino- Japanese 
Alliance,  Japan  and  the  large  pro- Japanese  party 
that  already  exists  in  China  will  be  able  to  bring 
China  to  the  conclusion  that  it  will  pay  her  best 
to  join  hands  with  Japan  in  order  that  together 
they  may  become  the  joint  masters  of  the  East. 


CHAPTER  ELEVEN 

A  CHINO-JAPANESE   UNION 

There  can  be  no  question  of  greater  interest 
and  importance  to  the  Western  nations  than  the 
question  of  Japan's  future  world-policy.  There 
are  some,  possessing  authority  to  speak,  from 
whom  we  have  recently  grown  accustomed  to  hear 
that  Japan  is  at  the  cross-roads.  They  profess 
to  believe  that  very  soon  we  are  to  see  an  end  of 
Imperialism  and  the  policy  of  expansion  in  the 
Island  Empire,  which  now  has  gone  on  its  tm- 
checked  way  for  nearly  three  decades.  They  are 
confident  that  the  invisible  and  irresponsible 
powers  behind  the  Throne,  which  actually  control 
Japan's  foreign  poKcy,  will  be  replaced  by  au- 
thoritative Cabinet  government. 

If  there  were  any  truth  or  wisdom  in  this 
pronouncement,  the  Western  world  could  afford 
to  forget  that  there  ever  was  such  a  thing  as  a 
Japanese  peril  and  turn  to  the  noble  task  of 
creating  a  new  world-order,  from  which  sus- 
picions, alarms,  wars  and  rumours  of  wars  are 
to  be  entirely  eliminated. 

There  are  many  considerations,  however,  which 

9S 


94        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

compel  the  thoughtful  observer  to  think  otherwise 
about  Japan's  choice  at  the  cross-roads.  Indeed, 
if  we  could  even  for  a  few  brief  moments  place 
ourselves  in  the  position  of  the  Japanese  nation, 
we  might  even  perceive  some  reasons  for  thinking 
that  Japan  must  either  go  on  in  the  old  way  or 
go  under. 

For  centuries  It  has  been  Japan's  good  fortune 
that  the  people  of  China  were  not  a  w^arlike 
nation.  Not  since  the  days  of  Gengis  Khan  and 
Kublai  Khan  has  Japan  had  anything  to  fear 
from  the  military  prowess  of  the  Chinese. 

To-day  the  case  is  different.  China,  like  all 
other  Eastern  nations,  has  begun  to  stir  herself. 
The  sleeping  giant  is  awakening  from  his  long 
slumber  and,  like  Rip  Van  Winkle,  he  finds,  on 
awaking,  that  the  world  has  grown  to  be  some- 
thing entirely  different  from  what  it  was  when 
he  retired  from  it.  In  the  heyday  of  her  might, 
China  possessed  a  great  art,  a  great  literature, 
flourishing  scientific  attainments  and  a  remarkable 
philosophy  of  life,  propounded  into  a  religion  by 
such  noble  thinkers  as  Confucius  and  Meng-tse. 
For  centuries  the  Japanese  have  been  pupils  at 
the  Chinese  shrine,  and  the  best  that  they  have 
in  art,  literature  and  religion  they  obtained  from 
Chinese  sources.  Only  one  thing  they  failed  to 
learn  from  their  teachers,  and  that  is  how  to 
keep  the  peace.  But,  to  be  just  to  the  Japanese, 
that  is  not  their  fault  so  much  as  it  is  the  fault 


A  CHINO-JAPANESE  UNION         95 

of  the  Western  nations  who  forced  Japan  to 
open  her  ports  under  the  mouths  of  their  cannon. 
Persuaded  by  the  belching  fire  of  the  guns  that 
they  must  either  be  converted  by  Western  ideas 
or  be  conquered  by  Western  arms,  the  Japanese 
chose  the  former  alternative.  And  now  it  is 
China's  turn  to  make  a  similar  choice,  for  the 
guns  have  been  thundering  continuously  at  her 
doors  for  decades  past. 

China  is  still  vulnerable.  The  decaying  Empire 
has  not  yet  convalesced  from  its  sleeping-sickness. 
The  Chinese  nation  is  beginning  to  reform  itself, 
and  after  a  republican  revolution  is  passing 
through  a  phase  of  consolidation  and  the  cen- 
tralizing of  its  Government.  Presently,  it  may 
be  too  strong  for  conquest.  That  is  what  Japan 
fears,  and  that  fact  is  the  guide-post  of  her  im- 
perialistic policies.  And  Japan  prefers  to  merge 
rather  than  be  submerged — to  make  common 
cause  with  the  Chinese  against  their  Western 
rivals  who  have  willed  it  that  it  should  be  so. 
It  is  not  a  Yellow  peril.  It  is  a  Japanese  peril. 
Under  Japanese  leadership  the  East  will  be 
armed  and  equipped  to  stand  over  against  the 
West.  If  China  did  not,  in  its  awakening, 
constitute  a  real  future  menace  for  Japan,  the 
Nipponese  could  now  afford  to  rest  on  their 
laurels  and  enjoy  the  rich  harvests  they  have 
already  reaped.  For  it  is  not  thinkable,  except 
in  the  face  of  a  real  danger,  that  a  nation  that 


96        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

is  over-populated,  too  rapidly  industrialized  and 
taxed  beyond  the  limits  of  endurance,  should 
elect  to  invest  half  its  revenues  in  armaments. 
Nor  is  there  any  economic  justification  for  such 
a  capital  outlay  except  conquest. 

Japan  has  only  to  convince  Peking  that  it 
would  pay  the  Chinese  nation  to  become  part 
of  her  family  and  the  world  will  be  brought 
suddenly  face  to  face  with  the  fait  accompli. 
Japan  *s  first  step  would  be  to  place  Japanese 
or  pro- Japanese  officials  in  every  position  of 
importance  and  to  remove  every  Chinaman  that 
showed  opposition.  Peking's  policy  would  be 
telegraphed  from  Tokio.  The  reorganization  of 
China's  finance,  customs,  military  and  naval 
services  would  soon  follow.  The  foreigner  who, 
for  so  long,  has  been  tolerated  in  China  and 
allowed  to  batten  on  his  ill-gotten  gains,  acquired 
at  China's  expense  in  her  weakness,  would  be 
asked  to  retire  to  other  fields,  and  the  East 
would  then  stand  for  the  first  time  in  ages  as  a 
bulwark  against  all  further  Western  aggression 
and  exploitation.  Indeed,  if  England  is  per- 
mitted to  remain  in  India  without  interference, 
it  will  be  only  on  condition  of  recognizing  and 
offering  no  opposition  to  the  new  arrangement. 
The  question  of  what  the  new  Anglo- Japanese 
AlHance  will  contain,  provided  it  is  renewed,  is 
left  for  later  discussion.  But  it  will  be  remem- 
bered that  the  existing  amended  Alliance  included 


A  CHINO-JAPANESE  UNION         S7 

India  in  its  scope,  and  since  the  Alliance  has 
required  Japan  to  act  in  aiding  to  defend  India 
in  certain  circumstances,  the  Japanese  have  made 
it  the  pretext  for  extending  their  influence  there, 
and  as  leader  and  champion  of  the  Eastern 
peoples,  Japan  stands  forth  in  the  guise  of 
protector,  to  whom  the  existing  racial  and  religious 
community  of  interests  can  no  longer  be  a  matter 
of  indifference.  This  attitude  of  Japan's  towards 
India  has  been  cleverly  devised  with  the  view 
to  strengthening  Japan  in  her  position  towards 
China.  The  Great  Powers  would  like  to  rescue 
China  from  Japan.  England,  however,  the  only 
Power  that  could  be  expected  to  take  the 
initiative  in  this  direction,  must  decline  to  do 
so  on  account  of  India. 

In  judging  of  the  strength  of  this  movement 
looking  towards  the  union  of  the  Yellow  races 
under  Japanese  leadership,  a  number  of  factors, 
usually  overlooked  in  the  West,  must  be  given 
consideration.  Mention  has  already  been  made 
of  the  Military  Party  in  Japan,  whose  ambitions 
rest  upon  an  historical  basis  and  are  founded 
upon  the  teachings  of  Japan's  greatest  educators 
since  the  early  part  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
Partly  to  realize  these  ambitions,  from  patriotic 
motives,  and  partly  to  retain  for  themselves 
their  position  of  power  and  privilege,  the  Military 
Party  have  exerted  themselves,  since  the  organ- 
ization of  the  Island  Empire  as  a  modem  State, 


98        THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

to  instil  the  spirit  of  Imperialism  and  self-confi- 
dence into  the  people,  and  to  lead  their  minds 
away  from  the  ideas  of  democracy  and  social  re- 
form. Every  war  thus  far  waged  by  Japan  has 
aided  greatly  in  the  accomplishment  of  these  ends. 
The  idea  of  a  world  mission  has  been  propagated 
and  permitted  to  grow  to  such  proportions  that 
it  is  fair  to  say  one  would  have  difficulty  in  finding 
many,  even  among  the  educated  classes,  who  are 
free  from  its  influence.  The  idea  of  race  superior- 
ity is  as  firmly  fixed  in  the  national  consciousness 
as  is  the  doctrine  of  the  divine  descent  of  the 
Emperor;  and  the  Shinto  worship  of  the  upper 
classes,  with  its  suggestion  of  divine  direction  and 
control,  has  exercised  a  most  potent  influence 
upon  the  lower  classes  as  well.  Like  the  Hebrews 
of  old,  the  Japanese  look  upon  themselves  as  a 
chosen  people,  whose  destiny  it  is  to  lead  the 
nations  to  a  higher  and  nobler  fate.  Moreover, 
the  contemptuous  attitude  of  the  West  towards 
Orientals  has  done  much  to  stiffen  the  Japanese 
desire  for  world  dominion.  To  carry  out  his  plans, 
he  must  first  demonstrate  his  superior  military 
power,  and  this  he  can  only  do  when  he  has  been 
accepted  as  the  leader  of  the  Eastern  nations  and 
has  succeeded  in  applying  to  them  his  methods  of 
efficiency.  With  China  under  Japanese  tutelage, 
the  rest  would  be  easy. 

Events  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war  have 
greatly  aided  the  Japanese  in  their  designs  upon 


A  CHINO-JAPANESE  UNION         99 

China.  The  complete  absorption  of  the  other 
Great  Powers  in  Europe  afforded  Japan  a  golden 
opportunity  to  promote  her  plans  unhindered. 
And  the  very  uncertainty  as  to  the  outcome  of 
the  struggle  which  lasted  tmtil  the  autumn  of  1 918 
made  it  all  the  easier  to  escape  the  opposition 
of  her  European  competitors.  The  United  States, 
standing  alone,  could  only  protest  for  the  time 
being,  and  besides,  the  American  Government 
was  convinced  that  China's  wrongs  would  be 
righted  by  the  Peace  Conference.  But  it  was  just 
here  that  Japan's  impregnable  position  in  Asia, 
in  the  face  of  the  entire  concert  of  the  Powers, 
became  clear  to  China  for  the  first  time.  Presi- 
dent Wilson's  abandonment  of  his  principles  was 
a  disillusionment  to  China  such  as  a  nation  seldom 
experiences,  and  her  statesmen  saw  themselves 
the  dupe  of  a  behef  in  Western  principles  of  fair 
play.  President  Wilson's  weakness,  moreover, 
betrayed  a  lack  of  political  insight  remarkable 
in  the  head  of  a  State  who  possessed  every  facility 
in  the  world  for  correct  information  and  advice. 
And  the  blow  thus  dealt  by  President  Wilson  to 
China's  futiure  destinies  may  be  fraught  with  con- 
sequences that  will  be  of  concern  to  the  farthest 
ages.  For  the  bankruptcy  of  his  principles  and  of 
the  League  of  Nations  idea,  upon  which  China 
had  built  all  her  hopes,  has  brought  the  union  of 
China  and  Japan  a  long  stride  nearer,  if,  indeed, 
it  has  not  made  it  inevitable. 


100      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

What  has  served  to  undermine  Chinese  belief  in 
th  ^  good  faith  of  the  Western  Powers  still  more  is 
the  recognition  given  in  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  to  '*  regional  understandings 
like  the  Monroe  Doctrine/'  By  ** regional  under- 
standings" are  to  be  understood  policies  such  as 
that  of  Austria,  before  the  war,  clashing  with  the 
similar  policy  of  Russia,  with  respect  to  the 
Balkan  States;  or  such  as  the  policy  of  England, 
clashing  until  yesterday  with  the  similar  policy 
of  Russia,  towards  Persia  and  Afghanistan;  or 
such  a  policy  as  Japan's  with  respect  to  North- 
eastern Asia. ' 

Much  as  these  policies  or  imderstandings  differ 
from  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  they  all  have  this  in 
common  with  it,  namely,  the  insistence  by  some 
strong  Power  that  no  other  strong  Power  shall 
extend  its  control  into  zones  where  such  extension 
is  Imputed  as  a  threatened  danger  to  the  interests 
of  the  first  Power.  And  in  all  such  cases  the 
larger  part  of  the  menace  which  is  feared  proceeds 
upon  the  theory  that  the  older  interests  may  be 
attacked  by  the  arms  of  the  incoming  sovereignty. 

Japan  has  already  procured  from  the  United 
States  in  the  Ishii-Lansing  Agreement  a  recog- 
nition of  her  *' special  interests''  in  China.  Eng- 
land and  the  other  Allied  Powers  have  recognized 
those  special  interests  by  their  action  in  the 
Shantung  question  and  by  their  failure  to  call  for 
the  annulment  of  the  twenty-one  demands.    By 


A  CHINO-JAPANESE  UNION       101 

these  various  steps,  therefore,  Japan  has  un- 
doubtedly succeeded  in  creating  a  **  regional  un- 
derstanding'' with  respect  to  China,  and  by  virtue 
of  Article  21  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  the  validity  thereof  is  no  longer  subject 
to  attack  on  the  part  of  those  nations  who  sub- 
scribe to  the  Covenant.  And,  indeed,  should  the 
United  States,  which  is  not  a  member  of  the 
League,  undertake  to  attack  its  validity,  then 
Article  17  of  the  Covenant  comes  into  play,  and 
if  the  United  States  refuses  arbitration  thereunder 
and  resorts  to  war,  then  the  provisions  of  Article 
16  of  the  Covenant  become  pertinent,  involving 
application  of  the  blockade  by  all  the  other 
members  of  the  League  and  the  use  of  armed 
force,  if  necessary,  until  America  is  reduced  to 
submission. 

Accordingly,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  if  the 
Chinese  look  upon  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations  as  an  instrument  for  their  undoing.  Their 
refusal  to  sign  the  Peace  Treaty  was,  therefore, 
in  effect  merely  a  last  effort  to  save  their  in- 
dependence; and,  severe  as  the  lesson  was  for 
them,  it  was  an  illuminating  one.  The  absolute 
lack  of  good  faith  of  the  allied  nations  stood  forth 
in  all  its  nakedness.  Only  the  action  of  the 
United  States  Senate  saved  America  from  being 
involved  in  the  same  dishonour,  and  if  the  Amer- 
ican people  can  only  be  brought  to  understand  that 
fact,  constitutional  government  and  the  cause  of 


102       THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

democracy  will  have  been  greatly  strengthened 
in  the  Union. 

Other  factors  of  importance  which  will  aid 
greatly  in  the  creation  of  a  Chino- Japanese  union 
are  the  existence  in  China  of  a  large  and  in- 
fluential pro- Japanese  Party  and  the  existing 
chaos  in  her  finances.  The  pro- Japanese  Party  is 
to  be  found,  for  the  most  part,  in  the  north  of 
China,  and  numbers  a  great  many  of  the  military 
leaders  among  its  adherents.  While  it  is  true  that 
Japan  has  advanced  a  great  deal  of  money  in 
secret  loans  to  these  elements,  giving  colour  to  the 
oft-repeated  charge  of  widespread  corruption 
among  them,  it  is  nevertheless  a  fact  that  many 
leading  Chinese  favour  the  union  on  purely 
patriotic  grounds.  They  sincerely  believe  that 
no  other  way  lies  salvation  for  China. 

The  disorganization  of  her  finances  has  been 
due  to  a  variety  of  causes.  The  revolution  in 
China  brought  with  it  a  great  deal  of  civil  dissen- 
sion, out  of  which  arose  the  setting  up  in  each 
province  of  a  Home  Rule  government  in  the  hands 
of  a  Tuchun  or  Military  Governor.  Centralized 
government  ceased  to  exist;  the  Tuchuns  made 
war  on  one  another,  while  at  the  same  time  suf- 
fering from  the  ravages  of  civil  war  at  home. 
Each  of  these  Tuchuns  maintained  an  army,  to 
a  great  extent  supported  by  foreign  loans.  Such 
a  condition  of  things  naturally  lent  itself  easily 
to  the  intrigues  of  any  foreign  Power  that  wished 


A  CHINO-JAPANESE  UNION       lOS 

to  take  advantage  of  the  situation.  Until  these 
armies  are  disbanded  there  would  seem  to  be 
little  hope  of  improving  the  condition  of  China's 
finances.  Japan  is,  of  course,  in  a  position  to 
profit  most  by  these  conditions,  and  in  the  exist- 
ing Four-Power  Consortium  for  relieving  the 
financial  needs  of  China,  Japan  will  naturally, 
from  her  position  and  interests,  take  the  leading 
part.  England  and  France  may  be  somewhat 
embarrassed  by  their  own  pressing  needs  at  home, 
which  leaves  the  United  States  to  hold  the  bag 
with  Japan.  The  latter  coimtry,  having  already 
secured  a  first  lien  on  China's  most  profitable 
tax-producing  means,  is  thus  in  a  position  to 
exercise  a  controlling  voice  in  the  disposition  of 
whatever  assets  remain. 

Thus  we  perceive  a  net  spread  about  China 
from  which  it  will  be  difiicult  for  her  to  escape. 
Nor  is  it  a  matter  entirely  free  from  doubt,  under 
present  conditions,  whether  it  is  desirable  for  her 
to  escape. 

It  is,  however,  another  question  whether  the 
great]^Westem  Powers,  including  Russia,  can  afford 
in  their  own  selfish  interests  (leaving  moral  con- 
siderations out  of  the  question)  to  permit  such  a 
union  to  be  consimimated  between  the  Yellow 
races.  It  is  surely  fraught  with  many  future 
perils,  and  the  immediate  effect  of  it  would  no 
doubt  be  disastrous  in  its  economic  aspects. 

If  anything  is  to  be  done  to  forestall  China's 


IM      THE  NEW,  JAPANESE  PERIL. 

doom,  it  must 'Be  cTone  witJiout  much  delay. 
Peace  with  Russia  is  an  immediate  necessity. 
Then  must  follow  the  creation  of  the  only  possible 
alliance  that  can  save  the  Chinese  Empire,  namely. 
Great  Britain,  America,  Germany  and  Russia. 


CHAPTER  TWELVE 

Britain's  change  of  policy  in  asia 

The  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  Treaty,  which  ex- 
pires  nominally  on  July  13,  1921,  contains  a  self- 
extending  clause,  as  follows:  ''In  case  neither 
of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  should  have 
notified  twelve  months  before  the  expiration  of 
the  said  ten  years  the  intention  of  terminating  it, 
it  shall  remain  binding  until  the  expiration  of  one 
year  from  the  day  on  which  either  of  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  shall  have  denounced  it." 

At  the  present  writing  it  seems  altogether 
unlikely  that  the  treaty  will  be  renewed.  Ordi- 
narily, negotiations  for  its  renewal  would  now 
be  under  way,  and  the  fact  that  they  have  not 
taken  place  speaks  volumes.  For  Britain  is 
beginning  to  have  some  doubts  of  the  wisdom 
of  her  policy,  which,  though  successful  in  weaken- 
ing Russian  and  German  influence  in  Asia,  has 
created  in  their  stead  a  far  more  dangerous 
opponent  of  British  power  and  prestige  on  the 
Asiatic  Continent  than  either  of  the  others  could 
ever  hope  to  be. 

105 


106      THE  NEW.  JAPANESE  PERIL 

Indeed,  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  has  alto- 
gether been  a  costly^aflEair  for  Britain.  Its  eflfect 
has  been  to  establish,  by  slow  but  steady  stages, 
Japanese  paramountcy  in  China,  and  its  ultimate 
effect  may  be  even  more  far-reaching.  Step  by 
step,  British  diplomacy  retreated  before  the  Jap- 
anese onslaught.  Let  us  examine  briefly  how  it 
was  done. 

In  1907-8  British- American  interests  received 
concessions  from  China  for  the  construction  of 
two  lines  of  railway  in  Manchuria.  Without 
going  into  particulars,  they  were  laiown  as  the 
Fakumen  and  the  Chinchow-Aigun  railway  proj- 
ects. J  Japan  objected  to  the  construction  of 
these  railroads,  and  induced  Russia  to  join  her 
in  objecting  to  the  Chinchow-Aigim  Railroad,  on 
the  groimd  that  they  would  compete  with  the 
Manchurian  railways  under  their  control  and 
that  the  leasehold  rights  tmder  which  they  held 
protected  them  against  such  competition.  With- 
out attempting  to  go  into  the  merits  of  the  case, 
suffice  it  to  say  that  this  contention  was  warmly 
disputed  in  England  and  America,  and  in  China, 
also,  the  claim  was  considered  to  be  without 
sufficient  justification.  Nevertheless,  the  Japan- 
ese veto  was  upheld  by  the  British  Foreign  Office. 

In  Manchuria,  Japan  likewise  asserted  her 
right  to  establish  innumerable  other  regulations, 
designed  to  close  out  British  and  American  com- 
petition, in  connection  with  the  administration 


BRITAIN^S  CHANGE  OF  POLICY   107 

of  the  railway  zone  and  of  the  ports  of  entry  in 
South  Manchuria.  Indeed,  from  the  beginning 
of  her  occupation  Japan  indicated  that  she  held 
herself  in  a  position  of  superior  advantage  and 
privilege  in  the  matter  of  industry  and  trade, 
and  that,  in  despite  of  the  principle  of  the  "Open 
Door"  and  equal  opportunity  to  all  nations, 
she  was  invested  with  the  right  to  regulate  the 
activities  of  other  nations  who  sought  to  obtain 
any  benefits  or  to  conduct  any  enterprise  for 
profit  in  this  exclusively  Japanese  sphere  of 
influence.  And  again  the  British  Foreign  Office 
acquiesced. 

In  1909,  Secretary  Knox  made  his  famous 
proposal  for  the  neutralization  of  the  Manchurian 
railways  under  international  control.  The  effect 
of  this,  if  accepted,  would  have  been  to  secure 
for  China  the  enjoyment  of  her  political  rights 
in  Manchuria  and  to  promote  the  normal  develop- 
ment of  her  eastern  provinces.  It  would  have 
put  an  end  to  the  constantly  arising  disagreements 
among  the  Powers  with  respect  to  the  policy  of 
the  *'Open  Door"  and  trade  with  China. 

The  Chinese  Government  assented  to  the  pro- 
posal. Russia  and  Japan  rejected  it,  the  moving 
spirit,  however,  being,  as  always,  Japan.  The 
British  Foreign  Office,  which  was  supposed  by 
Secretary  Ejiox  to  be  in  accord  with  him  in  the 
proposal,  in  reality  took  its  cue  from  Japan  and 
failed  to  back  up  the  Knox  plan.    Thus  China's 


108      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

wishes  were  disregarded  and  Japan  was  per- 
mitted to  flout  the  plain  provisions  of  the  Ports- 
mouth Treaty.  Henceforth,  with  England's 
approval,  China  was  to  be  denied  the  right  to 
decide  upon  the  course  of  railway  development 
within  her  territory,  and  Japan's  strategical  and 
political  interests  were  recognized  as  paramount 
in  planning  a  railway  system  within  China's 
territory.  Moreover,  Japan  now  had  the  right 
to  decide  who  would  finance,  construct  and 
operate  railways  within  China's  territory  and  to 
veto  arrangements  with  respect  to  these  matters 
which  China  wished  to  carry  out. 

In  this  connection,  it  may  perhaps  remove  any 
still  remaining  doubt  in  the  reader's  mind  with 
respect  to  the  above  conclusions  if  I  recall  the 
fact  that  in  still  another  part  of  China,  far  away 
from  Treaty  Ports  and  all  acknowledged  spheres 
of  influence  of  foreign  Powers,  an  American  syndi- 
cate proposed  to  construct  railways  1,500  miles  in 
length,  the  principal  being  from  Feng  Chen  in 
Mongolia  to  Kansu,  on  the  remote  western  borders. 
It  promised  great  economic  results.  It  had  no 
,  connection  whatever  with  politics.  It  was  solely 
a  work  of  development.  This  project,  like  all 
the  others  we  have  mentioned,  fell  under  the  ban  of 
the  Japanese  Government.  The  American  protest 
was  unheard.  The  Japanese  veto  held  good,  for 
England  stood  with  Japan. 

Korea  since  1883,  and  up  to  the  time  of  her 


BRITAIN'S  CHANGE  OF  POLICY   109 

annexation  by  Japan  in  1910,  was  always  con- 
sidered more  or  less  of  a  protege  of  America, 
Missions  and  schools  were  established  there  by 
American  philanthropic  and  religious  circles,  and 
there  had  grown  up^a  close  feeling  of  sympathy 
and  regard  in  America  for  their  Korean  bene- 
ficiaries. The  fate  of  Korea  could,  accordingly, 
never  be  a  matter  of  indifference  to  Americans, 
and  when  Japan  carried  through  her  ruthless 
annexation  plans  in  1910,  involving  the  complete 
subjection  of  the  Korean  nation,  American  circles 
were  deeply  moved.  And  here  again  we  perceive 
the  hand  of  Britain,  for  Korea's  fate  had  been 
sealed  in  the  Anglo- Japanese  Treaty  of  Alliance 
of  1905,  imder  which  Korea  is  dealt  with  as 
follows : 

*' Article  III. — ^Japan  possessing  paramotmt  po- 
litical, military  and  economic  interests  in  Korea, 
Great  Britain  recognizes  the  right  of  Japan  to 
take  such  measures  of  guidance,  control  and  pro- 
tection in  Korea  as  she  may  deem  proper  and 
necessary  to  safeguard  and  advance  those  in- 
terests- .  •  ." 

Britain's  acquiescence  in  Japan's  designs  upon 
Korea,  equally  with  her  assent  to  the  granting  of 
a  free  hand  to  Japan  and  Russia  in  Manchuria 
and  Mongolia,  was  an  indication  that  she  was 
moving  in  the  direction  of  a  complete  abandon- 
ment of  the  **Open  Door"  policy,  whereas  the 
rejection  of  Secretary  Knox's  plan,  the  greatest 


no      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

and  wisest  proposal  that  has  ever  been  made  to 
assist  China  in  her  struggle  to  preserve  her  au- 
tonomy, is  convincing  evidence  of  her  complete 
surrender  to  Japan  in  the  Far  East.  But  as  there 
are  always  bound  to  be  doubters,  let  us  examine 
some  further  evidence  of  England's  strange  yield- 
ing to  Japan  in  Far  Eastern  questions. 

In  the  province  of  Fukien  an  American  firm 
had  secured  a  contract  to  build  a  dry-dock  for 
China.  It  was  purely  a  commercial  project  and 
had  no  political  significance.  As  soon  as  Japan 
heard  of  the  matter,  she  lodged  a  vigorous  protest 
with  the  State  Department  at  Washington.  Not 
having  been  consulted  in  the  matter,  or  asked  to 
participate,  she  warned  the  State  Department  that 
imless  the  project  was  dropped  Japan  would  re- 
gard the  assent  of  the  American  Government  as 
an  unfriendly  act.  Japan's  viewpoint  prevailed. 
But  not  content  with  her  success  in  opposing  the 
project  in  question,  Japan  now  set  to  work  to 
make  her  veto  on  all  similar  projects  permanent, 
by  causing  to  be  inserted  in  the  twenty-one 
demands  imposed  on  China  in  1915  an  article  to 
the  effect  that  China  is  to  grant  to  no  other  Power 
than  Japan  any  concession  for  a  shipyard,  coaling 
station  or  similar  establishment,  and  to  permit  no 
private  establishment  of  the  kind  with  foreign 
capital. 

While  it  is  true  that  it  may  be  claimed  that  the 
dry-dock  project  concerned  the  United  States 


BRITAIN'S  CHANGE  OF  POLICY   111 

alone  and  not  Britain,  in  reality  it  is  not  so. 
For  the  State  Department's  final  decision  to  bow 
to  the  Japanese  decree  was  influenced,  if  not 
exclusively  dictated,  by  the  knowledge  that  the 
British  Foreign  Office  was  not  opposed  to  the 
Japanese  stand,  and  that  America  would  be 
playing  a  lone  hand  if  she  insisted  on  her  rights 
in  the  matter. 

With  Britain,  moreover,  rests  the  chief  respon- 
sibility that  Japan  has  had  her  will  over  China  in 
the  matter  of  Shantung,  for  it  was  under  the 
initiative  of  England  that  the  other  Allied  Powers 
signed  the  secret  agreement  of  February-March 
1 91 7,  agreeing  to  support  Japan's  claims  on  Shan- 
timg  at  the  Peace  Conference.  It  was  upon 
England's  initiative  in  this,  as  in  most  other  inter- 
AlHed  matters,  for  the  reason  that  Britain,  as  the 
foremost  nation  in  the  Western  coalition,  was  in  a 
position,  by  reason  of  her  military,  naval  and 
financial  strength,  to  impose  her  guidance  upon 
the  other  allied  nations  in  all  questions  which  did 
not  affect  any  vital  interests  of  her  alUes,  and,  of 
course,  in  the  Far  East  England's  interests  were 
superior  to  those  of  any  other  Western  nation. 

Up  to  1 91 5  British  commercial  interests  in  the 
Far  East  looked  on,  astounded  and  somewhat 
exasperated,  at  what  they  perceived  was  a  con- 
stant sacrifice  of  their  interests  to  the  interests  of 
Japan,  and  they  asked  themselves  what  compen- 
sations Britain  was  getting.    I  say  ** up  to  1915/' 


112      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

for  up  to  that  time  these  British  commercial 
interests  had  grown  firm  in  the  beHef  that  Britain 
was  playing  to  retain  her  position  of  exclusive 
privileges  in  the  Yangtse  Valley,  and  was  sacri- 
ficing her  position  elsewhere  because  of  the  neces- 
sity of  making  concessions  to  the  vigorous  Japanese 
onslaughts.  Accordingly,  it  was  expected  that  in 
return  for  England*s  complacency  elsewhere, 
Japan  would  at  least  respect  her  paramount  posi- 
tion in  the  Yangtse  Valley  and  in  South  China. 

Not  so,  however.  For  in  191 5  and  1916  Japan 
laid  her  hands  upon  the  chief  British  enterprises 
in  this  region,  notably  the  Han-Yeh-Ping  Iron 
and  Coal  Company,  and,  what  is  more,  made  the 
permanency  of  her  control  over  the  mines  and 
other  important  enterprises  in  this  region  a  matter 
of  negotiation  with  China,  and  accordingly  wp 
find  the  matter  treated  and  disposed  of,  witK 
Japanese  particularity,  in  Section  III  of  the 
twenty-one  demands  presented  to  China  in  1915. 
It  is  true  that  in  the  revised  demands  which  were 
actually  imposed  on  China  in  May  1915,  tlie 
original  demands  with  respect  to  the  Yangtse 
Valley  were  somewhat  modified.  But  this  did 
not  take  away  from  the  purpose  of  the  Japanese 
Government  to  supersede  British  influence  in  the 
Yangtse  Valley.  Nor,  so  far  as  is  known,  has  the 
British  Government  ever  protested  against  the 
demands.    Only  the  American  Government  did  so. 

One  further  instance  of  Japan's  interference 


BRITAIN'S  CHANGE  OF  POLICY   US 

where  foreign  Governments  have  sought  to  inter- 
est themselves  in  the  affairs  of  China  is  to  be 
found  in  the  history  of  the  Four-Power  Loan. 
After  the  revolution  and  the  establishment  of  re- 
publican government  in  China,  the  so-called  Four- 
Power  financial  group,  composed  of  British, 
American,  French  and  German  bankers,  respond- 
ing to  the  request  of  the  Chinese  Government, 
tmdertook  to  make  financial  advances  for  im- 
mediate use,  pending  the  issue  of  a  large  covering 
loan.  China  needed  money  for  internal  adminis- 
tration and  for  internal  improvements  and  develop- 
ments. Without  foreign  help  it  was  an  utter  im- 
possibility for  the  Chinese  Treasury  to  meet  its 
already  existing  obligations,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
programme  of  internal  reform  and  administration 
with  which  the  new  Government  proposed  to 
inaugurate  its  official  career. 

The  ensuing  negotiations  with  the  Four-Power 
group  continued  for  nearly  a  year  and  were  at- 
tended by  various  developments  which  it  is  beyond 
our  purpose  to  go  into.  Arrangements  for  the 
loan  had  proceeded  to  quite  an  advanced  stage, 
when  Japan  decided  it  was  about  time  to  interfere. 
Accordingly,  she  procured  Russia  to  join  with  her 
in  a  demand  to  be  included  in  the  group.  The 
request  was  objectionable,  coming  at  the  time  it 
did,  for  the  reason  that  it  raised  a  hitch  in  the 
negotiations  at  a  moment  when  China  was  in 
crying  need  of  fimds,  and  for  the  further  reason  > 


114      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

that  neither  Japan  nor  Russia  had,  at  the  time, 
any  free  capital  to  invest.  Moreover,  Japan's 
objection  put  political  questions  to  the  fore,  par- 
ticularly with  respect  to  the  use  of  any  part  of  the 
loan  for  the  promotion  of  industrial  enterprises  in 
Manchuria.  Thus,  as  Japan  put  it,  the  Russian 
and  Japanese  spheres  oi  influence  would  be  en- 
croached upon.  The  Four-Power  bankers,  realiz- 
ing the  complications  that  would  ensue,  imme- 
diately recognized  the  inadvisability  of  admitting 
Russian  and  Japanese  participation  in  a  loan 
agreement  which  they  had  striven  to  make  of  a 
purely  commercial  character.  The  British  For- 
eign Office,  however,  true  to  its  new  Asiatic  policy, 
exerted  its  Influence  in  favour  of  accepting  the 
Japanese  proposal.  China,  the  United  States  and 
Germany  were  opposed  to  it.  But  the  British 
view  finally  prevailed,  and  the  result  was  precisely 
what  the  Four-Power  bankers  had  apprehended. 
Complications  were  at  once  made.  Russia  and 
Japan,  mutually  supporting  one  another,  wanted  a 
stipulation  in  the  reorganization  loan  that  those 
Powers  must  be  consulted  about  any  provisions 
and  expenditures  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia. 
Discord  arose  among  the  group  bankers.  Many 
conferences  were  held,  but  it  seemed  impossible 
to  arrive  at  a  definite  understanding.  The 
American  representatives,  with  the  approval  of  the 
American  Government,  refused  to  participate 
further  if  any  restrictions  were  placed  on  China's 


BRITAIN'S  CHANGE  OF  POLICY  115 

autonomy  and  the  principle  of  the  "Open  Door/' 
Finally,  after  months  of  haggling,  the  Six-Power 
group  reached  an  understanding.  But  the  delay, 
aside  from  its  other  impleasant  issues,  had  one 
tmexpected  result.  A  new  Administration  had,  in 
the  meantime,  come  into  power  in  Washington, 
and  President  Wilson  was  averse  to  American 
participation  on  the  ground  that  the  reorganiza- 
tion loan  touched  the  internal  affairs  of  China,  and, 
accordingly,  the  American  bankers  had  to  with- 
draw as  participants  in  the  loan.  Thus  China 
lost  the  benefit  of  an  influence  that  would  have 
been  of  the  utmost  service  to  her,  not  only  in 
maintaining  the  *'Open  Door"  poKcy,  but  in 
creating  a  wider  international  market  for  Chinese 
investments.  Moreover,  American  participation 
would  have  greatly  ameliorated  foreign  pressure 
upon  the  conduct  of  China's  internal  affairs. 
China's  evil  genius,  however,  had,  with  British 
support,  scored  another  point. 

From  the  foregoing  pages,  it  must  be  clear  to 
the  reader  that  Britain,  since  her  rapprochement 
with  France  (1904)  and  Russia  (1907),  has  had  a 
policy  in  Asia  which,  even  to  many  thoughtful 
Englishmen,  has  seemed  to  border  on  the  mys- 
terious. Inquiring  minds  are  imable  to  arrive 
at  a  reasonable  conclusion  with  respect  to  what 
advantages  Britain  has  received  or  expects  to 
receive  by  reason  of  her  continued  and  tmin- 
terrupted  support  of  the  Japanese  programme  in 


116      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

Asia.  It  IS  true,  as  has  been  stated,  that  the 
Treaty  of  Alliance  runs  out  in  1921.  But  it  is 
self-extending,  and  the  failure  to  renew  it  or  to 
denounce  it  before  a  balance  of  account  has 
been  struck  between  Britain  and  Japan  gives 
rise  to  surmises  that  the  treaty  contains  secret 
clauses  which  it  is  in  the  interest  of  neither  nation 
to  make  public,  but  which  have  some  bearing  on 
Britain*s  past  and  future  policy  in  Asia.  And, 
indeed,  it  is  the  uncertainty  with  respect  to  this 
fact  which  may  make  it  difficult  for  other  nations 
to  work  together  with  Britain  in  negotiating  for 
a  future  poUcy  in  the  Far  East. 


CHAPTER  THIRTEEN 

THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE 

As  has  already  been  indicated  in  the  foregoing 
chapter,  the  question  of  the  renewal  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  is  already  a  moot  point,  and 
in  considering  the  probabilities  and  possibilities 
thereof,  it  will  be  well  to  consider  some  new 
aspects  of  the  subject  which  have  arisen  since 
the  last  Treaty  of  Alliance  was  signed  in  1911. 

In  the  first  place,  it  must  be  bome  in  mind  that 
aside  from  putting  a  check  on  the  aggressive 
tendencies  of  Russia  in  Asia,  and  aside  from  the 
aid  and  protection  given  to  Britain's  European 
policy  after  1907,  the  main  purpose  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Treaty  of  Alliance  was  to  protect  and 
preserve  the  integrity  of  China  as  an  independent 
state  and  to  maintain  therein  the  principle  of 
the  **Open  Door'*  for  the  commerce  of  all  nations 
on  a  footing  of  equality. 

Accordingly,  any  renewal  of  the  Alliance  which 
failed  to  emphasize  and  safeguard  this  principle 
and  to  insist  upon  its  equitable  application 
would  not  only  be  useless  from  the  British  point 

117 


118      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

of  view,  but  a  certain  source  of  trouble  in  the 
future.  In  Japan,  on  the  contrary,  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  is  now  regarded,  in  many- 
respects,  as  a  hindrance  rather  than  as  an  advan- 
tage, because  of  the  possible  restrictions  that 
may  flow  out  of  it  upon  Japanese  policy  in  China, 
due  to  its  fundamental  clash  with  British  interests 
there.  Thus  far  Japan  has  managed  to  have 
her  way,  in  spite  of  the  restrictions  of  the  treaty. 
But  in  doing  so  she  has  made  herself  an  object 
of  suspicion  and  distrust  in  British  Government 
circles,  which  may  in  the  end  go  far  to  offset  any 
gains  that  have  been  acquired  at  a  time  when 
Britain  was  not  in  a  position  to  oppose  her  full 
strength  to  the  Japanese  encroachments.  For 
in  Great  Britain  it  is  at  present  realized  chat  she 
has  paid  more  for  the  Alliance  than  it  was  worth 
to  her. 

We  must  now  consider  what  are  the  central 
facts  in  the  actual  situation  in  the  Far  East 
that  have  a  bearing  upon  the  question  of  the 
renewal  of  the  treaty.  These  may  be  summed 
up  as  follows: 

(i)  A  lack  of  centralization  in  the  government 
of  China.  Discord  and  dissension  among  the 
governing  forces  or  those  able  to  govern  have 
made  it  possible  for  Japan  to  acquire  a  position 
of  ascendancy.  China's  financial  difficulties  have 
been  exploited  by  Japan  in  a  manner  to  strengthen 
her  hold  on  the  various  factions  who  rule,  or 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    119 

pretend  to  rule,  in  the  contending  sections  and 
provinces  of  China.  There  being  no  regular 
revenues,  the  Peking  Government  has  been  com- 
pelled to  negotiate  foreign  loans,  for  the  most 
part  in  Japan,  who,  in  each  instance  of  a  new 
loan,  manages  to  attach  such  terms  and  conditions 
as  will  tighten  the  hold  she  already  has  on  the 
economic  and  financial  resources  of  China  and 
will  make  it  difficult  for  that  unhappy  country  to 
free  itself  from  a  financial  incubus  that  threatens 
to  stifle  its  very  national  existence. 

(2)  The  first  condition  of  a  restoration  to 
healthful  conditions  in  China  must  be  to  free  her 
government  from  the  shackles  that  bind  it  to 
Japan.  There  are  enough  independent  elements, 
a  sufficiently  large  ruling  class,  in  China,  and  a 
well-enough  organized  body  of  administrative 
functionaries  to  successfully  conduct  a  free  gov- 
ernment. But  China  must  really  be  free  to  act 
for  herself.  So  long  as  the  shadow  of  Japan 
hovers  over  the  land,  there  can  be  little  hope  of 
reconstruction  and  centralization  along  really 
democratic  lines. 

(3)  Under  no  consideration  should  there  be 
any  attempt  at  foreign  intervention.  Foreign 
intervention  has  brought  China  to  what  she  is 
to-day,  namely,  a  land  torn  by  faction,  verging 
on  bankruptcy,  impotent  to  oppose  force  by  force, 
a  complex  of  divergent  tendencies  that  are  not 
permitted  to  tmite  or  to  attain  uniformity.    A 


120       THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

virile,  intelligent,  thrifty  and  hard-working  people 
have  been  rendered  impotent  to  realize  and  put 
forth  their  full  strength.  They  have  in  turn 
been  hoodwinked,  bargained  with,  coerced  by 
force  of  arms,  lied  to,  cheated,  and  even  drugged 
and  narcotized  in  order  to  keep  them  in  leading- 
strings,  to  bind  them  to  the  paying  of  tribute  to 
their  unscrupulous  oppressors,  and  to  prevent 
them  from  rousing  themselves  from  their  slumbers 
and  throwing  off  their  tormentors.  Indeed,  what 
the  Far  East,  and  in  particular  China,  needs  is 
a  fresh  breeze,  perhaps  a  cyclone,  to  drive  out 
the  poisonous  gases  which  threaten  to  destroy 
its  very  life. 

(4)  Any  attempt  to  establish  a  consortium  of 
the  Powers,  to  attend  to  the  financial  needs  of 
China,  will  play  into  the  hands  of  Japan,  unless 
at  the  same  time  measures  are  taken  to  prevent 
unnecessary  interference  in  the  administrative 
processes  of  China.  It  would,  if  established 
without  the  proper  safeguards,  simply  mean  the 
organization  of  a  committee,  representing  certain 
of  the  Great  Powers,  with  a  Japanese  chairman 
and  Japanese  influence  predominant  thereon 
throughout.  It  would  mean  another  oppor- 
tunity for  Japan,  tmder  the  guise  of  exercising 
international  control,  to  strengthen  her  mastery 
over  China  and  to  make  that  country  entirely 
subservient  to  her  interests  and  leadership. 

(5)  The  newly  created  world  situation  demands 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    121 

that  increased  recognition  be  given  to  the  fact 
that  the  negotiations  for  a  renewal  of  the  AlU- 
ance  would  be  entirely  out  of  harmony  with 
the  principles  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  That  the  hour  is  approaching  when 
the  Chinese  Republic,  with  its  400,000,000  inhab- 
itants, will  decide  between  a  close  offensive  and 
defensive  alliance  with  Japan  and  representation 
as  an  independent  Power  (restored  to  all  its 
rights  of  sovereignty,  which  have  been  seriously 
impaired  by  the  actions  and  measures  of  Japan 
and  other  Great  Powers)  in  the  League  of  Nations. 
That  the  Chinese  Republic  having  become  a 
member  of  the  League  of  Nations  (by  signing  the 
Treaty  of  St.-Germain,  with  Austria)  is  in  a 
position  to  demand  that  the  principles  of  the 
Covenant  be  applied  to  it  as  to  any  other  inde- 
pendent signatory  Power,  and  that  China  cannot, 
as  formerly,  be  brought  within  the  scope  of  any 
international  agreement,  on  the  lines  of  the 
existing  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  Treaty,  without 
offending  the  principles  of  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  That  it  is  now  squarely  up 
to  the  Western  nations  to  decide  what  course 
they  are  in  future  to  pursue  towards  China, 
namely,  whether  they  shall  apply  the  principles 
of  the  League  of  Nations  to  China,  and,  there- 
fore, defend  and  protect  her  independence  and 
territorial  integrity,  or  whether  they  shall  betray 
these  principles,  and  with  them  the  League  gf 


122       THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

Nations,  by  returning  to  the  old  methods  of  pillage 
and  exploitation. 

The  foregoing  are  the  outstanding  facts  that 
will  have  to  be  weighed  carefully  by  the  British 
Foreign  Office  before  coming  to  any  definite 
conclusions  with  respect  to  the  renewal  of  the 
treaty.  The  inclination  is,  perhaps,  present,  in 
view  of  many  still  undetermined  factors  elsewhere, 
for  Britain  to  allow  the  whole  business  of  the 
treaty  to  rest  a  while,  and  even  to  permit  the 
Alliance  to  run  on  unrevised  under  the  self- 
extending  clauses  of  the  treaty.  If  so,  such  a 
course  is  certain  to  perpetuate  many  difficulties 
under  which  British  commerce  suffers  and  will 
seriously  prejudice  British  prestige  in  the  eyes 
of  the  Chinese.  Indeed,  the  Chinese  have  wit- 
nessed with  astonishment  the  apparent  com- 
placency which  up  to  now  has  been  displayed  by 
the  British,  in  the  face  of  the  fact  that  the  spirit 
of  the  Alliance  has  been  broken  in  so  many 
important  particulars,  as  witness  the  mockery  of 
the  so-called  ''Open  Door**  policy  in  Manchuria, 
the  abuse  of  trade-marks,  the  innumerable  petty 
loans  to  Peking  which  have  wasted  China's 
resources  and  kept  the  country  in  perpetual 
unrest,  and  the  uncertainty  of  Japan's  future 
action  with  respect  to  the  province  of  Shantung. 

If  we  look  now  at  the  attitude  of  the  Japanese 
towards  the  treaty,  we  find  that  the  chief  en- 
thusiasm for  a  renewal  is  to  be  found  among 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   123 

those  whose  principal  fear  is  lest  Japan  find  her- 
self poUtically  isolated  in  world  diplomacy.     For 
them,  the  renewal  of  the  AlHance  is  desirable  for 
the  one  reason*  if  for  no  other,  that  thereby  Japan 
may  show  the  world  that  the  many  signs  which 
have  been  pointing  recently  to  the  political  isola- 
tion of  Japan  are  completely  without  meaning. 
The  Japanese  sensitiveness  to  the  judgment  of 
the  outside  world,  in  this  regard,  may  be  a  power- 
ful factor  in  England's  hands  to  secure  such  a 
revision  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  as  will 
render-  her  position  with  respect  to  China  some- 
what   stronger    and    that    of    Japan    somewhat 
weaker.     If  Britain  should  decide  upon  a  revision 
of  the  treaty  along  lines  which  respected  Chinese 
rights,  the  Liberal  Party  in  Japan  would  be  her 
ally  in  such  a  diplomatic  move,  but  the  question 
is,  whether  the  growth  of  Liberalism  in  Japan 
Jhas  yet  attained  to  such  proportions  as  to  consti- 
tute a  sufficient  check  on  the  Imperialism  of  the 
ruling  classes.     The  result  of  the  recent  elections 
would  seem  to  indicate  the  contrary.    We  may, 
therefore,   conclude  that  as  yet  the  militaristic 
elements  in  the  political  life  of  Japan  will  continue 
to  steer  a  course  of  adventure  and  expansion  in 
world  politics  and  that  they  will  try  to  offset  the 
possible   advantages   of   a   new   Anglo- Japanese 
Alliance  by  pointing  out  the  disadvantages  to 
Japan's  world  position  in  case  she  yields  too  much 
for  the  sake  of  securing  the  British  signature  to 


124       THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

a  new  treaty  that  may  carry  with  it  greater 
hindrances  than  benefits.  In  other  words,  the 
leaders  of  Japanese  Real  Politik  deny  that  Japan 
can  obtain  as  great  substantial  material  advan- 
tages from  such  a  treaty  as  she  can  obtain  if  she 
goes  on  playing  a  lone  hand,  imembarrassed  by 
any  treaty  obligations. 

Japan  is  a  member  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
but  the  ties  which  bind  her  to  it  are  of  the  lightest, 
and  she  is  in  much  the  same  position,  with  respect 
thereto,  as  Germany,  who  is  able  to  choose 
whether  she  will  throw  in  her  commercial  and 
industrial  future  with  the  League  or  with  America, 
which  is  outside  the  League. 

Similarly,  Japan  might  try  to  resolve  all  diffi- 
culties with  America  and,  dependent  as  she  is  on 
the  latter  country  for  much  of  her  raw  material, 
make  a  virtue  of  necessity  and  close  a  very  tight 
agreement  with  both  America  and  Germany. 
Both  of  these  coimtries  afford  great  markets  for 
Japanese  manufactured  goods,  and  both  of  them 
produce,  in  large  measure,  what  Japanese  industry 
and  trade  require.  Such  an  understanding  would 
rest  upon  purely  financial  and  economic  grounds 
and  have  as  a  basis  for  its  existence  over  a  meas- 
urable term  of  years  the  calling  of  a  truce  with 
respect  to  all  outstanding  controversies,  the 
coimtries  recognizing  the  paramount  need  of  the 
world  to  get  back  to  work  and  restore  prosperity 
to  the  peoples  before  engaging  themselves  in  new 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    125 

disputes  over  political  questions  of  prestige,  power 
and  expansion  which  will  lead  to  more  wars. 

As  the  writer  sees  it,  the  only  other  successful 
alternative  for  England,  as  against  such  a  working 
together  of  America,  Japan  and  Germany,  would 
lie  in  the  combination  already  referred  to  in  these 
pages,  namely,  America,  England,  Germany  and 
Russia. 

For  it  is  only  a  question  of  time,  and  of  a 
much  shorter  time  than  is  generally  supposed, 
when  Germany  will  regain  her  old  position  of 
Britain's  most  active  competitor.  The  recent 
war  has  demonstrated  that  it  is  more  costly  to 
attempt  to  destroy  such  a  competitor  than  it  is 
to  try  to  live  on  good  terms  with  him,  imder  a 
policy  of  give  and  take,  live  and  let  live.  Those 
who  are  the  first  to  learn  the  lessons  of  the  war 
in  this  regard  will  also  be  the  first  to  restore 
prosperity  to  their  own  ruined  fortunes. 

It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  very  little  can, 
with  any  degree  of  certainty,  be  forecasted  with 
respect  to  future  Anglo-Japanese  relations,  with- 
out some  knowledge  of  what  Japan's  policy  is  to 
be  and  the  reaction  of  the  United  States  thereto. 
If  negotiations  for  a  removal  or  revision  of  the 
Alliance  are  commenced,  Britain  will,  of  course, 
be  guided,  to  a  very  great  extent,  by  the  views 
her  statesmen  entertain  with  respect  to  these 
questions.  Nor  will  they  venture  to  lose  sight 
of  the  fact  that  the  events  of  the  last  five  years 


126       THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

have  been  full  of  portents  that  point  the  way  of 
future  trouble  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan. 
Those  who  think  otherwise  confine  their  argu- 
ments to  the  fact  that  Japan  is  apparently  con- 
cerning herself  only  with  matters  in  the  North 
Pacific  and  China,  where  the  extent  of  her 
** special  interests''  is  less  a  question  of  dispute 
than  are  her  claims  in  other  directions.  But 
those  who  hold  to  the  opinion  that  the  Japanese 
will,  in  the  future,  by  no  means  be  content  with 
the  playing  of  a  partial  or  subordinate  r61e  in 
the  Pacific,  conceding  to  Britain  and  America  a 
share  in  the  division  of  spheres  of  influence,  point 
out  that  if  Japanese  interests  lie  wholly  in  the 
North  Pacific,  it  is  hard  to  understand  why  she 
has  come  southward  more  than  3,000  miles  to  the 
Marshall  and  Caroline  Islands  and  to  the  French 
islands  (the  Loyalty  and  Marquesas  groups),  less 
than  1,500  miles  from  the  eastern  coast  of  Australia. 

Before  the  new  or  revised  Anglo- Japanese 
Alliance  becomes  a  fixed  fact,  there  must  surely 
come  a  clearing  up  of  certain  points  which,  as 
yet,  are  obscure  both  to  Australians  and  to 
Americans.  So  far  as  the  former  are  concerned, 
their  demand  is  that  Japan  give  a  definite  guaran- 
tee to  confine  her  operations  to  the  North  Pacific 
and  that  she  assent  to  the  recognition  of  Australia 
as  a  white  man's  country  exclusively. 

On  the  other  hand,  America  will  always  see  in 
an  Anglo- Japanese  AlUance  a  possible  menace 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    127 

to  her  interests,  and  nothing  can  ever  remove  the 
fear  of  such  a  menace  from  the  minds  and  hearts 
of  Americans  except  a  declaration  contained  in 
the  treaty  itself  that  in  no  circumstances  is  the 
Alliance  aimed  at  America,  and  that  in  the  event  J 
of  a  Japanese  conflict,  into  which  America  may 
be  drawn,  England  does  not  obligate  herself  to 
join  with  Japan  or  to  take  sides  in  any  way  against 
the  United  States. 

So  long  as  such  a  guarantee  is  left  out  of  future 
agreements  between  England  and  Japan,  just  so 
long  will  Americans,  even  though  they  be  true 
friends  of  both  countries,  harbour  suspicions 
which  cannot  fail  to  weaken  those  cordial  relations 
between  States  which  are  the  chief  and  most 
valuable  elements  of  future  international  concord. 
Nor  should  these  guarantees  be  confined  to  an 
assurance  as  regards  America  alone.  Holland 
in  her  East  Indies  and  France  in  her  South  Asian 
and  Southern  Pacific  possessions  have  likewise 
an  interest  in  knowing  that  the  Anglo- Japanese 
Alliance  does  not  concern  itself  with  matters 
antagonistic  to  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo. 

Secret  diplomacy  stands  under  condemnation 
by  the  peoples  of  the  world,  and  Governments 
would  do  well  to  remember  that,  in  future, 
peoples  will  not  so  easily  allow  themselves  to  be 
dragged  into  wars,  the  seeds  of  which  have  been 
sown  by  those  who  refuse  to  listen  to  the  awakened 
voice  of  humanity. 


CHAPTER  FOURTEEN 

THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE   ALLIANCE 

With  respect  to  the  course  which  Anglo- Japanese 
relations  are  to  take  in  the  future,  there  is  one  very 
important  possibility  that  it  will  scarcely  do  to 
ignore.  Thus  far,  in  discussing  the  probabilities 
of  an  Anglo- Japanese  renewal  of  the  Treaty  of 
Alliance,  the  writer  has  based  his  conjectures 
upon  what  might  be  termed  the  normal  factors 
in  international  relations.  They  are  the  factors 
such  as  we  have  grown  accustomed  to  from  long 
usage  and  tradition,  such  as,  for  example,  that 
civilized  nations  will  not  employ  barbarous 
methods  in  making  war  and  will  respect  the  usual 
usages  of  war;  that  they  will  not  employ  savages 
or  semi-civilized  tribes  to  make  war  on  other 
civilized  nations  or  to  occupy  their  territory  with 
such  troops;  that  civilized  nations  will  no  longer 
engage  in  the  slave-trade  or,  what  is  equally  bad, 
compel  their  savage  or  semi-civilized  subjects 
by  methods  that  are  repulsive  to  humanity  to 
serve  in  their  conscript  armies;    that  an  inferior 

128 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    129 

civilization,  like  the  African,  shall  not  be  put 
in  a  position  where  it  may  become  a  menace  to 
the  higher  civilization  of  the  White  man  or  the 
Yellow  man. 

Such  are  some  of  the  normal  factors  in  inter- 
national relations  that  we  have  learned  to  honour 
and  observe  in  times  that  are  past.  But  we 
have  seen  them  all  violated  in  the  past  six  years. 
Moreover,  the  guilty  ones  are  confined  to  no  one 
group  of  the  belligerent  Powers,  and  some  of  the 
worst  of  the  violations  were  committed  after 
hostilities  had  ceased. 

Bearing  these  facts  in  mind,  the  purport  of 
which  simply  is  that  precedents,  usages  and 
traditions  (even  though  they  are  of  the  kind 
which  all  the  moral  forces  of  mankind  approve) 
no  longer  possess  any  power  to  hold  our  minds 
in  thrall,  we  may,  perhaps,  be  compelled  to  revise 
some  of  our  conclusions,  or,  at  least,  to  give  con- 
sideration to  certain  possibilities  which,  under 
the  old  normal  conditions,  we  should  reject  as 
crude  and  fanciful. 

And  among  such  possibilities  is  that  of  an 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  the  terms  of  which 
will  include  a  sharing  of  the  Asiatic  Continent 
and  of  all  the  Russias  between  the  two  allied 
nations. 

If  the  foregoing  suggestion  seems  at  all  fan- 
tastic to  the  reader,  let  him  bethink  that  Japan 
and   Britain,    by   slow   and   quiet   stages,    have 


130      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

already  seized  upon  and  now  control  all  the 
approaches  to  Russia,  China  and  the  Asiatic 
Continent. 

Russia  and  China  together  are  potentially  the 
most  important  commercial  fields  in  the  world. 
All  the  world  wishes  to  trade  with  them.  But 
Japan  has  occupied  Eastern  Siberia  and  together 
with  Britain  controls  all  the  strategic  approaches 
to  China  from  the  east — Dalny,  Tsingtau,  the 
Luchu  Islands,  Formosa,  Hong  Kong,  Singapore, 
and  the  Straits  of  Malacca.  On  the  west  and 
south,  Britain  now  controls  all  the  approaches 
to  Russia  and  the  Asiatic  Continent — Gibraltar, 
the  Dardanelles,  Suez,  Egypt,  Aden,  the  Persian 
Gulf,  East  Africa,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  On 
the  north,  Britain  controls  the  approaches  to 
Russia  by  reason  of  her  command  of  the  sea,  her 
control  of  the  Baltic  and  its  approaches,  and  from 
the  naval  base  she  is  creating  for  herself  at  Danzig. 
Thus  we  perceive  that  foreign  trade  can  only 
enter  Russia  by  passing  through  a  Japanese  zone 
on  the  east  and  a  British  zone  on  the  north,  west 
and  south.  Moreover,  a  glance  at  the  map  will 
prove  to  the  reader  that  Japanese  occupation  of 
Siberia  east  of  Lake  Baikal,  together  with  the 
existing  occupation  of  Manchuria  by  Japan,  pro- 
vides that  country,  to  use  a  wrestler's  expression, 
with  a  *' half -Nelson''  hold  on  the  Northern 
Provinces  of  China.  Japan's  occupation  of  East- 
em  Siberia  is,  accordingly,  a  move  directed  not 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    131 

only  against  Russia,  but  against  China.  Indeed, 
no  action  that  Japan  has  taken,  since  the  inaugura- 
tion of  her  imperial  policy  of  expansion,  more 
loudly  proclaims  her  intentions  as  regards  China 
and  the  Asiatic  Continent  than  this  occupation, 
with  British  approval,  of  Siberia  east  of  Lake 
Baikal.  For  here,  if  anywhere,  Chinese  interests 
are  paramount,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  China  and 
Siberia  are  contiguous  on  a  land  frontier  extending 
for  thousands  of  miles  and  that  the  Eastern 
Siberian  region  is  traversed  by  the  Siberian  Rail- 
road, which  also  runs  for  a  thousand  miles  through 
Chinese  territory,  where  it  is  known  as  the 
Chinese  Eastern  Railway.  This  great  avenue  of 
communication,  the  overland  connection  between 
Europe  and  the  shores  of  the  Pacific,  has  now,  so 
far  as  its  entire  Eastern  section  is  concerned,  fallen 
a  prey  to  the  Japanese.  China,  who  sought,  after 
the  breakdown  in  the  Russian  governmental 
functions  after  the  Revolution,  to  take  over  from 
Russia  the  operation  of  the  Chinese  Eastern 
Railway,  by  reason  of  her  reversionary  ownership 
therein,  has  been  ruthlessly  pushed  aside  by 
Japan.  Making  use  of  the  alleged  menace  of 
Bolshevism,  Japanese  military  authorities  at  once 
assumed  a  superior  authority  over  the  officers  of 
Chinese  troops  that  had  been  sent  to  maintain 
order  in  those  localities.  The  Chinese  com- 
manders in  Manchuria  showed  firmness  in  main- 
taining that  they  controlled  in  Chinese  territory 


132      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

and  in  refusing  to  yield  authority  there  to  the 
Japanese.  This  situation  led  to  many  clashes 
between  Chinese  and  Japanese  troops.  Japanese 
troops  moved  along  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway, 
placing  guards  at  all  bridges,  culverts  and  stations. 
As  Chinese  guards  had  already  been  stationed  at 
those  points,  maintaining  the  operation  of  the 
line  in  absolute  safety,  it  became  apparent  that 
the  Japanese  object  was  political  and  that  this 
demonstration  of  force  by  the  Mikado's  military 
authorities  would  soon  be  followed  by  the  com- 
plete occupation  of  Manchuria  and  of  Eastern 
Siberia,  together  with  the  railroads.  China  was 
permitted  to  take  no  part  in  these  operations, 
although  they  were  taking  place  in  Chinese  ter- 
ritory and  Chinese  interests  were  affected  to  a 
much  greater  extent  than  those  of  any  other  na- 
tion. Japan's  occupation  became  complete  and 
undisputed  after  the  breakdown  in  the  joint 
Allied  and  American  intervention  programme,  and 
the  failure  to  make  good  of  the  Stevens  Com- 
mission, under  which  the  Chinese  Eastern  and 
Siberian  Railways  were  to  be  operated  under  joint 
international  control.  The  difficulties  raised  by 
Japan  were,  of  course,  responsible  for  the  failure 
of  both  these  ventures. 

Now,  it  so  happens  that  Japanese  military  oc- 
cupation of  Eastern  Siberia  is  coexistent  and  co- 
extensive with  the  similar  advance  on  the  part  of 
Britain  on  the  other  side.    Japan's  military  oc- 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    133 

cupation  on  the  east  is  paralleled  by  Britain's 
naval  occupation  on  the  west,  in  the  Baltic  and 
the  Dardanelles.  Accordingly,  if  these  two  Em- 
pires should  effect  a  combination  for  mutual 
security  of  their  gains,  it  is  evident  what  will  be 
the  fate  of  Russia  and  China. 

For  America,  this  question  is  one  of  vital 
importance.  Outside  of  the  fact  that  the  exist- 
ence of  such  an  Alliance,  directed  towards  an 
interference  with  the  free  play  of  forces  in  China 
and  Russia,  would  eventually  result  in  stifling  the 
democratic  movements  which  have  arisen  in 
those  countries,  America  has  an  interest  in  the 
matter  which  might  even  extend  to  the  point 
where  it  would  have  to  consider  the  same  as  a 
menace  to  her  security. 

Moreover,  from  the  commercial  point  of  view 
the  menace  is  a  serious  one.  For  Japan's  com- 
mercial policy  in  the  parts  of  China  which  she 
already  has  penetrated,  and  Britain's  policy  of 
commercial  penetration  of  weaker  nations,  gives 
sufficient  intimation  of  what  such  zones  on  each 
side  of  Russia  and  China  would  mean  to  American 
and  all  other  foreign  trade. 

There  is,  again,  a  distinct  danger  to  be  appre- 
hended by  America,  aside  from  the  political  and 
other  dangers  already  alluded  to.  We  refer  to 
the  probability  that  Japan,  backed  by  England, 
will  seize  the  occasion  of  such  an  alKance  to  make 
a  direct  attack  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    Then 


134       THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

ihere  is  the  Panama  Canal,  the  one  waterway  of 
international  importance  which  is  not  already 
under  Britain's  control. 

There  have  been  not  a  few  political  observers 
who  have  doubted  whether  the  Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance  had  any  possible  application  to  the 
United  States.  All  the  more  so,  when  in  the  last 
Alliance  treaty  a  provision  was  included  to  the 
effect  that  **  Should  either  of  the  High  Contract- 
ing Parties  conclude  a  treaty  of  general  arbitra- 
tion with  a  third  Power,  it  is  agreed  that  nothing 
in  this  Agreement  shall  impose  on  such  contract- 
ing party  an  obligation  to  go  to  war  with  the 
Power  with  whom  such  an  arbitration  treaty  is 
in  force.'' 

Such  a  treaty  of  general  arbitration  was  in 
fact  negotiated  with  Great  Britain  by  President 
Taft  in  191 1,  but  the  same  failed  of  ratification 
in  the  Senate.  There  is,  therefore,  no  existing 
provision  in  any  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  of  Alli- 
ance which  excludes  the  possibility  of  Britain 
participating  with  Japan  in  a  war  against  the 
United  States.  On  the  other  hand,  what  positive 
evidence  is  there  that  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance 
does  apply  to  the  United  States?  Some  of  this 
evidence  has  already  been  alluded  to,  in  another 
connection,  in  a  previous  chapter,  but  it  will, 
perhaps,  add  something  to  the  clarity  of  the 
present  discussion  if  we  recapitulate  our  proofs 
once  again. 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    135 

We  must  first  consider  what  conclusions  are 
to  be  drawn  from  the  changed  and  still  changing 
relations  between  Britain  and  Japan  as  evidenced 
by  the  modifications  which  were  made  in  each 
new  treaty  as  it  was  signed.  There  have  been 
three  alliances — the  first  signed  in  1902,  which 
was  superseded  by  one  signed  in  1905,  which  in 
turn  was  amended  in  1911. 

In  the  first  treaty,  which  was  signed  prior  to 
the  outbreak  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  it  was 
provided  that  Britain  should  come  to  the  assist- 
ance of  Japan  in  case  of  an  attack  on  Japan  in 
which  a  second  Power  should  join  as  aggressor. 
The  alliance  also  guaranteed  the  independence  of 
Korea  and  of  China.  It  is  thus  apparent  that 
the  first  alliance  anticipated  the  Russo-Japanese 
War.  The  alliance  assured  Japan  that  when 
she  joined  battle  with  Russia  she  would  be  pro- 
tected by  Great  Britain  against  attack  by  any 
other  Power.  In  other  words,  Britain  guar- 
anteed that  Japan  would  have  to  deal  with  but 
one  adversary. 

When  the  second  alliance  was  made  in  1905, 
of  course  things  had  changed.  Japan  had 
defeated  Russia  and  was  in  occupation  of  Korea 
and  Manchuria.  Accordingly,  the  scope  of  the 
treaty  was  now  widened,  and  whereas  in  the 
first  treaty  Britain's  engagement  was  limited 
to  **  maintaining  the  independence  and  terri- 
torial integrity  of  the  Empire  of  China  and  the 


136       THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

Empire  of  Korea/'  in  the  second  treaty  Britain's 
engagement  was  enlarged  to  include  ''the  con- 
solidation and  maintenance  of  the  general  peace 
in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  India."  Fur- 
thermore, Japan  was  now  granted  a  free  hand 
in  Korea,  an  accompanying  memorandum  by 
Lord  Lansdowne,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
stating  that  **it  has  become  evident  that  Korea, 
owing  to  its  close  proximity  to  the  Japanese 
Empire  and  its  inability  to  stand  alone,  must 
fall  under  the  control  and  tutelage  of  Japan.** 
And,  finally,  the  scope  of  the  second  treaty  was 
widened  by  making  British  assistance  to  Japan 
in  case  of  war  conditional  upon  an  attack  by  a 
single  Power.  In  other  words,  notice  to  the 
world  to  keep  ''hands  off  Japan.  The  bonds 
between  the  two  nations  were  accordingly  getting 
tighter. 

To  the  impartial  observer  it  must  be  clear 
that  the  inclusion  of  India  within  the  scope  of 
the  second  treaty  is  the  keynote  of  the  whole 
enterprise  so  far  as  Britain  was  concerned. 
Britain  had  been  the  only  nation  which  from  the 
very  first  had  formed  a  correct  estimate  of  Japan- 
ese ambitions  and  of  Japan's  capacity  to  realize 
those  ambitions.  British  policy  at  this  time 
followed  two  aims — firstly,  to  weaken  Russia 
in  the  Far  East  and  then,  that  having  been 
accomplished,  Britain  was  prepared  to  make  an 
ally  of  Russia  in  the  pursuit  of  her  second  object, 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    137 

which  was  to  meet  the  rise  of  Germany  in  the 
West. 

In  pursuing  the  aforesaid  aims,  Britain  realized 
that  Japan  had  grown  too  great  and  powerful 
to  be  held  in  leading-strings  in  the  East.  Accord- 
ingly, Japan  had  *'to  be  given  her  head.**  She 
must  be  allowed  to  have  her  way  in  Asia  up  to  the 
point  where  Britain's  vital  interests  were  touched, 
and  those  vital  interests  are  simimed  up  in  one 
word — India.  Accordingly,  the  second  Treaty  of 
Alliance  is  a  bond  between  Britain  and  Japan 
in  which,  in  effect,  the  former  says  to  the  latter: 
'*You  recognize  and  protect  my  special  interests 
in  India  and  I  shall  recognize  and  protect  your 
special  interests  in  Eastern  Asia.*' 

In  the  third  treaty,  signed  July  13,  191 1,  the 
preamble  is  especially  significant.  It  reads  as 
follows:  ''The  Government  of  Japan  and  the 
Government  of  Great  Britain,  having  in  view  the 
important  changes  which  have  taken  place  in 
the  situation  since  the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Agreement  of  August  12,  1905,  and 
believing  that  the  revision  of  that  Agreement 
responding  to  such  changes  would  contribute  to 
general  stability  and  repose,  have  agreed  upon 
the  following  stipulations  to  replace  the  Agree- 
ment above  mentioned,  such  stipulations  hav- 
ing the  same  object  as  the  said  Agreement, 
namely: 

*'A.    The  consolidation  and  maintenance  of 


138      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

the  general  peace  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia 
and  India, 

"B.  The  preservation  of  the  common  inter- 
ests of  all  the  Powers  in  China  by  ensuring  the 
independence  and  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Em- 
pire and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunities 
for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in 
China. 

"C.  The  maintenance  of  the  territorial  rights 
of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  in  the  regions 
of  Eastern  Asia  and  of  India  and  the  defence  of 
their  special  interests  in  those  regions/' 

It  has  been  said  by  so  competent  an  authority 
as  Lord  Beaconsfield  that  diplomats  speak  a 
language  that  is  only  understood  by  themselves. 
Indeed,  this  is  nowhere  given  a  better  illus- 
tration than  in  these  three  treaties  we  are  now 
discussing.  For,  if  in  the  first  treaty  pres- 
ervation of  the  independence  of  Korea  was 
given  as  one  of  its  objects,  it  would  appear 
that  the  phrase  was  inserted  because  Japan 
intended  to  go  to  war  to  destroy  the  independence 
of  Korea,  and  this  was  known  at  the  time  the 
phrase  was  written  into  the  treaty.  Similarly, 
if  treaties  one,  two  and  three  each  contain  as- 
surances that  the  parties  thereto  mutually  guar- 
antee the  independence  and  territorial  iategrity 
of  the  Empire  of  China,  then  the  reason  of  it  is 
to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  parties  had  in 
reality  mutually  agreed  that  the  independence  and 


\ 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    139 

territorial  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  was  to 
be  the  subject  of  attack.  And,  indeed,  subsequent 
events  demonstrated  that  such  was  in  fact  the 
intention,  when  by  various  acts  it  became  clear 
that  Britain  was  committed  to  support  Japan's 
claim  of  a  paramount  position  in  Manchuria  and 
her  violation  of  the  principles  of  the  **Open 
Door''  and  the  integrity  of  China.  Such  acts  are 
those  we  have  already  entunerated  in  a  previous 
chapter,  namely,  Britain's  support  of  the  Japanese 
veto  on  the  Fakumen  and  Chinchow-Aigun  Rail- 
way schemes;  her  recognition  and  support  of 
Japan's  paramotmt  position  in  Fukien  Province; 
her  support  of  Japan's  actions  and  policy  in 
Shantung,  Manchuria  and  Mongolia. 

Britain's  insistence  upon  forcing  her  own  reading 
of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty  with  reference  to 
the  administration  of  the  Panama  Canal,  coming 
at  the  same  time  as  the  raising  of  the  Japanese 
immigration  issue  in  California,  was  the  first  sharp 
reminder  America  had  thus  far  received  that  in 
case  of  trouble  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  might  apply. 
Recently,  also,  has  come  a  realization  for  the  first 
time  that  the  Anglo- Japanese  AlHance  really 
meant  something  quite  different  from  what  its 
published  terms  are  permitted  to  disclose.  In- 
deed, the  conviction  that  this  is  so  has  been  grow- 
ing upon  Americans,  until  to-day  we  doubt  if  any 
treaty  that  might  be  signed  between  Japan  and 


140      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

Britain  would  be  received  by  them  with  anything 
but  profound  suspicion  and  distrust.  For  it  is 
from  conclusions  such  as  we  have  made  above  that 
Americans  have  come  firmly  to  believe  that  the 
Anglo- Japanese  AlHance  does  indeed  apply  to 
the  United  States. 


CHAPTER  FIFTEEN 

ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE — THE  JAPANESE  PERIL 

In  the  pursuit  of  her  main  object,  namely,  to  attain 
the  hegemony  in  the  Far  East,  Japan  had,  up  to 
1911,  the  support  of  Britain — ^not  freely  granted, 
it  is  true,  for  it  was  a  question  not  of  choice  but 
of  necessity.  In  the  amended  treaty  of  1911, 
Britain,  while  still  retaining  in  the  preamble  of  the 
treaty  stipulations  with  respect  to  her  special 
interests  in  India,  no  longer  makes  mention  of 
India  in  the  body  of  the  treaty,  and  the  treaty 
was  further  emasculated  by  providing  that  Britain 
need  not  come  to  Japan's  assistance  in  case  of 
attack  by  a  Power  with  whom  she  had  concluded 
a  treaty  of  general  arbitration.  This  was  inserted 
in  view  of  the  impending  treaty  of  general  ar- 
bitration between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  This  partial  weakening  of  the  force  of 
the  treaty  of  1905  meant,  in  other  words,  that 
Britain  felt  impelled,  for  certain  reasons,  to  *'pour 
a  little  water  in  her  wine.*'  The  beverage  had  got 
to  be  stronger  than  was  agreeable  to  the  British 
palate. 

141 


142      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

One  reason  for  the  change  lay  in  the  fact  that 
Britain,  having  made  an  entente  with  Russia  in 
1 90  7,  had  ceased  to  fear  an  attack  on  India  from 
that  quarter.  Other  reasons  are  to  be  sought  in 
the  growing  fear  of  a  too  rapid  aggrandizement  of 
Japan  in  China,  in  which  event  Britain  would 
simply  have  destroyed  one  Frankenstein  only  to 
raise  up  another,  and  finally  Britain,  having  sensed 
the  approach  of  a  great  European  war  in  the  not 
too  distant  future,  recognized  the  timely  need  of 
soothing  the  rising  susceptibilities  of  America 
with  respect  to  the  objects  of  the  Anglo- Japanese 
Alliance  and  its  possible  future  attitude  towards 
the  United  States. 

From  her  experiences  with  Japan  since  the 
signing  of  the  1911  treaty,  and  particularly  during 
the  war,  Britain  perceives  that  she  is  probably 
again  face  to  face  with  a  question  not  of  choice 
but  of  necessity.  It  is  a  question  for  her  of 
whether  she  is  to  choose  the  friendship  of  Japan 
or  the  friendship  of  America.  It  would  seem  ab- 
solutely impossible,  as  matters  stand  now,  for  her 
to  have  the  friendship  of  both  of  these  countries 
at  one  and  the  same  time.  Accordingly,  she  must 
make  her  choice,  and  upon  that  choice,  possibly 
the  most  momentous  one  she  has  ever  been  called 
on  to  make,  depends  the  entire  future  of  the 
British  Empire.  Let  us  examine  briefly  what  is 
involved  in  it. 

America's  foreign  policy  revolves  about  two  vital 


THE  ANGLO^APANESE  ALLIANCE    143 

doctrines  known  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the 
Hay  Doctrine.  The  one  involves  nothing  less  than 
a  guarantee  of  the  continued  independence,  free 
from  foreign  interference,  of  all  countries  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere — Canada  included.  Simi- 
larly, the  Hay  Doctrine  involves  nothing  less  than 
an  obligation  to  resist  any  interference  with  the 
territorial  integrity  or  independence  of  China. 

Both  of  these  doctrines  have  been  recognized 
and  subscribed  to  by  all  the  Powers.  They  have 
been  challenged  by  Japan  alone,  and  she  has 
given  clearly  to  understand  what  kind  of  a  doc- 
trine she  wants  to  substitute  for  these  policies. 
What  her  idea  of  a  Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  Far 
East  is  has  been  shown  in  Korea,  in  Manchuria, 
in  Shantung  and  in  other  regions  of  China. 

In  fact,  nothing  could  be  in  sharper  antithesis 
to  the  real  Monroe  Doctrine  than  the  Japanese 
interpretation  of  it  in  practice.  For  in  China 
it  means  that  no  railway  can  be  built,  no  mines 
or  other  natural  resources  exploited,  except  imder 
conditions  dictated  by  Japan;  that  no  foreign 
loan  can  be  made  without  the  consent  of  Japan 
being  first  obtained  and  except  with  Japanese 
participation;  that  Japan  must  be  consulted  in 
all  important  industrial  enterprises  requiring 
foreign  capital;  that  Japanese  must  be  employed 
as  political,  financial  and  military  advisers  in 
China;  that  China  must  consult  Japan  when  she 
wishes  to  purchase  armaments  and  must  purchase 


144      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

a  majority  of  such  supplies  in  Japan;  that  when 
foreign  capital  is  used  to  build  railways  in  China, 
Japanese  managers  must  be  employed  and  traffic 
rates  be  fixed  so  as  to  give  Japanese  commodities 
an  advantage  over  other  foreign  goods;  that 
supplies  used  in  railways  and  other  utilities  in 
China  must  be  purchased  in  Japan  or  through 
Japanese  firms;  that  Japanese  goods  entering 
China  shall  be  given  preferential  custom  rates; 
that  Japanese  shall  have  the  right  to  own  lands 
and  reside  in  all  parts  of  China  and  not  be  subject 
to  China^s  laws;  that  Japanese  must  be  heads  of 
police  in  important  Chinese  cities;  that  China 
shall  not  lease  any  of  her  own  territories  without 
first  consulting  Japan;  that  no  contracts  to  build 
naval  bases  or  harbour  works  in  China  shall  be 
permitted  without  first  obtaining  the  consent  of 
Japan ;  that  Japan  must  be  consulted  when  China 
desires  to  change  her  fiscal  systems. 

Now,  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  gives  as  one 
of  its  objects:  *'The  preservation  of  the  common 
interests  of  all  Powers  in  China  by  ensuring  the 
independence  and  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire 
and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  for  the 
commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China." 
And  yet,  in  the  face  of  this  provision  and  of 
similar  provisions  contained  in  treaties  with  three 
other  Great  Powers,  Japan  has  acted  in  entire 
disregard  thereof,  in  the  manner  we  have  seen, 
and  the  Anglo- Japanese  Treaty  of  Alliance  has 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    145 

protected  her  in  so  doing.  In  other  words,  the 
Hay  Doctrine,  one  of  the  two  main  pillars  upon 
which  rests  American  foreign  policy,  has  been 
wrecked  by  Japan  with  Britain's  consent. 

The  question  now  arises  as  to  what  is  the 
importance  to  America  of  insisting  upon  uphold- 
ing the  Hay  Doctrine.  The  importance  of  the 
question  has  a  twofold  aspect — a  material  and  a 
moral  aspect.  On  the  material  side,  the  chief 
importance  of  insisting  upon  the  Hay  Doctrine 
rests  in  the  fact  that  to  allow  a  neighbour  of  the 
United  States  on  the  Pacific  Ocean,  with  a  much 
lower  standard  of  living  and  perhaps  a  different 
standard  of  ethics,  to  wax  so  great  that  eventually 
it  may  become  a  menace  to  her  security,  or  to 
grow  so  strong  as  to  compel  the  United  States  to 
accept  its  standards  of  living  and  ethics  in  place 
of  her  own,  would  be  suicidal  to  America  as  a 
nation.  How  could  America  defend  her  position 
on  the  Immigration  Question,  for  example,  if  at 
some  future  time  Japan  has  extended  her  sway 
over  the  immense  population  and  material  re- 
sources of  China?  Or  how  would  America  be 
able  to  defend  that  other  great  policy — the  Monroe 
Doctrine — if  at  some  future  time  Japan,  with  the 
greater  part  of  Asia  behind  her,  should  insist  on 
some  of  the  South  American  States,  or  Mexico, 
being  thrown  open  to  the  invasion  of  the  Yellow 
man? 

Morally,  the  United  States  has  obligations  in 


148      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

this  connection  of  a  very  far-reaching  character. 
As  the  exponent  of  certain  phases  of  Western 
civilization,  such  as  democracy  and  liberal  insti- 
tutions; as  the  champion  of  liberty,  right,  justice, 
free  speech,  representative  institutions,  free  edu- 
cation and  other  of  the  humanities,  America  can- 
not afford  to  abdicate  from  the  high  position  she 
has  attained  in  these  regards,  and  more  especially 
not  if  driven  thereto  by  the  representatives  of 
another  race,  religion  and  culture. 

We  have  not  touched  upon  the  large  commer- 
cial interests  possessed  by  Americans  in  the  Far 
East  that  require  to  be  protected,  nor  spoken  of 
the  protection  against  Japanese  invasion  which 
America  owes  as  a  moral  duty  to  the  Filipinos, 
nor  of  the  transcendental  importance  to  American 
trade  and  American  security  that  lies  in  placing 
an  American  interpretation  in  place  of  a  British 
interpretation  upon  the  terms  of  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  Treaty.  Nevertheless,  all  of  these 
questions  are  bound  up  with  the  Eastern  Question 
in  some  way,  and  are  entitled  to  be  given  great 
weight  in  any  discussion  of  America's  attitude 
towards  a  renewal  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance. 

Since  the  cessation  of  hostilities  America  has 
learned  a  great  deal  about  the  iniquities  of  secret 
treaties.  Moreover,  she  has  been  filled  with  an 
ever-increasing  feeling  of  abhorrence  for  the  meas- 
ures and  manipulations  of  diplomats  who  make  a 
treaty  say  one  thing,  according  to  its  plain  sense, 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    147 

while  meaning  a  totally  different  thing  according 
to  their  interpretation — perhaps  the  antithesis  of 
what  is  written  and  published  to  the  world.  There 
is  a  well-grounded  belief,  furthermore,  that  some 
of  the  clearest  terms  of  treaties,  as  published,  are 
set  at  naught  by  secret  provisions  which  are  known 
to  none  but  the  parties  concerned.  Thus,  for 
example,  Russia  and  Japan  in  1916  made  a  treaty 
for  the  protection  of  their  interests  in  China  which 
in  effect  pointed  to  the  future  partition  of  China 
between  them  and  which  provided  that  the  same 
should  be  kept  a  secret  even  from  their  own  allies. 
This  treaty  was,  of  course,  in  complete  contra- 
vention of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance,  and  is 
an  additional  proof  of  Japan's  intention  to  have 
her  own  way — ^with  British  support  if  possible, 
or  without  it  if  necessary.  Again,  Japan  is 
reputed  to  have  been  on  the  point  of  concluding 
a  secret  treaty  with  Germany  in  the  early  summer 
of  1 918  and  before  the  German  reverses  put  an 
end  to  a  move  in  this  direction.  Other  examples 
of  double-deaHng  engaged  in  by  the  Great  Powers 
through  the  medium  of  secret  treaties  are  the 
Sykes-Picot  Treaty  of  191 7  between  France  and 
Britain  for  the  partition  of  Turkey,  in  which  the 
interests  of  their  allies,  Russia  and  Italy,  went 
unnoticed;  the  secret  agreements  between  France 
and  England  on  the  one  side,  and  Japan  on  the 
other,  in  February,  191 7,  for  the  support  of 
Japan's  claims  in  Shantung,  claims  which  werd 


148      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

in  direct  conflict  with  China's  interests,  and  to 
obtain  a  just  settlement  of  which  China  had  been 
induced  to  enter  the  war  as  the  ally  of  Britain 
and  France;  and  finally  the  London  Agreement 
of  April  26,  1915,  between  Italy  and  Britain, 
France  and  Russia,  in  which  the  rights  of  another 
ally  of  the  Allies,  namely,  Serbia,  were  bargained 
away  without  the  knowledge  and  consent  of  such 
ally.  While  this  list  by  no  means  exhausts  the 
roll  of  perfidious  documents  which  marked  the 
relations  of  the  Allies  among  themselves,  it  is 
large  enough  to  give  point  to  our  argument  that 
Americans  who  have  been  initiated  into  such 
mysteries  as  these  are  convinced  that  political 
treaties,  whatever  their  pretended  objects  may 
be,  are  not  to  be  regarded  in  any  other  wise  than 
with  suspicion  and  distrust.  How  should  they 
be  able  to  regard  an  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance 
with  any  other  feeUngs,  when  they  perceive  the 
manner  in  which  the  last  treaty  between  those 
two  countries  has  been  interpreted  by  Japan, 
with  the  acquiescence  of  Britain?  What  con- 
fidence can  they  ever  again  feel  in  the  published 
announcements  with  respect  to  the  intentions  of 
such  a  treaty,  when  they  have  seen  how  such 
alleged  intentions  have  been  made  a  mockery  of 
in  past  treaties?  How  can  they  beHeve  the  asser- 
tions of  these  countries  with  respect  to  the  absence 
of  secret  provisions  in  their  treaties  when  they 
perceive  how  these  very  nations  have  * 'double- 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE   149 

crossed**  their  own  allies  in  these  particulars? 
Of  course,  *'the  answer  is  in  the  negative/*  and 
both  Britain  and  Japan  may  rest  assured  that 
American  public  opinion  will  never  again  be 
easily  influenced,  by  the  published  assertions 
with  res^pect  to  treaties  like  the  one  now  under 
discussion,  to  commit  their  future  fortimes  to 
blind  trust  in  the  good  faith  of  any  nation  what- 
soever. 

America's  attitude  towards  any  renewal  of  the 
Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  is  strengthened  by  her 
conviction  that  her  position  in  the  matter  has 
the  sympathy  and  probably  the  active  support  of 
those  former  auxiliary  members  of  the  British 
Empire,  namely,  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand 
and  the  Union  of  South  Africa,  who  have  now 
been  raised  by  the  force  of  events,  according  to 
the  pronoimcement  of  General  Smuts,  to  the 
plane  of  equal  partners  in  the  British  Common- 
wealth. On  the  question  of  the  new  Japanese 
peril,  all  of  these  States  stand  side  by  side  with 
the  United  States,  and  their  influence  must 
necessarily  be  extended  in  opposition  to  so  dan- 
gerous a  policy  as  that  of  interlacing  their  future 
destiny  with  that  of  the  Land  of  the  Rising  Sun. 

One  other  consideration  in  this  connection  de- 
serves mention.  According  to  the  statement 
made  by  Mr.  Balfour  two  years  ago,  and  reiterated 
by  him  in  a  recent  speech  (in  which  he  made 
cynical  references  to  the  Council  of  the  League  of 


150      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

Nations  as  constituting  in  reality  only  the  Supreme 
Council  of  the  Allies  sitting  at  Paris),  the  British 
Government  is  not  prepared  to,  or  cannot  as  yet 
see  its  way  clear  to,  abandon  what  is  usually 
called  the  ** balance  of  power''  theory  of  world 
politics.  In  other  words,  he  favours  a  continu- 
ance of  the  checks-and-balances  principle  in  inter- 
national relations.  By  this  we  presume  he  must 
mean  that,  as  against  the  growing  power  and 
strength  of  the  United  States,  a  convenient  check 
lies  in  supporting  the  pretensions  of  Japan. 

Thus,  for  example,  what  is  more  natural  than 
for  Britain  on  the  Atlantic  and  Japan  on  the 
Pacific  to  act  in  concert  as  Naval  Powers  against 
America,  whose  naval  strength  in  capital  ships 
will  surpass  that  of  Britain  in  1924,  as  we  are 
informed  by  that  capital  British  naval  commen- 
tator, Archibald  Hurd. 

Furthermore,  there  is  the  question  of  the 
American  merchant  marine.  The  Atlantic  trade 
of  the  United  States  was  before  the  war  carried 
on  chiefly  by  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  whilst 
the  Pacific  trade  was  largely  in  the  hands  of  the 
Japanese.  The  United  States  very  naturally  de- 
sires to  recover  the  shipping  trade  she  has  lost 
from  those  countries  to  which  she  has  lost  it. 
The  chief  obstacle  thereto  is  now  Britain,  owing 
to  her  predominance  on  the  seas.  The  American 
maritime  policy  is  therefore  necessarily  and  in- 
evitably anti-British,  and  Britain,  for  the  first 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    151 

time  in  her  history,  sees  herself  compelled  to  wit- 
ness the  rise  of  a  rival  Maritime  Power  without 
being  able  to  take  measures  of  retaUation,  since 
American  raw  materials  are  needed  to  keep  her 
factories  running.  If  Britain  is  to  lose  her  old 
paramountcy  in  shipbuilding  and  shipping,  what 
is  to  be  the  future  of  the  British  Empire?  The 
answer  is  that  much  depends  on  the  Empire's 
power  of  production.  If  the  British  Empire  can- 
not keep  pace  with  America  in  the  power  of  pro- 
duction, then  the  United  States  will  in  course  of 
time  dominate  the  world,  not  only  in  general 
industrial  production,  but  in  shipbuilding  and 
shipping  as  well. 

Indeed,  we  may  find  the  key  to  the  recent  war, 
as  also  of  the  next  coming  war,  in  what  that  dis- 
tinguished British  economist  EUis  Barker  says  ^ 
about  coal  and  iron.  Mr.  Barker  points  out  that 
he  who  dominates  the  coal  and  iron  industries 
dominates  the  world.  Germany,  if  victorious, 
says  Mr.  Barker,  would  have  dominated  the  world 
not  so  much  owing  to  her  territorial  acquisitions 
as  owing  to  her  acquisition  of  a  monopoly  of  coal 
and  iron  on  the  continent  of  Europe.  The  present 
age  is  the  age  of  coal  and  iron.  Modem  ma- 
chinery, modem  implements  and  modem  means  of 
locomotion  and  transport  by  land  and  sea  are 
made  of  steel.  Providence  has  given  the  United 
States  not  only  the  hulk  of  the  world's  coal,  but  also 

^  Economic  Statesmanship t  by  J.  Ellis  Barker. 


152       THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

the  bulk  of  the  world's  iron.  The  conclusion  he 
reaches  is  that  Britain  went  to  war  to  prevent 
Germany  from  controlling  the  bulk  of  the  world's 
coal  and  iron,  and  just  so  she  may  have  to  go  to 
war  to  prevent  America  from  indulging  herself 
in  a  monopoly  of  these  products.  And  Americans 
are  asking  themselves  if  there  is  any  necessary 
connection  between  such  facts  as  these  and  a 
renewal  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance. 


CHAPTER  SIXTEEN 

ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE — THE  JAPANESE  PERIL 

When  Mr.  Ellis  Barker  states  that  he  who 
dominates  the  coal  and  iron  industries  dominates 
the  world,  we  believe  that  he  is  stating  what  is 
only  relatively  true.  It  is  surely  as  important 
for  the  existence  and  prosperity  of  a  nation  that 
it  dominate  the  sources  of  food  supply,  whether 
within  its  own  domains  or  abroad.  Suppose,  for 
example,  that  the  British  Isles  contained  more  than 
half  of  the  world's  total  supply  of  coal  and  iron, 
what  would  that  fact  avail  Great  Britain  in  a 
contest  with  a  foreign  foe  who  should  succeed 
in  sinking  her  transports  of  food  or  in  blockading 
her  ports?  Similarly,  one  of  Germany's  greatest 
economic  problems,  both  before  the  war  and  after, 
has  been  and  is  her  food  supply.  And  whatever 
we  may  think  of  her  efforts  to  dominate  the  coal 
and  iron  industries,  behind  that  lay  the  inexorable 
demands  of  her  rapidly  growing  population  for  a 
sufficient  food  supply,  which  she  is  unable  to 
supply  out  of  her  own  soil.  For  even  the  United 
States,  with  an  area  nearly  fifteen  times  as  great 

153 


154      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

as  Germany  and  a  population  only  little  more 
than  50  per  cent,  greater,  are  rapidly  approaching 
the  time  when  they  will  have  little,  if  any,  food  for 
export.  The  United  States  have  no  longer  a  huge 
regular  surplus  of  cattle,  beef  and  butter,  and 
before  long  they  may  not  produce  sufficient  meat 
for  their  domestic  requirements.  The  same  thing 
is  true  of  all  breadstuffs,  vegetables  and  fruit. 
Prom  being  the  greatest  granary  in  the  world, 
the  United  States  have  become  the  greatest  work- 
shop, and  according  to  the  census  of  1910  the  pro- 
duction of  the  United  States  manufacturing  in- 
dustries was  valued  at  approximately  2o>^  billion 
dollars,  whereas  the  production  of  the  farms  came 
only  to  S}4  billion  dollars,  and  in  the  interval  the 
disproportion  has  grown  even  greater. 

The  main  reason,  aside  from  the  rapid  increase 
of  population,  for  the  serious  falling  off  in  Amer- 
ica's export  of  food-stuffs,  lies  in  the  fact  that 
agriculture  is  not  sufficiently  productive,  due 
mainly  to  a  relatively  continuous  diminution 
in  the  rural  population  devoted  to  agricultural 
labours  and  a  flocking  thereof  to  the  cities — 
phenomena  which  we  see  repeated,  in  a  more  or 
less  degree,  in  such  other  great  industrial  nations 
as  Britain  and  Germany,  and  for  identical  reasons, 
namely,  higher  wages  and  shorter  hours  in  the  city, 
together  with  more  opportunity  for  amusement. 

In  the  British  Isles  the  bulk  of  the  agricultural 
land  has  been  abandoned  by  the  plough  and  has 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    155 

been  turned  into  grazing  land,  where  rough  grass 
produces  only  an  insignificant  quantity  of  meat, 
so  that  the  food  situation  for  Great  Britain  is 
even  a  more  desperate  one  than  in  Germany, 
where  6i  per  cent,  of  the  soil  is  imder  cultivation 
for  com  crops,  as  against  only  i8  per  cent,  in  the 
former  country.  From  these  figures  it  must  be 
apparent  that  agriculture  in  Great  Britain  is  an 
utterly  decayed  industry  and  that  the  nation  is 
absolutely  dependent  on  foreign  supplies  for  its 
existence.  Indeed,  Germany,  in  normal  times, 
if  thrown  back  entirely  on  her  own  resources  of 
food,  might,  perhaps,  just  manage  to  exist,  albeit 
on  short  rations,  whereas  Britain  in  a  similar 
situation  would  be  reduced  to  absolute  starvation. 
The  relevancy  of  all  these  facts  and  figures  to 
the  subject  in  hand  lies  in  the  fact^  that  the  next 
great  war,  like  the  last  one,  will  have  to  be  fought 
over  the  question  of  food  supply.  For  from  the 
beginning  of  history  the  most  vital  problems  of 
war  and  statesmanship  have  centred  about  the 
food  supply  and  the  conditions  of  its  distribution 
to  the  peoples  of  the  world.  No  Government, 
whatever  be  its  form,  whether  theocratic,  pluto- 
cratic, autocratic,  oligarchic  or  democratic,  could, 
imder  any  circumstances,  long  maintain  itself  in 
power  unless  it  has  managed  to  solve  this  fimda- 

*  Since  this  was  written  the  writer's  view  has  been  confinned 
by  an  address  delivered  at  Princeton  College  by  Sir  Auckland 
Geddes,  British  Ambassador  at  Washington. 


156      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

mental  problem  of  the  food  supply,  and  it  is  of  the 
very  essence  of  government  that  it  should  be  con- 
cerned with  this  problem  before  it  is  able  to  con- 
cern itself  with  any  other  question.  It  was  the 
knowledge  of  this  fact  on  the  part  of  the  Allied 
Governments  that  caused  them  to  make  use  of 
the  blockade  after  the  armistice  to  bring  pressure 
to  bear  upon  Germany  for  the  enforcing  of  the 
armistice  terms.  For  it  was  in  response  to  that 
pressure  that  the  German  Government  gave  up 
some  of  its  dearest  possessions — its  ships,  its  gold, 
its  rolling  stock,  its  coal  and  its  cattle.  Only  by 
making  these  sacrifices  was  it  possible  for  Ger- 
many to  secure  the  one  needful  thing — ^food. 
And  it  is  from  this  terrible  example  that  the  na- 
tions of  the  world  have  learned  to  prize  anew  the 
control  of  the  sources  of  food  supply. 

Accordingly,  with  the  certain  elimination  of  the 
United  States,  in  the  near  future,  as  a  source  of 
food  supply,  it  becomes  necessary  for  a  nation 
like  Britain,  which  has  for  so  many  decades  drawn 
the  bulk  of  her  provisions  from  abroad,  to  look 
about  her  and  take  stock  of  what  other  possible 
sources  of  food  supply  she  may  avail  herself  if 
she  is  to  keep  her  people  from  starvation.  And 
such  stock-taking  results  in  disclosing,  as  such 
sources,  firstly  Russia,  and  secondly  the  South 
American  countries.  We  do  not  exclude  other 
possibilities  from  this  calculation,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, Canada  and  Australia,  but  we  are  limiting 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    157 

the  subject  to  its  rough  outlines  only,  in  which 
minor  factors  can  make  no  appreciable  change. 

We  have,  then,  on  the  one  hand,  Germany,  who 
will  in  time  to  come  be  compelled  to  become  a 
formidable  competitor  for  the  harvests  of  Russia, 
in  which  her  geographical  situation,  to  say  nothing 
of  other  factors,  gives  her  great  advantages.  We 
have,  on  the  other  hand,  the  United  States, 
which  are  also  destined  to  become  a  competitor 
not  only  for  the  harvests  of  Russia,  but  for  the 
harvests  of  the  South  American  countries.  Her 
geographical  position  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
give  her  an  advantage  in  the  latter  countries. 
And  now  comes  Japan,  whose  agricultural  pro- 
duction is  also  said  to  be  reaching  its  limit  and 
demands  a  *' look-in"  in  the  countries  which  are 
to  provide  the  future  world  supply  of  food. 

How  are  all  of  these  claims  to  be  met  without 
war?  That  is  the  question  which  henceforth  is 
to  strain  the  thinking  powers  of  these  leading 
nations  of  the  world  until  such  time  as  the  genius 
of  man  shall  have  evolved  a  new  solution  for  an 
age-old  problem.  For  there  will  be  involved  in 
this  problem  the  fate  of  China,  the  stability  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  and  the  question  of  the  new 
Japanese  or  Yellow  peril.  So  far  as  concerns  the 
international  balance  of  power  formerly  existing 
in  the  Far  East,  that  has  already  been  destroyed 
through  the  reactions  of  the  Great  War.    What 


158      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

is  to  take  Its  place?  Constructive  statesmanship 
alone  can  supply  the  answer.  And  constructive 
statesmanship  demands  first  of  all  the  settlement 
of  the  problems  of  the  war  on  the  basis  of  right 
and  justice.  It  demands  that  no  nation  be 
pimished  for  the  fault  of  its  rulers,  and  that  the 
spirit  of  hatred  and  revenge  between  former 
belligerents  shall  give  place  to  sympathy  and  good 
will.  There  must  come  a  recognition  of  the  fact 
that  no  peace  can  be  permanent  which  does  not 
take  into  consideration  the  fact  that  for  a  nation 
to  seek  for  and  accept  political  advantage  out  of 
the  recent  war,  as  so  many  have  done  since  the 
cessation  of  hostilities,  is  to  make  the  sacrifice  of 
some  of  the  noblest  lives  himianity  has  had  to 
offer  a  matter  of  trade  and  barter.  It  is  to  deceive 
the  very  bone  and  sinew  of  the  nations  with'' 
promises  that  are  cashed  in  by  the  unworthy  who 
are  left  behind.  It  is  a  wrong  to  the  peoples  and 
a  wrong  to  the  State,  for  in  the  growing  intelli- 
gence of  the  masses  of  the  people  there  will  grow  up 
a  determination  that  they  will  never  permit  their 
leaders  to  deceive  them  again  and  to  make  of  their 
sacrifices  a  ladder  upon  which  to  climb  to  unde- 
served heights  of  glory,  where  the  joy  of  the  victors 
can  be  measured  only  by  the  misery  of  their 
victims.  Such  thoughts  as  these  will  awaken  the 
peoples  to  the  realization  that  their  liberties  are 
in  jeopardy — not  from  without,  but  from  within 
the  State.    For  they  will  have  understood  that 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    159 

the  war  has  not  settled  the  struggle  for  a  really 
democratic  world,  but  that  in  reality  it  has 
served  to  strengthen  and  rejuvenate  the  forces  of 
reaction  and  to  engraft  upon  the  body  politic  the 
"balance  of  power''  system  for  another  epoch. 

The  chief  importance  of  the  League  of  Nations 
idea  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  would  have  provided, 
if  properly  organized,  an  international  body  which 
could  have  taken  in  hand  the  absolutely  vital 
question  of  the  future  equitable  distribution  of  the 
world's  supplies  of  food  and  raw  materials.  It 
would  be  idle  to  talk  of  disarmament  until  such 
an  organization  had  been  founded,  with  its  Su- 
preme Economic  Council  given  authority  and 
power  to  regulate  such  distribution  for  the  entire 
world.  In  the  prosecution  of  its  work,  such  an 
Economic  Council  would  encounter  great,  per- 
haps insuperable,  obstacles.  There  is,  for  ex- 
ample, the  question  of  the  various  standards  of 
living.  Under  pre-war  standards  it  is  estimated 
that  ten  Japanese  can  live  on  what  one  American 
consumes  and  five  Japanese  upon  what  one  Ger- 
man consumes.  Accordingly,  the  absorption  by 
one  section  of  the  human  family  of  what  might  be 
considered  more  than  its  due  share  of  food  prod- 
ucts might  lead  to  diflQculties.  Indeed,  the  main  ^ 
cause  of  Australia's,  as  of  America's,  opposition, 
to  Japanese  immigration  is  an  economic  one  J 
The  Australian  and  American  worker,  with  his 
high  standard  of  living,  cannot  compete  with  the 


160      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

Japanese,  with  his  much  lower  standard.  And 
similarly  the  Japanese  Government  excludes  the 
Chinese  from  the  Island  Empire  because  the 
Chinese  have  a  still  lower  standard  than  the 
Japanese,  and  to  admit  them  in  large  numbers 
would  greatly  handicap  the  Japanese  workman 
and  throw  him  out  of  employment. 

The  problem  in  South  American  countries  Is 
essentially  the  same  as  it  is  in  the  countries  we 
have  just  mentioned.  So  long  as  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  is  upheld,  they  may  retain  their  present 
standard  of  living.  But  what  if  a  European  na- 
tion like  Russia,  or  an  Asiatic  nation  like  Japan, 
were  to  invade  and  annex  any  of  those  countries? 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  their  standard  of 
living  would  undergo  an  immediate  lowering. 

To  go  more  deeply  into  this  subject  would  only 
carry  us  too  far  afield.  It  is  our  purpose  to  dis- 
cuss the  matter  no  further  than  is  necessary  to 
show  the  inevitable  connection  of  these  ques- 
tions with  the  proposed  renewal  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance.  Such  an  alliance  can  only  be 
regarded  in  the  future  as  a  menace  to  the  stability 
not  only  of  the  United  States,  but  of  Australia, 
Canada  and  the  South  American  States.  For  the 
alliance  of  a  State  possessing  a  high  standard  of 
living  with  a  State  possessing  a  low  standard  can 
only  result  in  the  long  run  in  effecting  a  lowering  of 
standard  in  the  former,  and  finally  in  imposing  a 
lower  standard  of  living  upon  the  victims  of  their 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    161 

opposition  and  attack,  if  they  chance  to  be,  not 
Chinese  or  Indians,  but  Australians  or  Americans. 

Indeed,  it  is  this  fundamental  problem  of  the 
food  supply  and  of  the  wide  variance  between 
the  standards  of  living  of  the  European,  American 
and  Australian  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Japanese 
and  other  Asiatics  on  the  other  hand,  which  makes 
it  imperatively  necessary  for  the  European,  the 
American  and  the  Australian  to  stand  together, 
as  it  were,  against  a  common  foe.  We  do  not 
mean  that  Europe  and  America  should  unite  to 
keep  Asia  in  subjection.  By  no  means.  But  the 
Asiatics  should  be  permitted  to  work  out  their 
own  destinies,  and  every  interference  or  interven- 
tion by  Westerns  in  attempting  to  control  or 
direct  those  destinies  must  necessarily  result  in  the 
end  in  making  the  peoples  of  the  West  accept  the 
lower  and  more  servile  standards  of  the  East. 

If,  for  example,  Asia,  which  means  Japan,  and 
Great  Britain  should  join  hands  in  the  organiza- 
tion of  any  future  Supreme  Economic  Coimcil  of  a 
League  of  Nations,  they  would,  perhaps,  be  in  a 
position  to  dominate  its  decisions.  The  world 
shortage  of  food  and  other  raw  materials  would 
then  be  set  forth  as  due  to  the  selfish  consumption 
by  the  Americas  and  Australasia  of  more  than  their 
share  thereof,  or  to  a  refusal  on  their  part  to  share 
their  unoccupied  lands  with  others  who  require 
their  use  for  the  production  of  food  and  the 
development  of  other  natural  resources.     In  such 


i 


162      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

a  contingency  and  upon  such  an  issue,  Britain  and 
Japan  would  naturally  have  the  sympathy  and 
support  of  every  nation  in  the  worid  that  suffered 
from  a  similar  shortage.  And  particulariy  of  all 
those  nations,  colonies  and  dominions,  like  the 
African,  which  have  been  or  will  hereafter  be 
erected  out  of  tribes,  races  and  nationalities  that 
possess  a  low  standard  of  living,  since  those  with 
the  low  standard  must  assuredly  profit  by  reducing 
the  consumption  of  the  high  standard  nations. 
Britain  and  France  betrayed  what  may  be  re- 

Igarded  as  almost  a  fatal  weakness  when  they  made 
use  of  their  coloured  subject  races  to  fight  their 
battles  for  them  in  a  conflict  between  two  groups 
of  highly  civilized  white  nations.  Able  au- 
thorities on  the  subject  of  the  Black  Continent 
and  the  coloured  races,  like  E.  D.  Morel,  foresee  the 
most  serious  consequences  to  the  future  of  white 
civilization  from  this  misuse  of  subject  coloured 
races  in  the  white  man's  armies.  They  believe 
that  it  will  surely  affect  the  white  man's  security 
in  Africa,  and  eventually  his  security  in  Europe 
as  well.  Indeed,  judging  from  the  analogies  of 
past  history,  the  Senegalese  must  some  day  rule 
in  Paris  and  the  Bengalese  or  the  Punjabi  in 
London. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  certainly  harm  has  been  done, 
and  this  is  spoken  in  no  spirit  of  race  prejudice, 
and  still  more  harm  will  be  done  if  this  working 
together  of  white  with  coloured  races,  having  a 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE    163 

totally  different  standard  and  point  of  view  with 
respect  to  the  humanities  and  modes  of  living,  is 
allowed  to  develop  to  the  point  where  two  such 
allies  can  unite  in  a  common  purpose  against  a 
common  foe.  Indeed,  we  should  regard  it  as  just 
as  great  a  betrayal  of  race  if  the  Japanese  should 
consent  to  aid  the  British  in  suppressing  an 
Indian  uprising  as  wotdd  be  British  consent  to  aid 
the  Japanese  in  upsetting  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
in  a  war  against  America.  Neither  of  these  con- 
tingencies ought  to  be  so  much  as  even  thinkable, 
and  surely  nothing  could  more  positively  fore- 
shadow the  decline  and  fall  of  the  British  Empire, 
if  not  of  all  Western  civilization,  than  would 
either  of  these  eventualities,  if  it  should  come  to 
pass.  For  the  world  would  be  divided  against 
itself,  and  could  no  more  survive  under  such 
conditions  than  could  the  Union,  imder  Lincoln, 
''half  slave,  half  free.'* 


CHAPTER  SEVENTEEN 

CHINA  AND  THE   WESTERN  POWERS 

Looking  forward,  at  the  close  of  the  Great  War, 
it  would  seem  to  the  thoughtful  observer  that 
the  greatest  political  problem  which  the  Western 
nations  have  to  solve  outside  their  own  boimd- 
aries  is  the  question  of  how  to  avoid  a  future  race 
conflict  in  the  East.  As  the  writer  has  already 
pointed  out,  it  is  one  of  the  probabilities  that  have 
to  be  reckoned  with  that  Japanese^  Militarism 
and  Imperialism  must  sooner  or  later  call  such 
a  race  conflict  into  being,  unless  steps  are  taken 
by  the  Western  Powers  to  check  the  current  of 
the  stream  before  it  has  become  a  torrent.  An 
avalanche  is  a  wonderful  thing  to  witness  from 
afar,  but  let  us  beware  of  being  caught  in  one. 

Wise  statesmanship  will  decree  that  a  coalition 
composed  of  America,  Britain,  Germany  and 
Russia  is  the  soundest  proposal  that  can  be  made 
if  we  are  really  in  earnest  in  seeking  a  means  of 
defeating  the  plans  that  are  being  brewed  to  over- 
turn and  overwhelm  the  Western  world-order. 
Western  civilization  were  well  advised  to  have 

164 


CHINA  AND  WESTERN  POWERS  165 

no  illusions  on  the  subject.  For,  unless  a  higher 
statesmanship  is  exhibited  than  has  hitherto  been 
shown  in  the  settlement  of  the  terms  of  Peace, 
the  West  will  once  again  see  an  Attila  leading  his 
hordes  into  their  capitals  and  quartering  his 
beasts  in  the  pews  of  their  cathedrals.  And  when 
that  time  comes,  there  may  perhaps  be  some  sur- 
vivors of  a  cultured  and  literary  turn  of  mind 
who  will  ruefully  recall  Macaulay's  clairvoyant 
and  prophetic  words  about  the  traveler  from  New 
Zealand  who  would  one  day,  in  the  midst  of  a  great 
solitude,  take  his  stand  on  a  broken  arch  of  London 
Bridge  to  sketch  the  ruins  of  St.  Paul's. 

The  League  of  Nations  as  at  present  consti- 
tuted will  never  be  the  effective  instrument  its 
authors  intended  it  to  be.  That  is  to  say,  '4ts 
authors'*  who,  like  General  Smuts  and  Lord 
Robert  Cecil,  really  had  a  vision  of  a  better 
world  when  they  advocated  and  championed  a 
set  of  principles  which  were  to  have  embraced  all 
mankind  in  their  scope.  Their  failure  to  secure 
the  acceptance  of  those  broader  ideals  set  its 
seal  upon  the  instrument  as  it  finally  emerged 
from  the  Council  Chamber  of  the  ''Big  Five." 
It  was  the  seal  of  doom,  and  the  opportunity  to 
benefit  mankind  unto  the  farthest  ages  by  making 
one  sweeping  gesture  to  eliminate  the  seeds  of 
war  will  not  recur  again,  perhaps,  for  centuries. 
Accordingly,  there  remains  but  one  effective 
weapon  which  the  West  may  employ  to  save  us 


166      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

from  that  '*sea  of  troubles'*  towards  which  our 
statesmen  are  more  or  less  blindly  conducting 
us.  There  must  be  Russia,  with  her  far-flung 
territory  reaching  to  the  Pacific,  who  must  erect 
the  outer  dykes  to  stem  the  devastating  floods 
of  the  Yellow  races  when  they  begin  to  move. 
And  Russia  must  in  turn  be  supported  by  the 
arms  and  industry  of  Germany,  for  Russia's 
most  vulnerable  flank  must  be  secure  in  the  event 
of  such  a  race  struggle.  America  and  England 
must,  of  course,  hold  the  seas  and  keep  open  the 
trade  routes  of  the  world  in  so  far  as  it  is  necessary 
to  secure  the  victory. 

But  the  real  purpose  of  the  coalition  would  be 
to  promote  a  political  and  diplomatic  course  of 
action  which  will  render  a  conflict  unnecessary. 
And  to  do  so  they  must  first  clear  their  own  decks 
for  action  and  put  their  own  homes  in  order. 
That  is  to  say,  that  preliminary  to  any  united 
action  on  the  part  of  the  nations  named  there 
must  first  come  a  thoroughgoing  revision  of  the 
Treaties  of  Versailles  and  St. -Germain  and  a 
satisfactory  solution  of  the  Russian,  Turkish, 
Persian,  Egyptian,  Indian  and  Irish  questions. 

A  combination  of  the  four  Powers  named 
would  be  in  a  position  to  take  in  hand  the  reor- 
ganization of  the  Chinese  Republic  and  to  offer 
successful  opposition  to  the  intrigues  and  aggres- 
sive tactics  of  the  Japanese  in  the  Far  East. 
First  and  foremost,  however,  in  this  new  orienta- 


CHINA  AND  WESTERN  POWERS  167 

tion  of  the  four  Powers  must  be  a  scrupulous 
regard  and  respect  for  the  interests  of  China. 
By  pursuing  such  a  course  they  will,  in  time, 
discover,  not  only  that  it  is  "more  blessed  to  give 
than  to  receive,"  but  also  that  to  him  who  comes 
laden  with  gifts  more  material  rewards  are  ren- 
dered than  to  him  who  comes  armed  with  a  blim- 
derbuss,  prepared  only  to  rob  and  despoil.  To 
effect  any  lasting  and  beneficent  results,  they 
must  come  prepared  to  surrender  their  spheres 
of  influence,  their  Treaty  Ports  and  their  Boxer 
indemnities.  Only  thus  can  the  confidence  and 
trust  of  the  Chinese  nation  in  the  Western  Powers 
be  restored.  Only  thus  may  the  Powers  expect 
to  win  the  sympathy  of  the  Chinese  people  to 
their  aims.  And  as  a  corollary  to  these  steps, 
the  four  Powers  must  see  to  it  that  all  leases  and 
agreements,  in  which,  of  course,  are  included  the 
Chino- Japanese  secret  agreements  of  1915  and 
1 918,  shall  be  abrogated  in  order  that  China  may 
at  last  be  restored  to  full  sovereignty  in  Man- 
churia, Mongolia  and  Shantung.  Other  reforms 
will  include  the  abolition  of  extra-territoriality, 
which  deprives  the  Chinese  courts  of  legal  juris- 
diction over  the  foreigner,  and  the  right  of  China 
to  fix  her  own  tariff  dues.  Financially,  the 
Republic  must  be  assisted  to  her  feet  by  taking 
in  hand  a  reorganization  of  the  finances  of  the 
realm  and  by  making  loans  at  a  reasonable  rate 
of  interest  and  upon  reasonable  conditions,  the 


168      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

same  to  be  devoted  to  the  restoration  and  revival 
of  China's  industrial  and  economic  processes. 
As  much  technical  and  expert  assistance  as  is 
required  for  the  attainment  of  these  ends  must 
be  generously  offered,  without,  however,  in  any 
manner  depriving  the  Chinese  themselves  of  the 
actual  control.  Similarly,  the  imification  and 
extension  of  China's  transport  and  commimica- 
tion  system  must  be  taken  in  hand  in  order  that 
all  parts  of  the  commonwealth  may  be  boimd 
together  in  one  central  organization  whose  admin- 
istrative and  executive  acts  shall  reach  to  and 
be  respected  in  the  remotest  regions  of  the  State. 

Among  Chinese  statesmen  of  pre-eminence  who 
have  given  much  thought  to  the  subject  imder 
discussion  is  Liang  Chi-Chao,  whose  conclusions 
with  respect  to  what  is  needful  for  the  reform  of 
China  must  be  followed  by  every  enlightened  and 
impartial  critic  Indeed,  no  student  of  Chinese 
affairs  can  afford  to  disregard  the  thoughts  of  this 
wise  and  patriotic  Chinese  author  and  statesman, 
who  has  devoted  his  life  to  the  cause  of  progress 
in  his  native  land. 

Liang  Chi-Chao's  participation  in  Chinese  af- 
fairs goes  back  to  the  year  1898,  at  which  time 
began  the  first  real  assertion  of  progressive  in- 
fluence in  modem  China.  The  late  Emperor, 
Kuang-Hsu,  had  summoned  arotmd  him  men 
who  held  advanced  views,  chief  among  whom 
was  Kang-Yu-wei,  the  **modem  sage,"  as  he  was 


CHINA  AND  WESTERN  POWERS  169 

known  to  his  countrymen.  At  the  instigation 
of  this  truly  remarkable  man  the  young  Emperor 
issued  a  series  of  enlightened  edicts  which,  could 
they  have  been  carried  into  execution,  would 
have  revolutionized  the  national  polity.  A  Court 
cleavage  was  the  immediate  sequel.  Then  fol- 
lowed the  memorable  coup  d'etat  which  gave  the 
Dowager-Empress  supreme  power  and  reduced 
her  well-meaning  nephew,  the  Emperor,  to  the 
position  of  a  puppet.  Among  the  prominent 
leaders  in  the  new  movement  was  Liang  Chi- 
Chao.  Some  of  his  associates  were  put  to  death 
for  their  part  in  the  movement,  and  Liang  escaped 
a  similar  fate  by  taking  flight  to  Japan. 

Liang  Chi-Chao  now  devoted  himself  in  other 
ways  to  the  uplift  of  his  country.  In  the  religious 
thought  of  his  countrymen  he  saw  much  that 
required  purification,  and  accordingly  we  find 
him  directing  his  efforts  to  bring  Chinese  Bud- 
dhism back  to  the  older,  purer  form  of  worship 
and  thought  and  freed  from  superstitious  and 
unscientific  accessories  which  had  clung  about 
the  faith  in  the  long  centuries  of  its  observance. 
Moreover,  by  rendering  Western  works  in  science 
and  literature  accessible  to  the  Chinese,  Liang 
Chi-Chao  and  some  of  his  co-workers  have  done 
glreat  service.  By  dint  of  hard  labour,  Liang 
became  in  time  the  most  important  literary 
exponent  of  Chinese  nationaUsm.  In  his  his- 
torical work,  he  caused  Chinese  history  to  be 


170      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

studied  in  the  schools  in  a  critical  and  scientific 
manner. 

More  recently,  Liang  Chi-Chao  has  devoted  his 
extraordinary  talents  to  political  writing;  pri- 
marily, preaching  the  doctrines  of  constitutional 
government  and  representative  institutions,  but 
in  general  seeking  to  introduce  the  pubHc  mind 
to  the  thought  of  the  world. 

Such,  in  brief,  is  the  man  whose  political  views 
and  insight  have  attained  to  such  influence  on 
the  Chinese  nation  and  according  to  whom  China's 
misfortunes  are  to  be  attributed  to  the  policy  of 
intervention  employed  by  the  foreign  Powers  ever 
since  the  occupation  of  Hong  Kong  by  the  English 
in  1842,  followed  by  the  French  in  Annam  and 
Tongking  in  1885,  by  the  Germans  in  Tsingtao 
and  the  Russians  in  the  Liao-tung  Peninsula  in 
1898,  and  by  the  Japanese  in  South  Manchuria  in 
1905.  Each  one  of  these  interventions  became 
the  provocation  for  still  others,  and  the  list  we 
have  given  is  far  from  complete.  Accordingly, 
with  such  conflicting  elements  grazing  one  an- 
other in  China  in  every  direction,  it  cannot  be 
wondered  at  that  in  course  of  time  there  have 
evolved  innumerable  causes  of  strife,  discord  and 
dissension  among  the  Powers  concerned;  and  one 
has  only  to  read  an  impartial  account  of  what 
occurred  among  the  European  Powers  represented 
at  Peking  during  the  Boxer  Rebellion  in  1900  and 
the  siege  of  the  Legations  to  perceive  that  the 


CHINA  AND  WESTERN  POWERS  171 

feelings  and  antagonisms  then  aroused  already 
carried  the  seeds  of  a  general  world  conflict, 
which,  in  reality,  broke  loose  only  fourteen  years 
later.  These  seeds  of  conflict  will  continue  to 
exist,  so  Liang  Chi-Chao  believes,  just  so  long  as 
the  Powers  continue  their  present  policy  of  in- 
terference and  intervention. 

The  cure  lies,  says  Liang,  in  the  complete  restora^ 
tion  to  China  of  all  the  territory  of  which  she  has 
been  despoiled  since  first  she  had  to  do  with  the 
foreigner  from  the  West  in  the  early  years  of  the 
Victorian  era.  At  the  very  least,  China  should 
be  restored  to  the  status  quo  existing  prior  to  the 
date  of  the  Chino-Germanic  lease  agreement  of 
March  6,  1898.  *'Then,''  says  Liang,  ''China  will 
gladly  place  all  her  treasures  at  the  disposal  of  all 
the  world,  will  abandon  her  obstructive  tactics, 
and  rescind  the  laws  which  now  embarrass  the 
trade  of  foreigners  in  the  interior.  If,  however, 
these  reforms  are  not  carried  out,  then  will 
China  constitute  a  menace  to  the  peace  of  the 
world."  ^^ 

Nor  is  the  programme  of  reforms  which  are  to 
put  China  in  a  position  to  devote  herself  to  her 
nobler  tasks  in  the  world  to  be  regarded  as  com- 
pleted with  the  restoration  of  the  leased  terri- 
tories. In  addition  thereto,  Liang  demands  the 
complete  liberation  of  China  from  foreign  in- 
fluences, the  annulment  of  existing  treaties,  a  re- 
form of  the  tariff,  cancellation  of  the  Boxer  in- 


172      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

demnities,  abolition  of  the  extra-territorial  rights 
and  other  speciar  privileges  enjoyed  by  foreigners, 
rescission  of  the  191 5  and  1918  Agreements  with 
Japan,  and  a  reorganization  of  the  Chinese 
railways. 

It  is  of  importance  that  foreign  interests  should 
reach  a  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  programme 
of  reforms  thus  promulgated  and  championed  by 
Liang  Chi-Chao  is  one  that  has  the  support  and 
approval  not  only  of  the  most  authoritative  ele- 
ments in  China's  public  life,  but  likewise  of  the 
J  masses  of  the  people.  Nor  should  the  fact  be  lost 
'  sight  of  that,  with  all  his  patriotism,  Liang  would 
probably  be  among  the  first  to  advocate  a  union 
with  Japan,  or  at  least  the  acceptance  of  Japanese 
leadership  and  a  tentative  agreement  submitting 
to  Japanese  administrative  control  for  a  term  of 
years,  provided  the  Western  Powers  fail  to  accord 
China  a  timely  concurrence  in  her  just  demands. 
In  the  latter  possible  event,  assuming  that  the 
nation  follows  Liang's  lead,  all  the  elements  for  a 
future  race  conflict  will  have  been  gathered  to- 
gether, and  the  consequences  thereof  will  not  take 
long  in  making  themselves  felt  upon  the  Western 
nations. 

There  are  those  who  profess  to  believe  that  the 
raising  of  the  cry  **Save  China!'*  is  merely  a  new 
form  of  camouflaged  Western  hypocrisy,  seeking  to 
advance  selfish  interests  under  the  guise  of  a  new 
crusade  for  right  and  justice. 


CHINA  AND  WESTERN  POWERS  173 

This  would  be  true  if  the  Western  nations  now 
intervene  in  the  affairs  of  China  without  first 
offering  to  make  the  sacrifices  which  are  absolutely 
essential  if  the  situation  is  to  be  saved.  The 
writer  would  not  favour,  much  less  advocate,  the 
exclusion  of  Japan  from  participation  in  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  China,  if  he  did  not  at  the  same 
time  advocate  exclusion  of  the  other  Powers  as 
well.  There  is  no  question  here  of  ill-will  towards 
Japan  and  of  complacent  advocacy  of  the  so-called 
''superior  rights''  of  the  Western  nations.  On 
the  contrary,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
Western  nations  have  no  superior  rights  here. 
But  it  has  been  the  writer's  purpose  to  show  in  the 
preceding  pages  that  Japan,  likewise,  has  no 
superior  rights,  and  that  all  the  advantages  she 
requires  in  order  to  promote  the  happiness  and 
prosperity  of  the  Japanese  may  be  obtained 
without  extending  Japanese  sovereignty  over  vast 
regions  on  the  Asiatic  Continent  at  the  expense 
of  the  Chinese  and  other  neighbouring  peoples. 
It  has  been  shown  that  Japan  can  make  no  use 
of  these  outlying  regions  for  colonization  purposes, 
because  the  Japanese,  like  the  French,  may  own 
colonies  but  they  are  not  a  colonizing  race.  Nor 
is  the  plea  of  over-population  a  good  one  when 
we  compare  the  population  and  area  of  the 
Japanese  Empire  with  the  population  and  area 
of  such  densely  populated  countries  as  the  United 
Kingdom,  Germany,  Italy  and  France.    Japan's 


174      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

need  for  raw  materials,  particulariy  coal  and  iron, 
can  be  supplied  in  China  without  going  to  the 
length  of  depriving  the  Chinese  of  territory  and 
independence.  Moreover,  if  Japan's  reasons  for 
seeking  further  expansion  on  the  Asiatic  Continent 
are  sound,  then  no  country  in  the  world  can  be 
considered  safe  from  the  rapacity  of  its  neigh- 
bours and  the  whole  world  must  remain  an  armed 
camp.  To  save  the  peoples  from  such  a  fate  will 
be  the  highest  task  of  our  statesmen  in  the  coming 
years,  and  they  will  have  only  half  accomplished 
their  labours  if  they  save  Europe  and  neglect 
Asia.  For  we  are  in  accord  with  those  **  people 
in  East  and  West,  in  the  Old  World  and  the  New, 
who  are  convinced  that  the  only  hope  of  better 
things  is  in  a  constant  striving  to  bring  better 
understanding  between  the  races;  and  that  the 
West  cannot  be  free  unless  the  East  is  made  free 
too." 


CHAPTER  EIGHTEEN 

AMERICA   FACES   THE   NEW   WORLD   SITUATION 

The  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  in  19 14  saw  no 
country  in  the  world,  not  even  China,  so  unpre- 
pared to  face  its  consequences  as  was  the  United 
States.  Ever  since  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  in 
1865,  the  subject  of  war  was  one  which  had  grown 
to  have  but  the  merest  academic  interest  for 
Americans,  and  with  the  exception  of  the  Spanish- 
American  War  of  1898,  a  war  of  such  small  dimen- 
sions as  scarcely  to  deserve  the  name  of  a  national 
conflict,  nothing  had  occurred  in  half  a  century  to 
arouse  America  to  any  real  sense  of  danger  of 
attack  from  without,  or  to  diminish  in  any  sensible 
degree  the  sense  of  security  which  came  from  her 
geographical  position  of  isolation.  And  even  after 
the  hurricane  broke  loose  in  the  summer  of  1914, 
the  great  mass  of  Americans  continued  to  believe, 
for  at  least  two  years  longer,  in  the  possibility  of 
being  able  to  pursue  their  peaceful  pursuits  with- 
out having  to  take  much  thought  for  what  was 
going  on  beyond  their  boundaries. 
Many  causes  contributed  to  this  detached  way 

175 


176      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

of  looking  at  foreign  affairs,  aside  from  the  im- 
portant fact  of  geographical  isolation.  Tradi- 
tionally, Americans  had  been  warned  to  hold 
themselves  aloof  from  European  entangling  alli- 
ances and  from  foreign  disputes  generally.  Mili- 
tarism was  a  thing  imknown  on  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  Americans,  whatever  their  native 
combative  instincts  or  fighting  spirit  might  be, 
had  seen  their  country  grow  to  become  the  richest 
and  most  prosperous  among  the  nations  by  the 
arts  of  peace.  Providence  had  blessed  the  United 
States  with  abundance.  Among  the  nations  of  the 
world  she  was  the  largest  producer  of  com,  wheat, 
cotton,  tobacco,  pigs,  mules,  fish,  fruit,  coal,  iron, 
copper,  zinc,  lead,  petroleimi,  natural  gas,  timber 
and  many  other  products.  She  was  second  to 
none  in  her  wonderful  system  of  free  education, 
and  her  success  had  been  due  not  alone  to  the 
possession  of  vast  natural  resources,  but  to  the 
unexampled  energy  and  foresight  of  her  leaders 
and  to  the  inborn  gifts,  the  acquired  abiUties 
and  character  of  the  people.  Psychologically 
a  people  possessed  of  a  strange  mixture  of  com- 
mercialism and  ideaUsm,  Americans,  within  their 
limited  horizon,  became  a  nation,  for  a  large  part 
devoted  to  a  humanitarian  pacifism.  They  did 
not  covet  their  neighbour's  goods,  and  their 
idealism  prevented  them  from  believing  that  any 
neighbour  could  ever  harbour  contrary  sentiments 
towards  themselves. 


AMERICA  FACES  THE  SITUATION  177 

But  whatever  the  causes  may  be,  it  is  certain 
that  here  was  one  of  the  cleverest  and  most  intel- 
ligent nations  of  the  world,  who  regarded  foreign 
affairs  in  a  manner  quite  as  detached  and  quite  as 
academical  as  did  the  Chinese  up  to  the  year  1 900, 
when  at  last,  after  suffering  many  humiliations 
at  his  hands,  the  nation  was  roused  to  offer  re- 
sistance to  the  foreigner,  and  to  make  an  attempt, 
however  futile,  to  free  the  country  from  the  yoke 
of  foreign  interference. 

When  the  storm  broke,  and  for  more  than  two 
years  thereafter,  the  attitude  of  the  United 
States,  in  its  physical  weakness,  its  unprepared- 
ness,  its  indecision,  its  flabby  foreign  policy,  was 
indeed  a  humiliating  spectacle.  In  the  Pacific 
the  American  merchant  marine  had  been  swept 
from  the  board  by  Congressional  legislation  which 
created  a  set  of  conditions  making  it  impossible  to 
compete  with  foreign  lines.  Honolulu,  the  Philip- 
pines and  Guam  were  in  a  state  of  half -defence, 
the  Navy  concentrated  in  the  Atlantic  and  pre- 
vented from  sending  quick  relief  to  Pacific  stations 
by  reason  of  the  filling  up  of  the  Panama  Canal 
at  Culebra;  no  ships  were  available  for  munitions 
to  the  outlying  possessions;  the  Government  itself 
had  been  struck  by  panic,  in  which  the  State 
Department  lost  its  chief,  William  J.  Bryan,  and 
its  ablest  adviser,  Professor  John  Bassett  Moore; 
the  War  Department  suffering  similarly  in  the 
resignation   of    Secretary    Garrison,    by   general 


178       THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

acknowledgment  the  ablest  man  in  the  Wilson 
Cabinet;  and  the  Navy  likewise  having  to  endure 
the  serious  loss  of  one  of  its  ablest  Admirals, 
Fiske,  who  resigned  because  of  differences  with 
his  superiors.  Not  content  with  providing  the 
world  this  picture  of  absolute  consternation, 
Congress  now  proceeded  to  heap  fuel  upon  the 
flames  by  taking  up  for  consideration  an  Act  for 
abandoning  the  Philippines,  and  the  Bill  actually 
passed  one  Chamber  of  the  Legislature. 

Thus  America  was  playing  a  sorry  part  during 
a  period  when  she  saw  her  neighbour  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  Pacific  developing  and  ex- 
hibiting all  the  traits  of  strength,  preparedness 
and  efficiency  in  which  she  herself  was  so  sadly 
lacking.  She  saw  Japan  setting  forces  in  motion 
that  would  include  the  fate  of  the  Asiatic  Con- 
tinent in  the  course  and  outcome  of  the  conflict 
and  which  would  involve  American  position  and 
prestige  in  the  Orient.  America  beheld  with 
amazement  the  promptness  with  which,  a  few 
days  after  hostilities  commenced,  Baron  Kato, 
Japanese  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  annoimced 
in  the  Diet  that  Japan  was  prepared  to  assume  her 
obligations  under  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance. 
With  still  more  amazement,  America  perceived 
Japan  blocking  China's  proposal  to  neutralize  all 
territory  leased  to  foreign  nations,  a  solution 
which  would  have  obviated  Japan's  declaration 
of  war  on  Germany  to  obtain  possession  of  Kiao- 


AMERICA  FACES  THE  SITUATION   179 

chow,  and  delivering  an  ultimatum  to  Germany 
on  August  isth,  followed  by  a  declaration  of  war 
on  August  24th.  Nor  was  America's  astonish- 
ment in  any  wise  decreased  by  the  subsequent 
steps  taken  by  the  Government  at  Tokio.  The 
efficient  naval  and  military  demonstrations  at 
Kiao-chow  were  followed  by  administrative  steps 
taken  in  the  interior  of  Shantung,  the  seiz- 
ing of  the  Tsingtao-Tsinan  Railroad,  the  taking 
over  of  the  customs,  by  numerous  acts  regulating 
the  internal  affairs  of  the  province,  and  all  of 
this  culminated  finally  in  the  presentation  of  the 
twenty-one  demands  on  China  in  January  1915. 

These  occurrences,  involving  as  they  did  the 
undermining  of  solemnly  contracted  treaties  and 
the  repudiation  of  Japan's  promises,  were  slowly 
turning  the  light  on  Japan's  real  attitude  towards 
America.  They  showed  a  realization  on  Japan's 
part  of  America's  weakness  and  a  purpose  to 
profit  by  it.  Nor  did  the  Tokio  Government 
confine  itself  to  veiled  threats. 

Soon  after  the  war  began,  Japan  sent  a  strong 
fleet  to  cruise  in  the  Pacific,  although  she  had 
stated  that  her  naval  operations  would  be  con- 
fined to  Chinese  waters.  Not  only  was  the 
Japanese  fleet  found  to  be  cruising  in  American 
waters,  but  it  is  believed  that  attempts  were 
made  to  obtain  a  coaling  station  in  Mexican  ter- 
ritory on  the  coast  of  Lower  California.  The 
Japanese  battleship  Asama  went  aground  there 


180      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

in  December  1914,  in  Turtle  Bay,  and  it  did  not 
add  to  the  sense  of  security,  of  which  the  American 
people  now  began  to  feel  the  lack,  when  they 
were  informed  that  it  was  three  months  before 
the  United  States  learned  definitely  of  the  situa- 
tion of  the  Asama  so  near  to  her  own  coasts. 
By  that  time  other  Japanese  war-vessels  had 
assembled,  ostensibly  to  assist  the  Asama  from 
her  perilous  position.  Thus  the  situation  re- 
mained until  June  1915,  with  the  American 
battle  fleet  concentrated  in  the  Atlantic  and 
unable  to  use  the  Panama  Canal  for  a  swift  move- 
ment into  the  Pacific,  and  in  the  meantime  the 
twenty-one  demands  had  been  imposed  upon 
China  against  the  paper  protest  of  the  United 
States.  If  it  was  pure  madness,  as  some  have 
asserted,  for  Japan  to  make  these  bellicose  ges- 
tures in  the  face  of  Uncle  Sam  at  just  this  par- 
ticular time,  there  surely  was  method  in  it. 

Thus  America  saw  the  new  Asia  growing  up 
before  her  eyes — a  new  Asia  in  which  the  system 
of  checks  and  balances,  which  had  formerly 
existed  to  keep  the  most  predatory  Powers  in 
check,  had  now  been  superseded  by  the  omnip- 
otent power  of  Japan.  If  there  was  any  doubt 
with  respect  to  Russia's  future  position  there, 
it  was  soon  removed  with  the  outbreak  of  the 
Revolution  in  March  191 7.  This  was  the  finish- 
ing touch  that  put  America  in  a  position  where  she 
would  have  to  face  an  entirely  new  set  of  world 


AMERICA  FACES  THE  SITUATION  181 

forces  in  the  future,  both  in  the  Atlantic  and 
in  the  Pacific.  For  there  surely  could  have  been 
no  illusions  with  respect  to  America's  future 
position  in  the  Atlantic  after  the  old  European 
balance  of  power  had  been  destroyed  by  victory 
over  Germany.  Such  a  victory  meant  that 
Britain's  naval  power  was  set  free  to  pursue  the 
aims  of  the  British  Government  in  any  part  of 
the  world  without  having  to  fear  an  attack  upon 
her  flank  on  the  part  of  a  powerful  continental 
nation.  It  meant  that  if  complications  ensued 
between  the  United  States  and  Japan,  Britain 
would  be  in  a  position  to  take  sides  against 
America.  It  meant  that  America  would  have 
to  vie  with  Britain  in  naval  strength,  because 
otherwise  the  principle  for  which  America  pri- 
marily stands  in  her  foreign  diplomacy,  of  peace- 
ful penetration  of  foreign  markets,  with  equal 
opportunities  for  all,  could  not  be  upheld 
against  a  nation  that  held  command  of  the  seas. 
Involved  in  this  principle  were  America's  most 
cherished  Monroe  Doctrine  and  her  Hay  Doc- 
trine. These  tenets  of  American  foreign  policy 
had  not  hitherto  lain  at  the  mercy  of  Britain, 
because  Britain  had  been  forced  to  have  regard 
for  her  continental  enemies.  Now  she  was  not 
only  America's  leading  trade  competitor,  but  like- 
wise the  dominating  factor  upon  the  seas,  and  as 
such  she  could  open  and  close  the  doors  of  trade 
to  her  leading  trade  rival  entirely  at  her  own 


182      THE  NEW  JAPANESE  PERIL 

sweet  will.  The  numerous  notes  of  protest 
which  the  American  State  Department  presented 
to  the  British  Foreign  Office  during  the  war 
demonstrated  effectually  that  in  time  of  war  the 
rules  of  international  law  are  treated  with  as 
scanty  respect  by  the  British  as  the  Germans 
showed  for  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  It  is  the 
unmolested  right  of  a  neutral  to  trade,  within  cer- 
tain recognized  limits,  whether  with  belligerents 
or  with  other  neutrals,  that  has  constituted  a 
ground  of  policy  of  American  statesmanship  that 
dates  back  to  the  Napoleonic  wars.  Thence 
arises  America's  championing  of  the  principle 
known  as  ''the  freedom  of  the  seas.'*  And  with 
the  development  of  the  new  methods  of  warfare 
at  sea,  whereby  merchantmen  may  now  be 
attacked  not  only  on  the  surface,  but  likewise 
from  the  air  and  from  beneath  the  waters,  the 
doctrine  of  *'the  freedom  of  the  seas'*  is  an  even 
greater  necessity  than  it  has  been  in  the  past, 
when  trading  merchantmen  could  protect  them- 
selves more  or  less  successfully  from  raiders  and 
privateers.  Thus  the  United  States,  if  she  cannot 
by  reason  of  newly  acquired  naval  strength  com- 
pel the  recognition  and  acceptance  of  the  * 'free- 
dom of  the  seas"  principle,  will  see  her  entire 
foreign  trade  jeopardized  in  any  war  of  broad 
dimensions  between  naval  Powers.  It  is  a  prin- 
ciple that  every  maritime  nation  in  the  world, 
except  one,  has  had  an  interest  in  supporting. 


IX 


AMERICA  FACES  THE  SITUATION   183 

This  fact  alone  is  indicative  of  how  disadvan- 
tageous it  is  to  the  world  at  large  for  one  Power 
to  have  such  predominance  upon  the  seas  that 
the  combined  interests  of  all  the  rest  of  the  world 
cannot  force  her  to  recede  from  her  position. 

To  summarize  the  situation,  America  now  per- 
ceives herself  on  one  front  opposite  to  Japan,  j  V" 
which  is  now  predominant  in  Asia,  and  on  the 
other  front  she  stands  face  to  face  with  Britain, 
which  is  now  predominant  in  Europe.  And 
these  two  nations,  Britain  and  Japan,  are  known 
to  have  common  designs,  partly  set  forth  in  a 
Treaty  of  Alliance  and  partly  secret,  as  numerous 
disclosures  since  August  1914  have  made  clear  to 
the  world. 

Indeed,  the  peace  of  the  world  will  continue  to 
be  threatened  so  long  as  any  Power  or  combina- 
tion of  Powers,  be  it  Britain  alone,  Britain  and 
France,  Britain  and  Japan,  or  Britain,  France 
and  Japan,  may  impose  their  will  on  the  commerce 
and  industry  of  other  nations  or  by  unfair  regula- 
tions make  an  attempt  to  seize  their  markets. 
Every  nation  whose  industrial  development  results 
in  pressure  outward  into  foreign  commerce  must 
be  rendered  secure  against  hostile  measures  of 
any  Power  or  Powers  whose  right  to  enforce  such 
measures  rests  purely  upon  superior  force  or  upon 
a  superior  balance  of  forces.  The  danger  from 
great  militaristic  adventures  upon  the  land,  such 
as  we  saw  in  the  recent  war,  has  been  broken  for 


184      THE  NEW|  JAPANESE  PERIL 

the  time  being,  and  it  will  continue  to  remain 
broken  only  in  the  event  that  the  equally  hateful 
danger  of  navalism  upon  the  high  seas  shall  be 
extinguished. 

A  close  analysis  of  the  causes  of  the  recent  war 
must  lead  inevitably  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
fear  of  militarism  which  existed  on  the  one  side 
was  matched  by  the  fear  of  navalism  on  the  other 
side.  Fear  of  militarism  meant  fear  of  the 
pronouncedly  superior  advantages  in  industrial 
competition  possessed  by  a  nation  which,  like 
Germany,  could  gain  control  of  the  bulk  of 
Europe's  coal  and  iron.  Fear  of  navalism,  on 
the  other  hand,  meant  fear  of  the  blockade,  fear 
of  starvation,  fear  of  exclusion  from  the  sources 
of  the  world's  food  supplies,  fear  of  insecurity 
to  trade,  so  long  as  one  great  naval  Power  could 
set  at  defiance  the  universal  demand  for  accept- 
ance of  the  principle  of  *'the  freedom  of  the  seas." 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

RENEWALS  ONLY-— TEL.  NO.  642-3405 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


nFO  ?^  3  1969  33. 

REC*D  LD  f 

IK  iO '69 -9PM 

C?9oitloT47V'i.32                        U-^SS"'"^'"" 

